Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another

Keywords: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 21.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice M.M. Sundresh

Case In Brief:

• HPCL (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) had awarded BEEL (Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited) a turnkey contract for detailed engineering including civil and structural designs.
• The contract period was 18 months, there was a delay in completion therefore on written requests/applications made by BEEL, the time for completion was extended on two occasions.
  • Further, three revisions were also given by HPCL to the above extensions.
• Thereafter, BEEL abandoned the work, but it is an accepted position that around 80% of the work was complete.
• BEEL made a formal claim to HPCL for breach of contract on account of a delay in execution, causing extra expenses and losses. An advance payment of Rs.50 lakhs was demanded by BEEL for resumption of work.
• BEEL by the same letter also invoked the arbitration clause in the contract, if the proposal as given by BEEL was unacceptable to HPCL.
• HPCL refused to make the payment and, relying on the terms of the contract had impressed upon BEEL to resume and complete the remaining work, even if the matter was to proceed for arbitration.
• A sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate upon the disputes, claim was filed by BEEL, and reply/counter claim was filed by HPCL.
• The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the counter claim of HPCL for liquidated damages.
• An appeal was filed before the Division Bench of High Court whereby the Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal was set aside under Section 34/37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
• Hence, the present appeal is filed in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC took note of the case ONGC Limited. v. Saw Pipes Limited, (2003) in which SC held that an award can be set aside under Section 34 on the following grounds of public policy:
  • Fundamental policy of Indian law
  • The interest of India
  • Justice or morality
  • If it is patently illegal.
• The Bench distinguished between the concepts of justice and morality as “When an Award shocks the conscience of the court, for example where the claimant has restricted his claim, but the arbitral tribunal has awarded a higher amount without any reasonable ground of justification, that would be against justice. However, morality would cover illegal and unenforceable agreements, but interference would be only if warranted if something shocks the court’s conscience.”
• The SC held that the award passed by the Tribunal is patently illegal since it lacks reasoning in arriving at conclusions and calculation of amounts awarded. The High Court’s order setting aside the award was thereby upheld.

Relevant Provision:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 34 - Application for setting aside arbitral award —

(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if— (a) the party making the application establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]—

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that—

(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.

Explanation 1. —For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if, —

(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.

Explanation 2. —For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.

(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.

(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement.

(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.

Section 37 - Appealable orders — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: —

(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;

(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.

(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal —

(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

[Original Judgement]

Rahimal Bathu v. Ashiyal Beevi

Keywords: Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 26.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra

Case In Brief:

• The present respondent (Ashiyal Beevi) instituted an original suit declaring her as the exclusive owner of the property.
  • It was further prayed that, if the court concludes that she is not the exclusive owner of the property, her share therein be declared one-sixth and the same be partitioned accordingly.
• The case pertains to the fact that the suit property belonged to plaintiff’s grandmother Fathima Beevi and that he purchased it from her via sale deed dated 14^th November 1982.
• The appellant is the daughter in law of Fatima Beevi and her husband taking advantage of staying at the suit property got a gift deed executed in his favour dated 24^th April 1982.
• The trial Court held that property concerned was gifted to Fathima Beevi by her father and hence the gift-deed executed was invalid whereas the sale deed was valid. A review was filed against this judgement which was again dismissed on merits.
• Pursuant to rejection of review a revision petition was filed in the High Court (HC) under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).
  • The HC not only set aside the order of the trial court but also allowed the review application.
• Hence, an appeal is made in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC ruled that it cannot consider a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when it pertains to the rejection of a review application for an appealable decree by a subordinate court based on its merits.

Relevant Provision:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 115 – Revision —

(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears—

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:

Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.

Explanation —In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding.

