List of Current Affairs

Source:  Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

A Bench comprising Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti, in N. Manoharan v. The Administrative Officer & Anr. (2026), held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin, operating under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (PG Act). Being Central Government servants governed by the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e) of the PG Act.

What was the Background of the N. Manoharan v. The Administrative Officer & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The appellants were retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin, functioning under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). 
• They challenged the computation of their gratuity under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, contending they were entitled to a higher amount under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and demanded payment of the differential amount. 
• The Controlling Authority and Appellate Authority ruled in favour of the employees, holding that HWP qualified as an "industry" and therefore fell within the ambit of the PG Act. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court upheld this view. 
• However, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court reversed the decision, holding that since the retired employees of HWPs are Central Government employees governed by the CCS Pension Rules, they fall within the exclusion clause of Section 2(e) of the PG Act, and are therefore not "employees" entitled to claim gratuity under the PG Act. 
• This led to the appeal before the Supreme Court. 
• It may be noted that as per Section 2(e) of the PG Act, the definition of employee does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the Division Bench's finding and dismissed the appeal. 
• The judgment authored by Justice Bhatti observed that the exclusionary clause under Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act clearly keeps Central Government employees outside its ambit, thereby making it evident that the appellants were not "employees" entitled to claim gratuity under the PG Act. 
• The Court endorsed the respondent's argument: "The employees cannot claim to have the benefit of CCS Rules, status of a Central Government employee, while for gratuity, the benefits under the PG Act." 
• The appellants had relied on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Dharam Prakash Sharma (1998), where the Court had extended PG Act benefits despite the adoption of CCS Rules. The Bench distinguished that case on facts, noting that MCD employees were not Central Government servants but employees of a statutory corporation. In contrast, HWP staff are directly part of the governmental framework. 
• The Court observed: "On examination of constitution, establishment, and continuation, we notice the character of HWP as an adjunct of the Department of Atomic Energy… Therefore, the employees fall within the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e) of the PG Act." 
• Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 

What is the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972? 

About: 

• The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is a Central legislation that provides for the payment of gratuity to employees engaged in factories, mines, oilfields, plantations, ports, railway companies, shops, or other establishments. 
• Gratuity is a lump sum payment made by an employer to an employee as a token of gratitude for the services rendered over a continuous period. 
• An employee becomes eligible for gratuity upon completion of five or more years of continuous service, and it is payable at the time of resignation, retirement, death, or disablement. 
• The Act aims to provide social security and financial support to employees after long years of service. 

Gratuity as a Ground for Exclusion under Section 2(e): 

• Under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Section 2(e) defines who qualifies as an "employee" for the purpose of claiming gratuity under the Act. 
• The definition specifically excludes any person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity. 
• This provision ensures that Central Government employees who already receive gratuity benefits under their own service rules, such as the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, are not permitted to claim the higher or differential benefits available under the PG Act. 
• The exclusion reflects the legislative intent that the PG Act was designed to cover employees who had no other statutory protection for post-retirement benefits, not those already covered by a comprehensive governmental scheme. 

Source: Gujarat High Court

Why in News?

A Division Bench of Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda and Justice D.M. Vyas in the case of AKULKUMRA DINESHBHAI RANA & ANR. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2026) held that a working mother's arrangement of leaving her minor daughter with her own parents for care and upbringing does not amount to illegal confinement, and that a habeas corpus petition is not maintainable to resolve questions of child custody or welfare in a matrimonial dispute.

What was the Background of Akulkumra Dineshbhai Rana & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The petition arose out of a matrimonial dispute between two government employees — the parents of a minor girl aged four years. 
• Due to successive service transfers, both parents were posted at different places for a period of time before eventually residing together in Kachchh district. 
• After the parties began living separately, the father relocated to another city following a transfer, and approximately a year later, issued a legal notice proposing dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. 
• A criminal complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was subsequently filed by the mother against the father. 
• In August 2023, the mother took the four-year-old child to her parental home, where the child continued to reside with the maternal grandparents. 
• The father alleged that this arrangement was made against his wishes, pointing to the fact that he had arranged the child's schooling and paid school fees shortly before the child was taken away, contending that the decision was taken unilaterally. 
• The mother's case was that, since both parents were employed, it had become practically difficult to care for a young child without family support, and she therefore sought the assistance of her parents in looking after the child. 
• The father filed a habeas corpus petition before the Gujarat High Court, alleging illegal detention of the minor child by the mother and maternal relatives, and seeking the child's production before the Court along with a direction to hand over custody to him.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court at the outset noted that the custody of a four-year-old girl with her mother, in the absence of any pending custody proceedings or existing custody orders, could never be characterised as unlawful custody or illegal confinement. 
• The Bench observed that given the tender age of the child, the primary responsibility of meeting the child's needs would naturally rest on the mother rather than the father. 
• The Court acknowledged the practical difficulties faced by working couples in raising young children, and held that if a working mother decides to seek the help of her parents to ensure the child is brought up in a secure atmosphere, the father cannot be permitted to label such an arrangement as illegal custody or unlawful confinement. 
• The Bench firmly held that a father's disagreement with such an arrangement does not render it unlawful, stating that this arrangement was made by a mother to ensure that her daughter is well taken care of, and this will not entitle the father to file a habeas corpus petition. 
• The Court rejected the father's submission that the child's welfare required immediate transfer of custody, holding that habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy to decide questions of child custody or welfare in a matrimonial dispute. 
• The Bench directed that any claim for interim or permanent custody must be pursued before the competent Family Court by leading appropriate evidence on the issue of the child's welfare. 
• Accordingly, the habeas corpus petition was dismissed. 

What is Habeas Corpus? 

Meaning and Nature: 

• Habeas corpus is a Latin term meaning "you may have the body." 
• It is a legal procedure that acts as a remedial measure for persons who are illegally detained. 
• The basic purpose is to release a person from unlawful detention or imprisonment. 
• It is an order issued by the court to present the detenu before the court and check whether the arrest was lawful or not. 
• The writ determines a person's right to freedom and personal liberty. 

Constitutional Provisions: 

• The Supreme Court under Article 32 and High Courts under Article 226 have power to issue writs. 
• Under Article 32, the Supreme Court issues writs for violation of fundamental rights. 
• Under Article 226, High Courts have wider jurisdiction to issue writs for both violation of legal as well as fundamental rights. 
• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all authorities within and outside the territorial jurisdiction of India. 
• High Courts deal with matters when they have control over that authority, and the cause of action arises within their jurisdiction. 

Who May Apply: 

• The person confined or detained illegally. 
• Any person who is aware of the benefit of the case. 
• Any person familiar with the facts and circumstances of the case who willingly files an application under Article 32 or 226. 
• As held in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1983), if a detained person cannot file an application, some other person can file it on his behalf. 

When the Writ is Refused: 

• When the court lacks territorial jurisdiction over the detainer. 
• When detention is connected with the order of a competent court. 
• When the person detained is already set free. 
• When confinement has been legitimized by removal of defects. 
• When a competent court dismisses the petition on grounds of merits. 

Nature and Scope: 

• It is a procedural writ, not a substantive writ, as held in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate Darjeeling (1974). 
• The focus is on the legality of detention by examining facts and circumstances, rather than merely producing the body before court. 
• The writ can be filed not only for wrongful confinement but also for protection from ill-treatment and discrimination by detaining authority, as held in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980). 
• The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to illegal confinement cases; successive petitions can be filed with fresh grounds. 

Burden of Proof: 

• The burden lies on the detaining person or authority to satisfy the court that detention was on legal grounds. 
• If the detenu alleges malicious confinement outside the authority's jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the detenu.