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Civil Law

July 2023

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 29-Aug-2023

Dheeraj Singh v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority & Ors

Keywords: Civil Law, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Krishna Murari, Bela M. Trivedi

Case In Brief:

  • The Respondent State Government of Uttar Pradesh had issued a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by virtue of which a large tract of land, including the land of the appellants herein was acquired for the purpose of Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority.
  • The possession of the aforesaid lands was taken on different dates between 13.08.1993 and 31.05.1994.
  • The Special Land Acquisition Officer, by order dated 27.08.1994, determined the market value of the plots at three different rates i.e., Rs.32.52/-, Rs.22.44/- and Rs. 16.46/- paisa per square yard.
  • Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellants herein sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 350/- to Rs. 500/- per square yard on grounds of parity to other lands acquired in the vicinity.
  • The Learned District Judge, in the aforesaid reference, determined the market value of the said lands at Rs. 400/- along with certain deductions.
  • Respondent, Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority filed an appeal in the High Court, to which the appellants herein filed their cross appeals.
  • The HC, vide order and judgment dated 04.01.2017, confirmed the compensation determined by the Learned District Judge.
  • The Appellants, aggrieved by the fact that their cross objection for enhancement was not properly considered, filed a review, however, the same was dismissed.
  • Hence the present appeal.

Verdict:

  • A bench of Justices Krishna Murari and Bela M. Trivedi of the Apex Court, while allowing the appeal, observed that the HC was under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by the appellants.
  • The Court further said that the matter is fit for remand to the HC for fresh adjudication on the grounds raised in the cross objections during appeal by the appellants referring to the case of Jitendra Prasad Nayak v. Anant Kumar Sah and Anr.(1997) in which this Court, in an identical circumstance wherein the cross objections filed by the appellant therein was not considered by the court of first appeal, held for remand of the case back to the HC.

Relevant Provision:

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order 41

The provision of Cross-Appeal is provided under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code.

Order 41 - Appeals from Original Decrees

Rule 22 - Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal —

(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree 2 [but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

Explanation. — A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.

(2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto. —Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto.

[Original Judgement]

Gagan Baba v. Samit Mandal

Keywords: Criminal Law, Civil Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Krishna Murari, Sanjay Kumar

Case In Brief:

  • The petitioner’s case is that there is trend of initiating malafide criminal proceedings against financial institutions/lenders.
  • Then officers, representatives and managers of such institutions somehow restrain them from pursuing recovery proceedings of their enforceable debts, and/or to compel them to make settlement of their dues.
  • FIRs are also registered in this regard to circumvent legally owed debts by skipping the statutory regime of SARFAESI, and also by projecting a purely civil financial dispute as a criminal matter with a view to intimidate and in abuse of the criminal process.

Verdict:

  • The Supreme Court observed that the continuing trend of projecting a purely civil financial dispute as a criminal matter is extremely disturbing.
  • While making note of case Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) it held that this Court had noticed taking recourse to criminal law by bypassing statutory remedies to bring the financial institutions on their knees, has the inherent potentiality to affect the marrows of economic health of the nation.

Relevant Provision:

FIR once filed can be quashed by the HC under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Section 482 - Saving of inherent powers of HC.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the HC to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

[Original Judgement]

Gurbachan Singh (D) v. Gurcharan Singh(D)

Keywords: Civil Law, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 24.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S. Oka, Sanjay Karol

Case In Brief:

  • The present appeal pertains to a property dispute wherein one of the two brothers namely, Faqir Singh had allegedly sold off the portion of property belonging to him.
  • That his brother Gurbachan Singh and he inherited the suit property from their father namely Suchet Singh who died intestate in the year 1942.
  • Gurcharan Singh (Respondent - herein plaintiff) bought a piece of land belonging to Faqir Singh.
  • He was put in possession of such land however; it was forcibly taken by the appellant Gurbachan Singh.
  • Faqir Singh did not have any exclusive title or possession over the suit property, he could not purport to sell the same.
  • A suit for possession over such disputed property was filed by Gurcharan Singh before the Sub Judge 1st Class, Jullundur (now Jalandhar) which was decided in favour of Gurbachan Singh.
  • On 1st appeal the learned Additional District Judge upheld the judgement rendered by the subordinate court on the grounds:
    • That there is no document on record to prove that the disputed property had been given to Faqir Singh in the family partition.
    • If partition was indeed affected 50 or 60 years ago, then there should have been an entry in the revenue record to that effect, however, no such entry is to be found.
  • The Punjab and Haryana High Court, while allowing a second appeal, had set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below it without framing any substantial question of law.
  • Hence the present appeal.