[Original Judgement]

Shirdi Nagar Panchayat v. Kishor Sharad Borawake and Others

Keywords: Constitution of India, 1950, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 22.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

Case In Brief:

• In 2004, the Government of Maharashtra issued a notification.
  • It converted the respondents' (landowner) land from a ‘No Development Zone’ to ‘Residential Zone’, subject to the Municipal Council receiving 10% compulsory ‘open space’ and 10% as ‘amenity space’, free of charge.
• Permission was sought by the landowners from the Town Planning Authority for development of land which was granted.
• Consequently, the plot was divided into various divisions and further sold.
• Landowners made an agreement with the Municipal Council, transferring and delivering specific land for use as 'open space' and 'amenity space' in alignment with the 2004 Notification.
  • The Municipal Council's name was also officially recorded in the revenue documents for the 'amenity space' and 'open space' they received
• The Municipal Council demanded possession of the above said property in 2012.
• The landowners initiated a civil lawsuit to request a permanent injunction order and concurrently submitted an application for a temporary injunction order against the Municipal Council.
• The temporary injunction was rejected by the trial court whereas it was upheld by the District Court in appeal.
• Thereafter, the landowners filed a writ petition before the High Court (HC) challenging the Government Notification of 2004.
• The HC held that the writ petition filed by the landowners was not maintainable on account of the delay.
  • The HC also restricted the Municipal Council from changing the use of the land of ‘open space’ and ‘amenity space’ except for the beneficial enjoyment of residential plot holders.
• Hence the petition was filed in Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• SC while relying upon the case of Narayanrao Jagobaji Gowande Public Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Ors, (2016), where SC held that, a clause that allows the government to grant land development permissions for commercial purposes, while also mandating the landowner to provide a portion of the land for public utility without charge, should not be deemed as unlawful, dismissed the appeal.

[Original Judgement]

Phulel Singh v. State of Haryana

Keywords: Indian Penal Code, 1860, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 27.09.2023

Bench Strength – 3 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Case In Brief:

• The marriage between the deceased and the appellant was solemnized in 1987.
• It was contended on behalf of the prosecution that the appellant used to harass the deceased on account of giving him insufficient dowry.
  • Succumbing to the demands of the appellant, the parents of the deceased paid the appellant in cash and in 1990, gave him a scooter and gold ornaments.
  • Further, the demands for dowry continued which were brought to the notice of the father and brother of deceased by her.
• Eventually the deceased was burnt and was taken to the hospital where she was admitted and was unconscious.
• Medical examination revealed that the deceased had 91% burns on her body.
• When the deceased regained consciousness, she told her brother that it was the appellant who had burnt her.
• The Executive Magistrate filed an application to obtain the opinion of the medical expert regarding her fit state of mind to record the statement, it was recorded at about 4:40 P.M. the same day and her thumb impression was obtained.
• A First Information Report (FIR) was recorded based on the said statement of the deceased against her father-in-law, mother-in-law and the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 498 - A, 307, 406 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• Later on, upon death of the victim upon completion of investigation charges were framed for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 304-B of IPC.
• The Sessions judge convicted them under Section 304-B but gave the benefit of doubt to acquit them under section 302 IPC.
• The High Court (HC) acquitted the father-in-law under Section 304-B IPC but confirmed the sentence given to the appellant.
• Dissatisfied with this, the appellant turned to the SC.

Verdict:

The SC acquitted the convict in the case, and emphasized that the critical importance of ensuring that a dying declaration is trustworthy and reliable and inspires confidence when it is considered the sole basis for a criminal conviction.

Relevant Provision:

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Section 32 - Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant - (1) When it relates to cause of death –– When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

[Original Judgement]

A. Krishna Shenoy v. Ganga Devi G. & Ors

Keywords: Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 11.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Case In Brief:

• A suit for partition was filed, on the first occasion in which the petitioner was presented as a defendant.
• The preliminary decree passed in the said suit became final as against the petitioner herein.
• However, two of his sisters were not mentioned as parties.
• An attempt made by them during final proceedings in this regard did not produce any positive results.
• Hence, they filed an independent suit for partition.
• During the proceedings, they filed an application for a preliminary decree by the court in the earlier suit against the petitioner.
• The counsel for the petitioner argued that when a separate suit was filed, an application on the same is hit by Section 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).
• However, a supplementary preliminary decree was passed by the court, which, in turn, was confirmed.
• Hence, they filed this Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC held that “Admittedly, we are dealing with a suit for partition, in which every interested party is deemed to be a plaintiff. Law does not bar passing of numerous preliminary decrees”.
• The court denied the application of Section 10 CPC on the application.

