List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Gobind Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2026), held that parties do not possess any vested or automatic right to seek admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).  

• The Court further held that the appellate court may permit additional evidence only upon being satisfied that the conditions expressly stipulated under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are fulfilled, and that litigants cannot be permitted to fill gaps in their case by introducing new material at the appellate stage.

What was the Background of Gobind Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The case pertained to a title dispute over a piece of land in Gwalior. 
• The Appellant-plaintiffs claimed ownership and possession of the disputed land on the basis of adverse possession through their predecessors. 
• The Respondent, Union of India, contended that ownership of the land had been transferred to them from the State Government in 1953. 
• The trial court decreed the Appellants' suit for declaration of title and injunction in their favour. 
• A first appeal was filed by the Union of India before the High Court challenging the trial court's decree. 
• During the pendency of the appeal, the Appellants filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to adduce additional evidence on record. 
• Without adjudicating the Appellants' application for additional evidence, the High Court decided the first appeal and reversed the trial court's findings. 
• Aggrieved by the dismissal of their review petition by the High Court, the Appellant-plaintiffs approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court's omission to expressly adjudicate their application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court held that no error was committed by the High Court in omitting to decide the Appellant's application for additional evidence, as the production of additional evidence is not a vested right of the litigant. 
• The Court observed that the appellate court may permit additional evidence only upon being satisfied that the conditions expressly stipulated under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are fulfilled, and that parties do not possess any vested or automatic right to seek such admission. 
• Relying on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2012), the Court reiterated that unless the requirements under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are strictly satisfied, additional evidence cannot be adduced at the appellate stage, and such permission cannot be granted as a matter of course or at the whim or convenience of a litigating party. 
• The Court held that since the Appellants themselves had asserted title on the basis of long and continuous possession through their predecessors, their subsequent attempt to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage assumed little legal significance. 
• The Court further held that once the trial had concluded and the decree was under challenge in appeal, the Appellants could not be permitted to fill the gaps in their case by seeking to adduce further material to fortify a claim that was fundamentally flawed. 
• The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

What is Order XLI Rule 27 CPC? 

About:  

• Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deals comprehensively with Appeals from Original Decrees.

General Prohibition: 

• The parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court as a matter of right. 
• The appellate proceedings are ordinarily confined to the record as it stood before the trial court. 
• A party cannot seek to supplement or strengthen its case by introducing fresh material at the appellate stage unless strictly permitted under the provision.

Exceptional Circumstances for Admission: 

• Additional evidence may be allowed by the Appellate Court only under the following specific and exhaustively enumerated circumstances: 
• Clause (a) — Wrongful Refusal by Trial Court:  
  • Where the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted during the trial proceedings. 
  • The focus here is on a failure of justice occasioned by the trial court's erroneous exclusion of material evidence. 
• Clause (aa) — Evidence Not Available Despite Due Diligence:  
  • Where the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. 
  • This clause places a positive obligation on the party to demonstrate genuine unavailability, and not mere oversight or neglect. 
• Clause (b) — Appellate Court's Own Requirement:  
  • Where the Appellate Court itself requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. 
  • This clause is court-driven rather than party-driven, and is activated by the appellate court's own judicial necessity.

Discretionary Power: 

• The provision vests discretionary power in the Appellate Court to allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined, upon being satisfied that any of the prescribed conditions under Clauses (a), (aa), or (b) are fulfilled. 
• This discretion is:  
  • Not absolute or arbitrary — it must be exercised judiciously and within the parameters of the three clauses. 
  • Not exercisable as a matter of course or routine indulgence. 
  • Subject to strict satisfaction of the enumerated conditions before any permission is granted.

Mandatory Recording Requirement: 

• Sub-rule (2) of Order XLI Rule 27 introduces an important procedural accountability mechanism. 
• It mandates that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reasons for its admission. 
• This requirement:  
  • Ensures judicial accountability and transparency in the exercise of discretionary power. 
  • Prevents arbitrary or unreasoned admission of additional evidence. 
  • Creates an appellate record that can be scrutinised by higher courts if the exercise of discretion is challenged.

Legislative Intent: 

• The provision reflects a careful legislative balancing act between two competing imperatives:  
  • Finality of trial court proceedings — Parties must diligently present their full case at trial and cannot treat appellate proceedings as a second opportunity to cure deficiencies of their own making. 
  • Appellate court's duty to ensure justice — In genuine cases of unavailability or trial court error, justice must not be sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. 
• The rule further ensures that appellate proceedings do not become a substitute for proper trial conduct, and that parties exercise due diligence at the appropriate stage rather than strategically withholding evidence for later deployment.