Verdict:

  • The Apex Court stated that a substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 of CPC, is not defined in the Code.
  • The Court while taking note of the fact that the case arose out of a dispute in Punjab, observed that the single Judge sitting in second appellate jurisdiction cannot be at fault for not having framed substantial questions of law while referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs v. Chandrika (2016).
    • The court said “Therefore, the rigors of Section 100 do not apply. It has been held by this court that in appeals arising out of the state of Punjab or the State of Haryana, courts are not required to frame substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of CPC".

Relevant Provision:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 100 - Second appeal —

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

[Original Judgement]

Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana

Keywords: Criminal Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC), Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices S. Ravindra Bhat, Dipankar Datta

Case In Brief:

  • The present appeal in the Supreme Court (SC) is filed against the judgement of Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing a petition filed under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC) on the ground that there was sufficient material found against the accused in course of investigation and hence the FIR cannot be quashed.
  • The accused was charged with cheating, criminal breach of trust, theft etc. Apart from these, the offence under Section 180 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was also invoked against him.
  • The SC bench noted that in reply affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, it was stated that as the accused refused to sign her statement therefore, she was also charged for commission of an offence under Section 180 IPC.

Verdict:

  • While upholding the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petition under Section 482 CrPC, the court said that “In terms of Section 162, CrPC, no statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of any investigation under Chapter XII of the CrPC, which is reduced to writing, is required to be signed by the person making the statement and that section 180 of the IPC gets attracted only if a statement is refused to be signed which a public servant is legally competent to require the person making the statement to sign."
  • The Supreme Court thus held that Section 180 of IPC is not attracted if a person refuses to sign the statement made to a police officer in course of an investigation.

Relevant Provision:

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 162 - Statements to Police not to be Signed: Use of Statements in Evidence.—(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examinations.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of clause (1) of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.

Explanation. — An omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in sub-section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a question of fact.

Section 482 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court —

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 180 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court —

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

[Original Judgement]

Sandeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr.

Keywords: Criminal Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 28.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and C. T. Ravikumar

Case In Brief:

  • The First Information Report (FIR) revealed that there were in total fifteen assailants who had broken open the complainant’s house, in the middle of the night and had come in order to assault the inmates of the house.
  • Police, after investigation, had filed a chargesheet against nine persons, but not against 3 persons (including respondent no. 2) whose names were placed in column 2 of the chargesheet.
  • During the examination-in-chief, the complainant unambiguously stated the roles of these three assailants, who were named in the FIR but not made accused in the chargesheet.
  • Thereafter an application was moved before the Trial Court by the Appellant under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), for summoning these three persons.
  • The application was allowed by the Trial Court, but only one person out of three (respondent no. 2), responded and filed a revision plea before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.
  • The High Court allowed the revision plea and acquitted him (respondent no. 2) on finding him innocent.
  • The Apex Court in this case observed that the HC committed a grave error in allowing the revision plea of the accused, it was absolutely necessary for the Trial Court to have summoned the three accused, including the revisionist.

Verdict:

  • The merit of the evidence has to be appreciated only during the trial, by cross-examination of the witnesses and scrutiny of the Court.
  • This is not to be done at the stage of Section 319 CrPC.

Relevant Provision –

Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence -

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub- section (1), then-

(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced a fresh, and the witnesses re- heard;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.

