List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News?

A Division Bench of Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary of the Allahabad High Court, in Jagdamba Harijan v. State of U.P(2026) held that an FIR lodged with the assistance of a private advocate is not rendered doubtful or diluted on that ground alone.  

• The Court further held that legal assistance is available to all persons at every stage of criminal proceedings, including at the stage of lodging an FIR, and no embargo can be placed on seeking such assistance.

What was the Background of Jagdamba Harijan v. State of U.P (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from a criminal appeal challenging a conviction in a homicide matter originating from an acid attack. 
• The informant's mother and sister-in-law were the victims of the attack, and the informant had personally seen the face of the appellant, who had previously threatened the informant's brother and harassed the sister-in-law's father. 
• The incident occurred on the intervening night of 07/08 May 2014 at around 2:00 AM; however, the FIR was registered only on 09 May 2014 at 11:00 AM, and the accused was arrested on 13 May 2014. 
• Both victims subsequently succumbed to their injuries. 
• The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 304, 326-A, and 452 of the IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Sections 304 and 326-A, and rigorous imprisonment of two years with a fine of Rs. 5,000 under Section 452, with an additional six months' imprisonment in default of payment of fine. He was, however, acquitted under Section 323 IPC. 
• The appellant approached the High Court challenging his conviction, raising primarily two grounds — delay in lodging the FIR and the fact that the FIR was drafted by a private advocate.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court upheld the Trial Court's finding that in an acid attack situation, prioritising the treatment of the injured over lodging an FIR is a natural and justified course of action, and such delay alone cannot be used to refute the entire prosecution story. 
• The Court held that "providing medical aid is and must be the step before lodging an FIR" in acid attack cases and other emergencies requiring urgent medical help, and that such delay ought to be construed as common and natural. 
• On the question of advocate assistance, the Court noted that the informant was an illiterate person in a state of severe mental distress, whose immediate family had been subjected to a brutal acid attack, and that seeking a literate person's help — who happened to be an advocate — was entirely natural in the circumstances. 
• The Court firmly held that legal aid is permissible at every stage of criminal proceedings, including at the stage of lodging an FIR, and no embargo can be placed on seeking assistance from a private advocate. 
• While acknowledging that an FIR drafted with advocate's assistance warrants careful scrutiny to ensure it is not malicious or motivated, the Court held that such assistance, by itself, does not cast doubt on the FIR's credibility or render it false. 
• The Court reiterated the settled legal position that an FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence — it is merely an instrument by which the criminal machinery is set into motion. 
• Finding no merit in the appellant's arguments, the Court upheld the Trial Court's conviction and dismissed the appeal. 

What is FIR & Legal Provisions in Relation to it? 

About: 

• A First Information Report (FIR) is a written document prepared by the police upon receiving information about the commission of a cognizable offence. 
• The term "First Information Report (FIR)" does not appear in the Code; it is the common name for information given under Section 154 of the CrPC, now replaced by Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 

Section 173(1) — Recording of Information: 

• Information relating to a cognizable offence may be given orally or by electronic communication, irrespective of the area where the offence was committed (Zero FIR). 
• If given orally, the officer must reduce it to writing, read it back to the informant, and get it signed. 
• If given electronically, it must be signed by the informant within three days of being taken on record. 
• The substance of the information must be entered in a prescribed book maintained by the police station. 

Special Provisions under Section 173(1): 

• Where the offence alleged is against a woman (under specified sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), the information must be recorded by a woman police officer. 
• Where the victim is mentally or physically disabled (temporarily or permanently), the information must be recorded at the victim's residence or a place of their choice, in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and the recording must be videographed. 
• In such cases, the police officer must also get the victim's statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate at the earliest opportunity.

Section 173(2) — Copy to Informant: 

• A copy of the recorded FIR must be provided immediately and free of cost to the informant or the victim.

Section 173(3) — Preliminary Enquiry (New Provision): 

• For cognizable offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, the officer-in-charge may, with prior permission of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, either:  
  • Conduct a preliminary enquiry within 14 days to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, or 
  • Proceed directly with investigation if a prima facie case is already evident.

Section 173(4) — Remedy Against Refusal to Register FIR: 

• If an officer refuses to register an FIR, the aggrieved person may send the substance of the information in writing by post to the Superintendent of Police. 
• If the SP is satisfied that a cognizable offence is disclosed, they shall either investigate the case personally or direct a subordinate officer to investigate. 
• If this remedy also fails, the aggrieved person may approach the Magistrate under Section 175(3) of the BNSS.