Procedural Safeguards: 

• Due Diligence Requirement under Clause (aa):  
  • The requirement of establishing due diligence prevents abuse of the provision. 
  • A party must affirmatively demonstrate that despite reasonable and genuine efforts, the evidence in question was neither within its knowledge nor capable of being produced at the time of the trial court's decree. 
  • Mere ignorance, carelessness, or tactical choice will not satisfy this standard. 
• Substantial Cause Criterion under Clause (b):  
  • The "substantial cause" criterion provides a degree of flexibility to appellate courts to admit evidence necessary for the proper adjudication of disputes, whilst keeping the exercise of such power within judicially defined parameters. 
  • It is not a catch-all provision but a residuary power to be used in extraordinary circumstances where the interests of justice and proper adjudication genuinely demand it. 

Source: Orissa High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi of the Orissa High Court, in Sanat Kumar Pradhan v. State of Odisha (2026), upheld the conviction of a man found guilty of repeatedly committing sexual intercourse with a minor girl, while firmly holding that village panchayats have no authority to settle serious criminal offences — particularly child sexual abuse — through mediation or promises of marriage.  

• The Court directed the concerned District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police to undertake sensitisation drives ensuring community functionaries understand that allegations of sexual offences against minors must be reported to lawful authorities without delay.

What was the Background of Sanat Kumar Pradhan v. State of Odisha (2026) Case? 

• The incident originated on 18.07.2016 in Phiringia, Kandhamal, where the appellant allegedly visited the minor victim's house in the absence of her parents and committed forcible sexual intercourse, threatening her to remain silent. 
• The victim later disclosed the incident to her mother, following which a panchayat meeting was convened where the appellant allegedly admitted to the act and agreed to marry the victim upon her attaining majority. 
• The parties married on 12.05.2021, but the appellant allegedly continued sexual relations with the victim throughout the intervening years, abandoned her shortly after marriage, and his parents allegedly attempted to kill her. 
• An FIR was registered on 30.01.2024 — nearly eight years after the first incident. 
• Upon trial, the Ad-hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTSC), Kandhamal, Phulbani convicted the appellant under Section 6(1) POCSO Act read with Section 376(2)(n) IPC, sentencing him to 20 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹20,000/-. 
• The appellant preferred a criminal appeal before the Orissa High Court challenging the conviction and sentence.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court upheld the conviction on all grounds raised by the appellant. On the question of the victim's minority, it relied on the school admission register as sufficient proof of her age. The eight-year delay in filing the FIR was held not fatal, as it was adequately explained by the informal village-level handling of the matter. Investigative gaps cited by the defence were dismissed since no material prejudice to the accused was demonstrated. The juvenility plea raised on behalf of the appellant was rejected outright for lack of any legally admissible foundational material. 
• Most significantly, the Court held that the appellant's subsequent marriage to the victim was no defence in law — a later marriage cannot retrospectively cleanse the initial illegality or bar criminal liability. 
• On the question of panchayat intervention, the Court took a strong stance, holding that village bodies have no jurisdiction over criminal offences and that settling child sexual abuse through promises of marriage amounts to protecting the wrongdoer and silencing the victim.  
• It reminded that Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act impose a mandatory obligation to report such offences to the SJPU or local police — an obligation no panchayat can override.

What are Panchayats in India? 

About: 

• Panchayats are institutions of local self-governance at the grassroots level, enshrined in the Constitution of India. 
• The system aims to promote democratic principles, social justice, and equitable development by involving citizens in decision-making. 
• The term "Panchayati Raj" literally translates to "rule of the village council" in Sanskrit, reflecting its roots in traditional village governance.

Journey of Panchayats in India: 

• Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957): First recommended the Panchayati Raj system; advocated a three-tier structure comprising Gram Panchayats, Panchayat Samitis, and Zila Parishads. 
• Ashok Mehta Committee (1977): Recommended a two-tier system eliminating the block-level intermediary; stressed decentralisation of powers to Gram Panchayats and Zila Parishads. 
• 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: Granted constitutional status to Panchayati Raj institutions; formalised the three-tier system at village, block, and district levels; mandated reservation for SCs, STs, and women; established State Election Commissions; and provided for devolution of powers to Panchayats.

Key Constitutional Provisions: 

• Article 40 (DPSP): Directs the State to organise village panchayats and vest them with powers necessary to function as units of local self-government. 
• Article 243: Provides definitions of key terms including District, Gram Sabha, Panchayat, and Village. 
• Article 243A: Empowers the Gram Sabha to exercise such functions at the village level as the State Legislature may prescribe by law. 
• Articles 243B–243O: Govern the establishment, composition, reservation of seats, and powers of Panchayats at all three levels.

Constitution of Panchayats (Article 243B): 

• Every State shall constitute Panchayats at the village, intermediate, and district levels. 
• States with a population not exceeding twenty lakhs are exempt from constituting Panchayats at the intermediate level.