List of Current Affairs

Source: High Court at Calcutta

Why in News? 

Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das of the High Court at Calcutta, in the case of Anirban Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2026), allowed a criminal revision petition and quashed the entire criminal proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim Medinipur.  

• The Court held that a mere breach of a promise to marry, following a nearly five-year consensual relationship, does not amount to rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 64 of BNS). 

What was the Background of Anirban Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The complainant alleged that she developed a romantic relationship with the petitioner, Anirban Mukherjee, in 2017. 
• In 2018, she alleged that the petitioner forced her to consume liquor and sexually assaulted her. 
• Thereafter, on the assurance of marriage, she continued the relationship and accompanied him to several places, including Digha and Goa. 
• The complainant subsequently became pregnant and alleged that the petitioner compelled her to terminate the pregnancy. 
• Following the termination, the petitioner refused to marry her and threatened to circulate private photographs. 
• A charge sheet was filed against the petitioner under Sections 417 (cheating), 376 (rape), 313 (causing miscarriage without consent), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• The petitioner filed a criminal revision petition before the Calcutta High Court seeking quashing of the said proceedings.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court examined the case diary, statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC, medical records, and travel details, and found that the parties maintained a consensual, intimate relationship from 2017 to 2022 without any contemporaneous complaint. 
• Despite alleging sexual assault in 2018, the complainant continued to travel and stay with the petitioner across multiple locations over several years, significantly weakening the prosecution's case of coercion or misconception. 
• The pregnancy termination was conducted with the complainant's consent, with the petitioner signing as guardian, thereby negating the allegation under Section 313 IPC. 
• Referring to Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that consent is vitiated only where a false promise to marry was made from the very beginning with no intention to fulfil it — a subsequent refusal to marry cannot retrospectively criminalise consensual intimacy. 
• The Court noted that "misconception of fact" as required under Section 90 IPC was clearly absent in the present case. 
• The allegations under Sections 417 and 506 IPC were also found unsustainable for want of foundational ingredients. 
• The Court termed the continuation of the prosecution a "sheer abuse of the process of court" and quashed the entire proceedings.

What is the Offence of False Promise to Marry? 

About:  

• In IPC, there is no such explicit offence. However, such an offence can be found in Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 
  • Section 69 of BNS provides punishment for Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.  
  • It states that whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.  
  • Explanation— “deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.

Essential Elements: 

• The first essential element requires proof of sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.  
• The second element mandates that such sexual intercourse was obtained through deceitful means or false promise of marriage.  
• The third element requires establishing that the accused had no genuine intention of fulfilling the marriage promise from the beginning.  
• The fourth element specifies that the sexual intercourse must not constitute the offence of rape under existing statutory provisions. 
• The fifth element demands demonstrating that the complainant's consent was obtained specifically due to deceitful means or false marriage promises.  
• The statutory explanation clarifies that deceitful means includes inducement through false promises of employment, promotion, or marriage by concealing true identity.  
• The prosecution must establish that the accused harboured mala fide intentions and clandestine motives from the inception of the relationship. 
• The essential element of fraudulent intent distinguishes this offence from mere breach of promise or inability to marry due to unforeseen circumstances. The temporal aspect requires proving that deception existed at the time of sexual intercourse rather than merely subsequent change of mind.  
• The causation element establishes that the complainant would not have consented to sexual intercourse without the false promise or deceptive representation. The section requires demonstrating that the accused deliberately employed deceptive tactics to obtain sexual favours under the guise of future marriage.

What is Section 64 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)? 

• Section 64 in the BNS provides punishment for rape  
• Earlier it was dealt with under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code,1860 
• Section 64(1) establishes the general punishment for rape as rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which may extend to life imprisonment, along with a fine. 
• Section 64(2) provides enhanced or aggravated forms of rape with more severe punishments. 
• Section 64(2)(h) specifically deals with a situation where a person "commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant." 
• The punishment prescribed for offences under Section 64(2)(h) is rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which may extend to imprisonment for life (meaning the remainder of the person's natural life), along with a fine. 
• This provision considers rape of a pregnant woman as an aggravated form of sexual assault, recognizing the additional vulnerability of pregnant victims and potential harm to both the woman and her unborn child. 
• Section 64(2)(h) is one of several circumstances listed in Section 64(2) where the law imposes more severe punishments due to the particularly egregious nature of the offence. 
• This section recognizes that committing rape with the knowledge that the victim is pregnant demonstrates heightened culpability warranting enhanced punishment. 
• The classification of this offence under Section 64(2) rather than 64(1) reflects the legislature's intent to treat such cases with greater severity.

