List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava of the Allahabad High Court in Tarkeshwar Pandey v. Deenanath Yadav and Others (2025) dismissed a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), holding that such appeals are maintainable only against decrees passed in appeal, not against orders passed in miscellaneous appeals under Section 104(1). 

What was the Background of Tarkeshwar Pandey v. Deenanath Yadav and Others (2025) Case? 

• The appellant (plaintiff) had filed an application seeking injunction in the trial court, which was rejected on July 25, 2023. 
• Against this rejection, the appellant filed a Civil Appeal under Section 104(1) read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) before the District Judge, Ballia. 
• The District Judge dismissed the civil appeal on March 20, 2025, confirming the trial court's order rejecting the injunction application. 
• The appellant then filed a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC before the Allahabad High Court against the order passed by the District Judge. 
• The Stamp Reporter submitted a report stating that the appeal appeared non-maintainable as it was filed against an order passed in a miscellaneous appeal. 
• The appellant's counsel argued that since the impugned order was passed by a court exercising appellate jurisdiction, a second appeal under Section 100 CPC would be maintainable. 
• The respondent's counsel controverted this submission, contending that Section 100 CPC applies only to decrees passed in appeal, not to orders passed in miscellaneous appeals.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court emphasized that a 'decree' and an 'order' are distinct concepts under the CPC. A decree (Section 2(2)) conclusively determines the rights of parties in a suit, while an order (Section 2(14)) is any decision that is not a decree. 
• The Court held that Section 100 CPC explicitly provides that second appeals lie only from decrees passed in appeal, not from orders. The language is clear and unambiguous. 
• Order XLIII Rule 1 specifies appealable orders under Section 104(1). However, Section 104(2) creates an absolute bar, stating: "No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section." This means there is no second miscellaneous appeal and no second appeal under Section 100 against orders passed in miscellaneous appeals. 
• Since the impugned order was passed in a miscellaneous appeal under Section 104(1) read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r), it is not a decree. Therefore, the second appeal was not maintainable. 
• The appellant's counsel sought permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to avail appropriate legal remedy. The Court dismissed the appeal accordingly.

What is Section 100 of CPC? 

Statutory Provisions: 

• Section 100 CPC provides for second appeal to the High Court from an appellate decree passed by subordinate courts. 
• Appeal lies only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. 
• The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved. 
• When satisfied, the High Court shall formulate the substantial question of law. 
• The appeal is heard on the formulated question, though the court retains power to hear on other substantial questions of law if necessary. 

Nature and Scope of Jurisdiction: 

• No vested right of appeal exists unless the statute provides for it. 
• The first appellate court is declared as the final court on facts. 
• High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or facts unless a substantial question of law is involved. 
• High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact, however gross the error may appear. 
• High Court is not a second court of first appeal. 

Historical Context: 

• Section 100 was amended in 1976, imposing drastic restrictions on High Court's jurisdiction. 
• Even before 1976, the Privy Council treated the first appellate court as final on facts. 
• The amendment aimed to prevent High Courts from disposing of second appeals without substantial questions of law. 

Mandatory Requirements: 

• Appellant must formulate the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal (Sub-section 3). 
• High Court must expressly and specifically formulate the substantial question of law (Sub-section 4). 
• The appeal must be heard only on the formulated question (Sub-section 5). 
• Exercise of appellate jurisdiction without fulfilling statutory mandate renders the judgment a nullity. 

Prohibited Grounds for Interference: 

• High Court cannot set aside findings of fact and reappraise evidence. 
• Cannot interfere merely because findings are against the weight of evidence. 
• Cannot interfere only because the first appellate court did not address the trial court's reasoning in detail. 
• Cannot entertain second appeal on grounds of erroneous findings of fact. 

Consequences of Non-Compliance: 

• Second appeal allowed without framing substantial question of law is liable to be set aside. 
• No remand to High Court as appellant cannot benefit from their own wrong of not fulfilling mandatory requirements. 
• Judgment rendered without following proper procedure cannot be sustained. 

Exceptions and Flexibility: 

• Appeal may lie from appellate decrees passed ex parte (Sub-section 2). 
• High Court can hear appeal on other substantial questions of law not originally formulated, with recorded reasons (Proviso to Sub-section 5). 
• Formulation of substantial question may be inferred from questions actually considered and decided, though this view has been criticized. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B Varale dismissed a plea seeking a government job in exchange for land acquired in 1998, ruling that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides only for monetary compensation—not employment—in such cases. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sanjeev Kumar v State of Haryana and others (2025). 

