Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. (Biscuit Division) & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.06.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra  

Case In Brief: 

• Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited (Biscuit Division) operated exclusively for Britannia Industries Limited for over 30 years under Job Work Agreements. On May 24, 2019, Britannia terminated the agreement with effect from November 27, 2019. 
• HSML submitted a closure application on August 28, 2019, under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, affecting 178 permanent workers. The Deputy Secretary rejected the application as incomplete on September 25, 2019, demanding additional information about efforts to prevent closure. 
• Despite HSML's detailed response on October 10, 2019, showing unsuccessful attempts to secure alternative business with Mondelez, ITC, and Parle Biscuits, the authorities again found the response lacking. Workers' unions opposed the closure and obtained an interim order from the Industrial Tribunal restraining closure. 
• The Bombay High Court dismissed HSML's challenges, leading to appeals before the Supreme Court.

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court balanced constitutional rights under Article 19(1)(g) with statutory worker protections. It held that HSML's closure application dated August 28, 2019, was complete and valid, triggering the 60-day statutory period under Section 25-O. 
• The Court ruled that the Deputy Secretary lacked authority to reject closure applications - only the Minister-in-Charge possessed such power. The Minister's unlawful delegation to the Deputy Secretary rendered all communications legally invalid. 
• The Court recognized HSML's compelling circumstances after losing its exclusive 30-year business relationship with no viable alternatives. It allowed the appeals, declaring closure valid from August 28, 2019, with deemed closure taking effect in October 2019. 
• For worker welfare, the Court directed HSML to pay ₹15 crores total compensation (enhanced from ₹10 crores) to be disbursed within eight weeks, while ruling that litigation-period payments would not be recoverable from workers. 

Relevant Provision: 

Article – 19(1)(g) of the COI: 

• All citizens shall have the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu

Date of Judgement/Order – 04.06.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench –  Justices BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma 

Case In Brief: 

• The case arose from a 2003 incident where the appellant, who was a neighbor of the deceased Smt. Mariammal, allegedly entered her room at night and attempted to outrage her modesty. The next day, the deceased committed suicide along with her infant daughter by consuming poison.  
• The Trial Court initially acquitted the appellant under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) but convicted him under Sections 354 and 448 IPC. When the appellant filed an appeal against his conviction, the High Court, while hearing his appeal, exercised suo motu revisional powers and not only dismissed his appeal but also convicted him under Section 306 IPC and enhanced his sentence to five years rigorous imprisonment.  
• This prompted the appellant to approach the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court's authority to enhance punishment in his own appeal. 

Verdict: 

• The Court emphasized that "the right of appeal is an invaluable right, particularly for an accused who cannot be condemned eternally by a trial judge, without having a right to seek a re-look of the Trial Court's judgment by a superior or appellate court. The right to prefer an appeal is not only a statutory right but also a constitutional right in the case of an accused."  
• The Court further observed that an accused has comprehensive rights in appeal, stating that "an accused can question procedural flaws, impropriety and lapses that may have been committed by the Trial Court in arriving at the judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence."  
• Most importantly, the Court held that "the appellate court in an appeal filed by the accused cannot while maintaining the conviction enhance the sentence.  
• While exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly, when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused."  
• The Court applied the principle of "reformatio in peius" (change for the worse), ruling that an appellant cannot be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. 

Relevant Provision: 

Right to Appeal: 

• The right to appeal is a legal entitlement that allows parties to challenge lower court decisions in higher courts and is recognized under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
• It is a statutory right, not an inherent right, and can only be exercised within the framework of specific statutes that grant it.

[Read Original Judgment] 

Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama Chettiar and Another. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 14.06.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi   

Case In Brief:

• The appellant purchased disputed property from Mr. Hussain Babu in 1998, who had previously acquired it from Ms. Jayam Ammal in 1991. The appellant claimed to be in peaceful possession of the property when circumstances arose that led to the present litigation.  
• While in possession, the appellant discovered that an advocate-commissioner was seeking to inspect his property. Upon inquiry, he learned that defendant No. 1, claiming to be a co-owner, had filed a partition suit against Ms. Jayam Ammal and others in O.S. No. 298 of 1996 and had secured an ex parte decree dated 29.07.1997 in his favour.  
• The appellant alleged that Ms. Jayam Ammal died immediately after the suit was filed, and her daughter Selvi did not contest the proceedings, allowing the suit to proceed ex parte. Hussain Babu, who was the third defendant in the earlier suit, was reportedly in Abu Dhabi and believed that Selvi would defend the case and protect the purchaser's interests.  
• The appellant contended that the ex parte decree was obtained fraudulently and collusively. He specifically alleged that defendant No. 1 committed fraud by filing the suit in the Sub-Court, Cuddalore, which lacked territorial jurisdiction, when the suit should have been filed in the Sub-Court, Chidambaram, based on the location of the disputed properties.  
• Compelled by these circumstances, the appellant instituted O.S. No. 60 of 2009 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction, claiming the ex parte decree was not binding on him. The defendant filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, contending that the suit was barred by res judicata since the earlier ex parte decree had attained finality.  
• The appellant argued that he was not a party to the earlier suit and therefore the principle of res judicata would not apply to him. He maintained that the ex parte decree was collusive and that the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be attracted to his case. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed that under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC, courts are limited to examining only plaint averments and accompanying documents, and cannot consider the defendant's defence or supporting documents. The Court held that res judicata adjudication exceeds the scope of Order VII, Rule 11 as it necessitates examining pleadings, issues, and decisions from previous suits, which goes beyond the limited purview of plaint rejection applications. 
• The Court noted that determining res judicata requires establishing four essential elements: first, that a previous suit was decided; second, that the issues were directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; third, that the same parties or parties claiming through them under the same title were involved; and fourth, that the issues were finally adjudicated by a competent court. The Court emphasized that allegations involving collusive ex parte decrees, jurisdictional fraud, or bonafide purchaser status require in-depth examination and detailed analysis of the previous decree's impact. 
• The Court observed that res judicata cannot be decided based on mere assertions in plaint rejection applications and that determining similarity of cause of action requires a trial with analysis of first suit documents, not speculation or inference. The Supreme Court noted that the Trial Court failed to consider or analyze the appellant's plaint case and disagreed with its approach in rejecting the appellant's objection. 
• The Court held that res judicata objections cannot bar suits under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC, particularly given specific averments about ex parte decrees, transaction circumstances, and declaration prayers. The Court clarified that it expressed no opinion on whether the ex parte decree would operate as res judicata, keeping all defendant grounds, including res judicata, open for final trial determination.