Relevant Provision:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)

Section 10 - Stay of suit —

No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court.

Explanation - The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action.

[Original Order]

PACL v. Central Bureau of Investigation

Keywords: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 05.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice A.S. Bopanna

Case In Brief:

• Interlocutory applications were filed by the accused seeking bail for several punishable offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978.
• The case against the accused was filed after an inquiry was made by the Centra Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
• The accused applied for bail on all the cases pending against them.
• Hence, a Criminal Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC held that “One cannot apply one bail order to all the other subsequent cases. We do not have adequate particulars pertaining to the subsequent cases filed, like the chargesheet pertaining to the case registered by different investigating agencies. It is not as if the applicants are unable to approach the courts concerned to seek bail”.
• The court considered the condition of the accused, the court granted an interim bail for the period of 3 months for approaching concerned authorities for bail in each case pending against them.

Relevant Provision:

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

Section 438 - Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest —

• Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter-alia, the following factors, namely—
  • the nature and gravity of the accusation;
  • the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;
  • the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and.
  • where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested,either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail;

Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this Sub-Section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.

• • • (1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under Sub-Section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court,
    • (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice.
• When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under subsection
  • (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including—
  • a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;
  • a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;
  • a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;
  • such other condition as may be imposed under Sub-Section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.
• If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail, and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-Section (1).
• Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code.

[Original Judgment]

Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor,

Keywords: Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act of 1971), Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 06.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra

Case In Brief:

• The counsel appearing on behalf of his client before the Gujarat High Court undertook that the property under dispute will not be sold out till the pendency of the main petition.
• However, the client executed 13 sale deeds for the property during the pendency of the petition.
• The breach of undertaking by the counsel of the appellant was marked as a willful disobedience of court and hence, civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act of 1971).
• They also tendered an apology before the HC which was not accepted by the HC.
• Hence, a Criminal Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC held that “An assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/ advocate on behalf of his client to the court, the willful breach or disobedience of the same would amount to “civil contempt” as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971”.
• The court rejected the apology tendered by terming it as “legal trick to wriggle out of responsibility”.

Relevant Provision:

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act of 1971)

Section 2 (b) - Civil Contempt —

(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;

[Original Judgment]

BTL EPC Lt v. Macawber Beekay Pvt. Ltd.

Keywords: Constitution of India, 1950, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 18.09.2023

Bench Strength – 3 Judges

Composition of Bench – CJI D Y Chandrachud and Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra

Case In Brief:

• Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) was awarded a contract for setting up the 5x800 MW Yadadri Thermal Power Station.
• BHEL invited bids to subcontract a part of the work.
• On 29^th September 2022, a letter of intent was issued to the appellant (BTL EPC Ltd) for a total contract value of Rs 378.64 crores.
• On 23^rd July 2020, the Public Procurement Division in the Department of Expenditure of the Union Ministry of Finance issued an Order imposing certain restrictions under Rule 144(xi) of the General Financial Rules 2017, whereby a prospective bidder from a country that shares a land border with India, would be eligible to bid, only if such bidder is registered with the Competent Authority.
• The first respondent instituted a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) before the High Court of Karnataka contending that the award of the contract to the appellant was in breach of the conditions which were imposed in the Order dated 23^rd July 2020 of the Union Ministry of Finance.
• The contention of the Respondent was that the Chinese company which had entered into a consortium agreement with the appellant to enable the appellant to fulfill the eligibility conditions under the tender floated by BHEL was required to be registered with the competent authority, according to the Public Procurement Order.
• It was further contested by the Respondent that in the absence of such registration, the tender submitted by the appellant did not meet the technical requirements and could not have been considered by BHEL.
• The Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition.
• Thereafter the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka reversed the decision of the Single Judge and allowed the writ appeal.
• Thereafter an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgement division bench of the Karnataka High Court that had quashed the letter of intent issued by BHEL in favour of the Appellant.
• The Apex Court set aside the order of the Division Bench and restored the order of the Single Bench of the High Court of Karnataka.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court held that it is a settled law that in contracts involving complex technical issues, the Court should exercise restraint in exercising the power of judicial review.
• The Court further states that even if a party to the contract is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the COI, and as such, is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court, the Court should not readily interfere in commercial or contractual matters.