[Original Judgment]

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail

Keywords: Criminal Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 25.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Case In Brief:

  • National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) sought directions from the Apex Court towards release of undertrial prisoners who were in jail, despite the grant of bail.
  • The Amicus Curaie put forth the three major directions that have been prayed before the court:
    • Whenever an application for modification of the bail condition is filed, the court may endeavor to dispose of the same within a reasonable period of say 2 weeks.
    • NALSA can develop a module and have an orientation programme for Judicial officers and academies on this aspect of the matter, that is imposing reasonable bail conditions considering the financial condition of the prisoner and monitoring the release of accused granted bail.
    • The e-prison software for email alerts may be monitored by NALSA over the next 3-4 months and if there are any difficulties which are faced in the said software or if improvements are required, the same can be discussed and incorporated.

Verdict:

  • The court acknowledged the directions in the following points:
    • Insofar as 1st direction is concerned, every endeavor must be made by the court where they impose the conditions of bail, the conditions must be fruitful.
      • Prompt attention should be given to where the order of bail has not resulted in release.
    • The development of a module for judicial officers along with State Judicial Academies which NALSA has suggested in 2nd point of the directions sought, can be useful educating exercise.
    • The court also accepted the third point.

Relevant Provision –

Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained -

  • Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties;
  • Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties;
  • Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

[Original Order]

Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K. Madan Mohan Rao & Ors

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Constitution of India, 1950, Supreme Court, Article 326, Adult Suffrage

Date of Judgement/Order – 24.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and C. T. Ravikumar

Case In Brief:

  • The appellant was a successful candidate in the election conducted for the Zaheerabad Parliamentary Constituency in Telangana on 11.04.2019.
  • He was declared elected on 23.05.2019, defeating the respondent.
  • Respondent filed an election petition against the appellant and alleged that the appellant had furnished false information in Form 26 (election affidavit).
  • The respondent also stated that the appellant filed false information in C-4 report furnished to the District Election Officer.
    • Respondent added that there was no previous publication of papers regarding pending cases against the appellant and he also did not mention the cases in which he was convicted.
  • The appellant contended that there was no need to disclose the so-called criminal cases as they did not fall within Section 8 and Section 33A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 as he had not been sentenced to imprisonment of more than one year.
    • Section 8 of the Act provides for disqualification of elected candidates, upon their conviction of specified offences.
    • The court analyzed that Section 33A was introduced through an amendment to the Act, in 2002, it compels those holding out their candidature to disclose information about their criminal antecedents.
    • The idea behind this provision is to ensure transparency and enable the voters to make an informed choice while casting the ballot.
  • The issue before the court was that in a democracy the voters must know the criminal antecedents of candidates contesting the elections so that they can utilize their right to vote enshrined in the Constitution, cautiously.

Verdict:

  • Democracy has been held to be a part of one of the essential features of the Constitution.
    • However, somewhat paradoxically, the right to vote has not been recognized as a Fundamental Right yet.
    • It was termed as a “mere” statutory right.
  • The right to vote, based on an informed choice, is a crucial component of the essence of democracy.
  • This right is precious and was the result of a long and arduous fight for freedom, for Swaraj, where the citizen has an inalienable right to exercise her or his right to franchise.

Relevant Provision –

Article 326 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the basis of adult suffrage -

The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; but is to say, every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less than twenty one years of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election.

[Original Judgment]

Madras Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Constitution of India, 1950, Supreme Court, Article 14, Right to Equality

Date of Judgement/Order – 06.07.2023

Bench Strength – 3 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices B. R. Gavai, Sanjay Karol and Aravind Kumar

Case In Brief:

  • The Appellant is a company set up in 1965 for the manufacture of aluminum, which is a power and electricity intensive process.
  • The Appellant had a contract with the respondent regarding supply of electricity for its plant which was requested to reduce, twice.
  • The Appellant requested to reduce the amount concerning the fact that the earlier agreed cost of consumption of such power constituted more than 40 percent of the cost of production, and that the company itself had established a captive power plant.
  • Despite such a request being made and some initial communication, no steps effectuating such a request were taken.
  • Therefore, the Appellant was forced to pay as per the contracted demand of electricity supply.
  • The Appellants cited other examples where similar applications by similarly placed persons were considered and decided upon by the Board with promptitude and requested the court for an equal treatment.