What was the Background of Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Haryana and others (2025) Case? 

• The petitioner's family-owned agricultural land was acquired by the State Government in the year 1998 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
• At the time of land acquisition in 1998, the petitioner was not even born and therefore had no direct involvement in the acquisition of proceedings. 
• Pursuant to the acquisition, the appropriate compensation was determined by the competent authority and was duly paid to the family members of the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
• The family accepted the compensation amount as awarded under the statutory framework of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
• Nearly three decades after the acquisition, in the year 2025, the petitioner made an application to the State Government seeking appointment to government service on compassionate grounds. 
• The petitioner's claim for employment was premised on the ground that the same should be provided in lieu of the land which had been acquired from his family in 1998. 
• The petitioner contended that employment in government service was a consequential right flowing from the land acquisition and should be granted to compensate for the loss suffered by the family. 
• The concerned authorities rejected the petitioner's application for appointment, holding that there was no statutory provision or entitlement for grant of employment in lieu of acquired land. 
• Aggrieved by the rejection, the petitioner approached the High Court by way of a writ petition seeking direction to the authorities to provide him employment. 
• The High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the decision of the authorities and finding no merit in the petitioner's claim for employment. 
• Being dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 
• The petitioner submitted that even if there existed an administrative policy providing employment to families affected by land acquisition, he should be entitled to the benefit of such policy. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, upon acquisition of land, the affected person or his family is entitled only to monetary compensation as prescribed under the statutory scheme. 
• The Court noted that there is no provision whatsoever in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for grant of employment or job in lieu of the acquired land. 
• The Bench observed that the statutory scheme of the Act envisages payment of adequate compensation as the complete and exhaustive remedy for deprivation of property rights through acquisition. 
• The Court held that once lawful compensation has been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the State's obligation under the statute stands fully discharged and satisfied. 
• The Supreme Court observed that even if there existed any administrative policy decision at any point in time providing for grant of employment to persons affected by land acquisition, such policy cannot prevail over or override the express statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 
• The Court noted that administrative policies or executive decisions cannot confer rights which are not contemplated or provided for under the parent statute. 
• The Bench observed that the petitioner's claim for employment was filed after a substantial delay of more than 18 years from the date of framing of any such policy, rendering the claim stale and time barred. 
• The Court observed that the petitioner, who was not even born at the time of acquisition, had no vested right to seek employment on the basis of a transaction to which he was not a party. 
• The Supreme Court found no error, illegality, or perversity in the orders passed by the concerned authorities or in the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's claim. 
• The Court held that the authorities and the High Court had rightly rejected the claim for employment, as the same was neither sustainable in law nor supported by any statutory provision. 
• The Bench concluded that the family having already received and accepted the statutory compensation, no further relief or benefit could be claimed after nearly three decades of the acquisition. 
• The Supreme Court observed that entertaining such belated claims would set a dangerous precedent and would be contrary to the settled principles of land acquisition law and the doctrine of finality in legal proceedings. 

What Legal Provisions Were Referred? 

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: 

• The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the primary statutory framework governing acquisition of private land by the State for public purposes and provides for determination and payment of compensation to affected landowners. 
• Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, upon acquisition of land, the affected person or his family is entitled only to monetary compensation as prescribed under the statutory scheme. 
• The Act envisages payment of adequate compensation as the complete and exhaustive remedy for deprivation of property rights through acquisition. 
• There is no provision whatsoever in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for grant of employment or job in lieu of acquired land. 
• Once lawful compensation has been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the State's obligation under the statute stands fully discharged and satisfied. 
• Administrative policies or executive decisions cannot confer rights which are not contemplated or provided for under the parent statute, and such policies cannot prevail over or override the express statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 

Article 136 of the Constitution of India: 

• Article 136 of the Constitution of India confers special jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, sentence, or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. 
• The petitioner invoked Article 136 by filing a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's judgement dismissing his writ petition seeking employment in lieu of acquired land. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale has held that reiterated that all courts must strictly follow binding precedents, emphasizing that judicial discipline—not discretion—sustains the credibility of the judiciary under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra (2025). 

What was the Background of Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra (2025) Case? 