Relevant Provision:

Constitution of India, 1950

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32.

[Original Judgment]

Satendra Babu v. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Keywords: Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 06.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices B.R. Gavai and Prashant Kumar Mishra

Case In Brief:

• The petitioner is behind bars for a period of one year four months in connection with Case Crime No. 351 of 2021 registered at Police Station Bhamora, District Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh and the charge-sheet has already been filed.
• The bail application of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court of Allahabad on the grounds that the petitioner did not appear before the Trial Court and as such warrants came to be issued.
• Thereafter a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed before the Supreme Court.
• Dismissing the SLP, the Supreme Court granted bail to the accused.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court stated that when accused persons are in prison, it is the duty of the police to produce them before the trial court. If the police fail to produce them before the court, then the accused cannot be made to suffer due to such negligence of the police.

Relevant Provision:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 436 - In what cases bail to be taken.

(1) When any person other than a person accused of a non- bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail: Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided: Provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sub- section (3) of section 116 or section 446A ¹ .

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail- bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any such refusal shall be without prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof under section 446.

[Original Judgment]

Valliammai v. K.P. Mural

Keywords: The Limitation Act, 1963, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 12.09.2023

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi

Case In Brief:

• A. Valliammai had entered into an agreement to sell the suit property with respondent K. Sriram.
• The amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid by K. Sriram to A. Valliammai as an advance. The balance sale consideration o was required to be paid within one year, that is, by 26^th May 1989.
• On 11^th July 1991, K. Sriram had issued a legal notice through his advocate, requiring A. Valliammai to accept the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed within one month.
• A. Valliammai had agreed to execute the sale deed within one year from the date of the agreement by executing single or multiple deeds in favour of K. Sriram.
• A. Valliammai had expressed her willingness to sell only half of the Suit Property, and she also alleged that K. Sriram had failed to perform and abide by the agreement to sell within the stipulated deadline due to his inability to complete the contract.
• On 15^th July 1991, K. Sriram filed a suit for permanent injunction to restrain A. Valliammai from dealing with Suit Property till she executes the sale deeds.
• On 23^rd December 1992, Sriram assigned his rights under the agreement to sell in favour of respondent no.1 – K.P. Murali and respondent no.2 - S.P. Duraisamy.
• K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy filed a suit for specific performance.
• The Trial Court directed specific performance, which was affirmed by the Division Bench High Court of Madras.
• Aggrieved by the Judgement of the High Court, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
• The Supreme Court set aside the judgment for specific performance, as affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

Verdict:

The Supreme Court observed that when no time is fixed for specific performance of a contract, then the limitation period for a specific performance suit as per Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, will run from the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on part of the defendant to perform the contract to determine the period of limitation.

Relevant Provision:

The Limitation Act, 1963

Article 54

• The first part of Article 54 states that the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance would be three years from the date fixed for performance.
• The second part of Article 54 states that when no date is fixed, the period of limitation is three years from the date when the plaintiff noticed that performance has been refused.

[Original Judgment]