Verdict:

  • The SC noted that a state action irrespective of being in the contractual realm must abide by Article 14.
  • Actions of respondent were observed unreasonable and arbitrary.

Relevant Provision –

Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - Equality before law

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

[Original Judgment]

Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi

Keywords: Criminal Law, Indian Penal Code, 1860, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Dipankar Datta and S. Ravindra Bhat

Case In Brief:

  • In this case, the appellant is the owner of the immovable property.
  • With the intention to redevelop the same, he had entered into three agreements with the builder.
  • As per the agreements, the builder was required to construct a multi-storied building in which the appellant would have ownership rights in respect of the 3rd floor and whereas the builder would have rights to deal with the 1st and the 2nd floors together.
  • The builder entered into an agreement with the complainants to sell the ownership rights of the 2nd floor of the proposed building.
  • The complainants were not handed over possession of the second floor which they intended to purchase.
  • The complainants lodged the First Information Report (FIR) under Sections 420, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) in which the appellant, the builder and a broker were shown as accused.
  • Apprehending arrest, the appellant approached the High Court of Delhi seeking an order under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).
  • The High Court granted bail subject to the condition of the appellant depositing 22 lakh with the trial court.
  • However, the appellant could not fulfill the condition.
  • Aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to extend the time to fulfil the condition, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

  • The Supreme Court held that the High Court fell in grave error in imposing such conditions.
  • It remitted the matter to the high court and directed reconsideration of the application for pre-arrest bail on its own merits.
  • The Supreme Court has disapproved of the practise followed by the Courts to direct deposit of amount as a condition for granting anticipatory bail for the offence of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

Relevant Provisions:

Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.

Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person de­ceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 420 of IPC- Punishment for criminal breach of trust.

Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 34 of IPC - Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) - Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.

(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non- bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.

(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub- section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-

(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;

(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;

(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;

(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub- section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.

(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, be shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub- section (1).

[Original Judgement]

Sarnam Singh v. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.

Keywords: Civil Law, Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal

Case In Brief:

  • The appellant was working as a gunman with M/s Bharat Hotels Ltd. and had met with an accident on 24th November 2013.
  • As a result of which he suffered injuries and his right lower limb had to be amputated.
  • The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded him a compensation of ₹ 34,29,800/-.
  • Out of the total compensation awarded, ₹ 30,84,800/- was awarded taking into account his functional disability at 100% with reference to his job as a gunman.
  • Subsequently, against the order of the Tribunal, the insurance company filed an appeal before the High Court of Delhi.
  • The High Court reduced the compensation by ₹ 4,92,205/- taking his loss of earning capacity at 80%.
  • Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellant.

Verdict:

  • The Supreme Court observed that in cases of motor accident claims, the physical disability caused due to an accident must be judged with reference to the nature of the work being done by the injured for assessing award of compensation.
  • Therefore, the order passed by the High Court was set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal was restored.

Relevant Provisions:

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Replacing the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force on 1st July 1989. The Act contains in detail the legislative provisions in relation to licensing of drivers/conductors, registration and control of motor vehicles, special provisions in regard to state transport undertakings, traffic regulation, insurance, liability, offences and penalties, etc.

[Original Judgement]

Pradeep v. The State of Haryana

Keywords: Criminal Law, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 05.07.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal

Case In Brief:

  • In this case, the accused was convicted by the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 449 and 324 read with Section 34 of IPC.
  • The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.
    • For the offence under Section 449 read with Section 34, the accused was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
    • For the offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
  • Thereafter, the accused filed an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
  • The conviction was upheld by the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was based mainly on the testimony of a minor witness.
  • Aggrieved by the judgement of the High Court, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

  • While setting aside the judgement of the High Court, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of the offences alleged against him.
  • The Court further held that the trial courts have to make proper preliminary examination of minor witnesses before recording their evidence as per Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Relevant Provisions:

Section 449 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death.

Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence punishable with death, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 324 of IPC - Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, volun­tarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stab­bing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to in­hale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either de­scription for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 34 of IPC - Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Section 302 of IPC - Punishment for murder.

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

  • Section 118 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) - Who may testify.

All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.

[Original Judgement]