• These appeals concerned 96 landowners in Maharashtra who challenged revenue mutations describing their lands as "private forests" vested in the State Government. 
• The State claimed that notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 were issued and published in the Official Gazette during the early 1960s, calling upon forest owners to show cause why regulatory measures should not be imposed. 
• The landowners contended that these notices were never personally served as required under Section 35(5) of the IFA, no inquiry was conducted, no final notification under Section 35(1) was issued, and the proceedings remained dormant for decades. 
• The Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 came into force on 30th August 1975, providing that all private forests would vest in the State, with "private forest" defined to include lands in respect of which a notice had been issued under Section 35(3) of the IFA. 
• Despite the alleged vesting in 1975, the State never took physical possession under Section 5 of the MPFA, paid no compensation, and the lands continued to be treated as private holdings with transfers being effected and permissions granted for decades. 
• From 2001 onwards, State authorities began making administrative entries in village revenue records reflecting forest proceedings and State ownership, which the landowners alleged were made without notice and in violation of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. 
• The landowners filed writ petitions seeking correction of records, declaratory relief regarding title, and restoration of entries consistent with private ownership, pleading violations of mandatory statutory procedures, natural justice, and reliance on stale notices. 
• The State defended the mutations as ministerial reflections of statutory vesting that occurred automatically on 30.08.1975 based on the Gazette publications, while raising objections regarding delay and availability of departmental remedies.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Supreme Court emphasised that judicial discipline requires obedience to binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, and that courts below must give full and faithful effect to appellate decisions, as resistance or evasion erodes predictability and weakens faith in the rule of law. 
• The Court held that the controlling precedent in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2014) established that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA is insufficient for vesting; the notice must be served on the owner, as "issuance" comprehends due service which alone triggers the right to object and be heard. 
• The Court found that essential statutory links were missing across all 96 appeals: there was no proof of service of Section 35(3) notices, no final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA, no taking of possession under Section 5 of the MPFA, and no compensation exercise—actual possession remained with private owners throughout. 
• The Court rejected the State's reliance on post-hoc materials such as satellite imagery from 2016 and nineteenth-century notifications invoked for the first time on appeal, holding that administrative orders must stand or fall on the reasons originally given and that only the character of land on the appointed day (30.08.1975) is relevant. 
• The Court observed that expropriatory legislation must be construed strictly under Article 300-A of the Constitution, and when a statute prescribes a manner of doing a thing it must be done in that manner or not at all—mutation entries being ministerial cannot perfect an acquisition lacking statutory predicates. 
• The Court rejected the High Court's distinctions based on whether appellants were original or subsequent purchasers or whether construction existed, holding that the binding ratio on service and strict compliance does not turn on such immaterial differences. 
• The Court noted with concern that the impugned judgment was authored by the same Judge whose earlier contrary view had been set aside by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce, observing that the judgment's attempt to minimise binding precedent and distinguish on immaterial facts created an appearance of reluctance to accept precedent and constituted an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare decisis. 
• The Court concluded that fidelity to binding precedent and the statutory scheme admitted no conclusion other than setting aside the High Court's order, as the present appeals were indistinguishable in principle from Godrej & Boyce and the High Court could not avoid the binding ratio consistently with Article 141 of the Constitution. 

How Do Articles 141 and 144 of the Indian Constitution Uphold Judicial Discipline and Hierarchy? 

• Article 141 of the Constitution of India: 
  • Article 141 provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India, thereby adopting the doctrine of stare decisis (to stand by decisions and not disturb what is settled). 
  • Only the ratio decidendi (the reason or rationale for the decision) of a Supreme Court judgement is binding, not the entire judgement, and this principle applies to all subsequent similar cases with identical issues and facts. 
  • Article 141 does not permit exceptions—once a judgement is pronounced, it automatically becomes binding precedent, and the Supreme Court cannot designate what shall not be treated as precedent. 
  • Exceptions to binding precedent include obiter dictum (observations made in passing), per incuriam (decisions ignoring relevant law), sub silentio (principles applied without consideration), and legislative provisions that can abrogate precedents. 
  • In Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagadeesan (2002), the Supreme Court held that it is impermissible for High Courts to overrule Supreme Court decisions, reinforcing that binding precedent must be faithfully followed by all subordinate courts.
• Article 144 of the Constitution of India: 
  • Article 144 provides that all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. 
  • This creates a constitutional obligation upon all civil authorities (executive and administrative bodies) and judicial authorities (subordinate courts and tribunals) to assist, support, and facilitate the Supreme Court in discharging its functions and implementing its orders. 
  • Together, Articles 141 and 144 are structural guarantees that bind the judicial system into a coherent hierarchy, ensuring that obedience to Supreme Court decisions is a constitutional duty and not a matter of personal preference, thereby preserving the unity of law and public confidence in the rule of law.