Relevant Provision: 

Order VII Rule 11: Rejection of plaint: 

The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—  

• (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; 
• (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;  
• (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;  
• (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; 

[Read Original Judgment] 

Ashwinkumar Govindbhai Prajapati v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 25.06.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench –Justices KV Viswanathan and N Kotiswar Singh 

Case In Brief: 

• The petitioner is a practicing advocate enrolled in 1997 who regularly appears before all courts across Gujarat and serves as President of Vastral Advocates Association. On 24 June 2024, an agreement was executed between Parmar Kamleshkumar Amratlal and Panchal Princekumar Bhavanishankar concerning a loan transaction.  
• Subsequently, on 13 February 2025, an FIR bearing No.11191037250276 of 2025 was lodged at Odhav Police Station, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The FIR was registered under Sections 296(b) and 351(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 40, 42(a), 42(d) and 42(e) of Gujarat Money-Lenders Act, 2011, and Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.  
• Panchal Princekumar Bhavanishankar was arrested on 25 February 2025 in connection with the said FIR.   
• The petitioner, acting as defence counsel for Panchal Princekumar Bhavanishankar, filed a regular bail application bearing Criminal Misc. Application No.1399 of 2025 before the Sessions Court at Ahmedabad. The Court granted regular bail to the accused after due consideration.  
• On 24 March 2025, while the matter stood thus, a notice under Section 179 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 was served upon the petitioner. The notice was issued by D.R. Patel, Assistant Commissioner of Police, SC/ST Cell-2, Ahmedabad City, requiring the petitioner to appear within three days "to know the true details of facts and circumstances of the case."  
• The petitioner challenged this notice before the Gujarat High Court by filing R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No.5349/2025. The High Court dismissed the petition after examining a report dated 11 April 2025 prepared by D.R. Patel, which stated that the petitioner had not responded to the summons and due to his non-cooperation, further investigation was stalled.  
• The petitioner's case is that he was neither an accused nor a witness in the matter and was only discharging his professional role as advocate for the accused. The FIR pertains to a dispute between the complainant and the accused, and the petitioner has no connection beyond his role as legal counsel for the accused. 

Verdict: 

• The High Court held that since the summons was served under Section 179 of BNSS in the capacity of witness and the authorities had power to investigate, there was no violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court through this special leave petition.  
• The Court held that the legal profession constitutes an integral component of the process of administration of justice.   
• The Court observed that permitting investigating agencies or police to directly summon defence counsel or advocates who advise parties in a given case would seriously undermine the autonomy of the legal profession and constitute a direct threat to the independence of administration of justice.  
• The Court held that communications between advocates and clients are privileged under Section 132 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and cannot be subject-matter of enquiry under Section 179 or any other provisions of BNSS.  
• The Court observed that advocates are bound by professional duty to maintain confidentiality of client information and advice provided.  
• The Court postulated two fundamental questions: whether investigating agencies can directly summon lawyers advising parties, and whether judicial oversight should be prescribed for exceptional cases where the individual's role extends beyond legal representation.   
• The Court held that what is at stake is the efficacy of administration of justice and the capacity of lawyers to conscientiously and fearlessly discharge their professional duties.  
• The Court observed that subjecting a professional to the beck and call of investigating agency where he is counsel in the matter appears prima facie to be untenable.  
• The Court held that the matter requires comprehensive consideration as it involves fundamental questions affecting the independence and autonomy of the legal profession.  
• The Court observed the importance of the matter and called for assistance from Attorney General, Solicitor General, Bar Council of India Chairman, and Bar Association Presidents to address these important issues.  

Relevant Provision: 

Section 132 of BSA - Professional communications: 

• (1) No advocate, shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client’s express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his service as such advocate, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional service, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such service: Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure of—  
  • (a) any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose; 
  • (b) any fact observed by any advocate, in the course of his service as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his service. 
• (2) It is immaterial whether the attention of such advocate referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1), was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client. 

[Read Original Judgment]