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi in the case of Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (2026) held that an absconding accused cannot invoke the principle of parity to seek anticipatory bail merely because co-accused persons have been acquitted in trial. 

What was the Background of Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The complainant was aggrieved by the Madhya Pradesh High Court's Indore Bench order granting anticipatory bail to Respondent No.2-accused, who was declared an absconder. 
• The High Court granted anticipatory bail merely because the co-accused persons in the subject FIR were acquitted by the trial court. 
• The accused had absconded from investigation and trial for nearly six years. 
• The accused had threatened to kill the injured victim Shailendra alias Pintu, who was also an eye witness in the subject FIR, for opposing his bail application. 
• An FIR No.272/2019 dated 10.05.2019 was registered against the accused for threatening the witness. 
• The accused's earlier anticipatory bail pleas had already been rejected. 
• The complainant challenged the High Court's order before the Supreme Court, arguing that parity cannot be claimed by an absconding accused. 
• The complainant contended that the co-accused person's acquittal was based on evidence specific to them and had no bearing on the absconding accused. 
• The State (Respondent No.1) supported the complainant's appeal, though the Supreme Court questioned their decision not to appeal against the High Court's decision. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court observed that the principle of parity cannot be invoked by an absconder who deliberately evades trial to seek anticipatory bail merely because a co-accused has been acquitted. 
• The Court stated "granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law-abiding co-accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the process of trial and further, incentivises people to evade the process of law with impunity." 
• The Court found that the ground raised by the accused that other co-accused were acquitted "does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused himself failed to cooperate with the Court and delayed the trial of the other co-accused by absconding." 
• The High Court's reasoning for granting anticipatory bail solely on the absence of cogent evidence and the acquittal of co-accused was termed as erroneous by the Supreme Court. 
• The Court observed that the High Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of the absconding accused is wholly irrelevant for deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required to produce any evidence against the absconding accused during the trial of co-accused persons. 
• The Court emphasized that the accused had absconded for about 6 years and made a mockery of the judicial process. 
• The Court clarified that while an absconder is not entitled to anticipatory bail as a general rule, in exceptional cases where on perusal of the FIR, case diary and other relevant materials, the Court is of prima facie opinion that no case is made out against the absconding accused, then the power of granting anticipatory bail may be exercised. 
• The Court held that the High Court had not rightly exercised discretion to grant anticipatory bail as it was not a fit case for such relief. 
• The appeal was allowed, and the accused was directed to surrender before the Court concerned within four weeks from the date of judgment. 

What is the Principle of Parity? 

Meaning & Definition: 

• The parity principle means that a sentence should be "similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances." 
• All sentences must respect the parity principle given the subjective nature of the sentencing process. 
• Offenders sentenced for the same or similar offences should not receive disparate sentences. 
• Sentences should be approximately the same, taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors unique to the individual. 
• Parity does not mean uniformity and should not reduce the focus on the need for proportionality. 

Purpose: 

• The purpose of the parity principle is to ensure fairness by avoiding disproportionate sentences among convicted persons where essentially the same facts and circumstances indicate equivalent or like sentences. 
• It does not override the individualized approach to sentencing. 
• The purpose is not to match sentences perfectly but rather to advance fairness. 

Parity in Bail Cases 

• In bail matters, the parity principle is invoked when a co-accused has been granted bail, and the accused seeks similar relief on the ground of being similarly situated. 
• The principle allows an accused to claim bail on the ground that a co-accused in the same FIR has been granted bail or acquitted. 

Limitations of Parity in Bail: 

• Parity cannot be claimed as an absolute right; it must be assessed in light of individual circumstances. 
• An absconding accused cannot invoke the principle of parity to seek anticipatory bail merely because co-accused persons have been acquitted. 
• The acquittal of co-accused is based on evidence specific to their trial and does not automatically benefit an absconding accused who evaded the entire trial process. 
• Any findings recorded by the trial court in favour of or against an absconding accused during the co-accused's trial are wholly irrelevant for deciding the bail application of the absconder. 
• Granting anticipatory bail to an absconder on parity grounds sets a bad precedent and incentivises evasion of the judicial process.