Key New Features Introduced by BNSS over CrPC: 

• Zero FIR — FIR can be registered at any police station regardless of territorial jurisdiction. 
• Electronic FIR — Information can now be given through electronic communication. 
• Preliminary Enquiry — A structured pre-investigation enquiry mechanism introduced for mid-range offences (3–7 years). 
• Enhanced victim protection — Mandatory woman officer recording and videography for vulnerable victims. 

Source: Chhattisgarh High Court 

Why in News?

A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Justice Arvind Kumar Verma of the Chhattisgarh High Court, in Smt. Gudiya Nagesh & Anr. v. Nil (2026), held that a Scheduled Tribe (ST) member who voluntarily adopts Hindu customs, rites, and traditions and opts to be governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) cannot be denied its protection solely because Section 2(2) of the HMA excludes its general application to ST communities.

What was the Background of Smt. Gudiya Nagesh & Anr. v. Nil (2026) Case? 

• The appellants were a married couple who solemnised their marriage in 2009 in accordance with Hindu rites and customs, including the performance of Saptapadi. 
• The wife belonged to the Scheduled Caste (SC) category, while the husband was from the Scheduled Tribe (ST) community. 
• Despite his ST status, the husband voluntarily chose to follow Hindu marriage rituals. 
• The couple began living separately from April 2014 and jointly sought divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the HMA before the Family Court, Bastar. 
• The Family Court dismissed the application, holding that by virtue of Section 2(2) of the HMA, the Act is inapplicable to members of the ST community. 
• Both parties, aggrieved by the dismissal, preferred an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act before the High Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court framed the core question as whether the Family Court was justified in holding that Section 13-B of the HMA would not apply to the parties solely on account of the husband's ST status under Section 2(2) of the Act. 
• The Court clarified that Section 2(2) of the HMA — which provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to ST members unless the Central Government directs otherwise by notification — is a measure of protection and not a measure of exclusion. 
• Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Labishwar Manjhi v. Pran Manjhi & Ors. (2000), the Court affirmed the well-recognised principle that ST members who are substantially Hinduised and follow Hindu customs cannot be relegated to customary courts, particularly when they themselves admit to observing Hindu rites, customs, and traditions. 
• Further drawing on the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in Chittapuli v. Union Government (2020) and the Delhi High Court's ruling in Satprakash Meena v. Alka Meena (2021), the Court held that parties who voluntarily perform Saptapadi and follow Hindu rites cannot be excluded from the HMA's purview. 
• The Court held that where an ST member voluntarily submits to the HMA's jurisdiction on the basis that they are Hinduised and follow Hindu customs, it would be open to such a member to object to proceedings under the Act — but they cannot be barred from invoking it at the threshold. 
• Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Family Court to decide the mutual divorce application under Section 13-B of the HMA on its own merits.

What is Section 2 of HMA? 

Section 2 — Application of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: 

Section 2(1) — Who the Act Applies To: 

The Act applies to three broad categories of persons: 

• Hindus by religion in any form or development, expressly including Virashaivas, Lingayats, and followers of the Brahmo, Prarthana, or Arya Samaj movements. 
• Buddhists, Jainas, and Sikhs by religion. 
• Any other person domiciled in the applicable territories who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew — unless it is proved that such a person would not have been governed by Hindu law or custom even before the Act was passed. 

Explanation — Who Qualifies as Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh: 

• A child (legitimate or illegitimate) both of whose parents belong to any of these religions. 
• A child (legitimate or illegitimate) one of whose parents belongs to any of these religions, provided the child is raised as a member of that parent's community or family. 
• Any person who converts or reconverts to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh religion.

Section 2(2) — Exception for Scheduled Tribes: 

• Notwithstanding the broad applicability under Section 2(1), the Act does not automatically apply to members of any Scheduled Tribe as defined under Article 366(25) of the Constitution.  
• This exclusion holds unless the Central Government issues a specific notification in the Official Gazette directing otherwise.

Article 366(25) — Definition of "Scheduled Tribes" 

• "Scheduled Tribes" refers to such tribes, tribal communities, or parts/groups within them as are deemed to be Scheduled Tribes under Article 342 of the Constitution. 
• The definition is not self-contained — it derives its operative meaning entirely by reference to Article 342.