List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court   

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal held that a revisional court cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the executing court by deciding an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and must remand the matter if preliminary issues like res judicata need adjudication. 

• The Allahabad High Court held this in the matter of Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2025). 

What was the Background of Smt. Santosh Awasthi v. Smt. Urmila Jain  (2025) Case? 

• Malti Devi, the original landowner, sold 1.8 acres of land to Roop Chand Jain, who subsequently divided it into multiple plots. 
• On 03rd December 1976, Roop Chand Jain sold plot number 767 to Sushila Kumari, wife of Ram Narayan. 
• On 20.05.1979, Urmila Jain purchased 9 decimal of plot number 776 from Malti Devi, along with several other plots. 
• Following Sushila Kumari's death in 1986, Urmila Jain filed a suit for permanent injunction on 28th January 1991 against Ram Narayan and his sons regarding plots 776 and 771. 
• On 21st January 1991, a correction deed/titimma was executed by the Power of Attorney holder of Roop Chand Jain, changing the plot number from 767 to 776 in favor of Ram Narayan. 
• During the pendency of the suits, Ram Narayan transferred the disputed property to Smt. Santosh Awasthi (the petitioner) on 12.01.2001. 
• The suit filed by Urmila Jain was decreed on 14.10.2003, while the suit filed by Ram Narayan was dismissed, and his subsequent appeal was also dismissed on 13.04.2010. 
• Smt. Santosh Awasthi filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC in the execution proceedings, which remained pending for approximately 10 years (2014-2024).

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that where transfer of property occurs during pendency of litigation (lis pendens), such transfer is governed by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 making the transferee bound by the final decree even if not party to the suit. 
• The Court noted that Order XXI Rule 102 expressly bars transferees pendente lite from seeking relief under Rules 98 and 100, rendering the petitioner's application under Order XXI Rule 97 non-maintainable from the outset. 
• The Court held that once it was admitted that the petitioner was a transferee pendente lite, the executing court should have promptly decided the objection rather than postponing the issue of res judicata for final determination after evidence. 
• The Court observed that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC rather than remanding the matter to the executing court with appropriate directions. 
• The Court emphasized that execution proceedings should be disposed of expeditiously, referencing the Supreme Court's directive that such proceedings should be completed within six months from filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for delay. 
• The Court found that no offence against the judicial process was more egregious than allowing execution proceedings to linger indeterminately, thereby frustrating decree holders from realizing the fruits of their litigation. 

What is Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC? 

• Order XXI Rule 97 provides a legal remedy when decree-holders or auction purchasers face resistance while taking possession of immovable property. 
• The aggrieved party must file a specific application to the court complaining about the resistance or obstruction. 
• Upon receiving such application, the court must adjudicate the matter through a summary proceeding rather than requiring a separate suit. 
• This provision ensures effective implementation of court decrees by empowering courts to remove obstacles preventing execution of their own orders. 
• The court will determine if the resistance is justified and may pass appropriate orders to ensure rightful possession. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan held that when limitation involves disputed facts and mixed questions of fact and law, it cannot be decided at the Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) stage and must proceed to trial. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The appellant, P. Kumarakurubaran, was assigned a vacant site by the Special Tahsildar, Saidapet, Tamil Nadu in 1974, where he constructed a house and paid taxes. 
• The appellant executed a Power of Attorney in 1978 in favor of his father, K. Pothikannu Pillai, for the purposes of construction and related activities, but not for property alienation. 
• Contrary to the restricted scope of authority, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in 1988 in favor of the second respondent (appellant's granddaughter), which the appellant claimed was illegal. 
• The appellant alleged he became aware of this transaction only in 2011, whereupon he filed a police complaint under the Land Grabbing Cell against the respondent's family. 
• Subsequently, the second respondent executed a settlement deed in favor of the third respondent in 2012, who then executed a General Power of Attorney deed in favor of the first respondent. 
• The appellant filed suit O.S. No. 310 of 2014 seeking declaration of ownership, permanent injunction, and nullification of the various deeds executed by the respondents. 
• During the proceedings, the respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on grounds that it was undervalued and barred by limitation. 
• The Additional District Judge dismissed this application, but upon revision, the Madras High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition and rejected the plaint solely on the grounds of limitation. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that the question of limitation, especially in matters involving knowledge or notice of impugned transactions, is a mixed question of law and fact that cannot be conclusively determined without a full-fledged trial. 
• The Court held that where the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily but becomes a mixed question requiring evidence. 
• The Court noted that for Order VII Rule 11 purposes, the averments in the plaint must be taken at face value and assumed to be true, and the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint without permitting parties to lead evidence. 
• The Court found that the appellant's assertion regarding his discovery of the offence in 2011 and subsequent actions (complaint filing, patta application) could not be dismissed without proper evidentiary examination. 
• The Court observed that the High Court improperly reversed the trial court's well-reasoned order without undertaking examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable. 

What is Order VII Rule 11 of CPC? 

• Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is a significant procedural provision that empowers courts to reject a plaint at the threshold stage without proceeding to trial. This rule serves as a filtering mechanism to prevent frivolous, vexatious, or legally untenable suits from consuming judicial time and resources. 
• The provision enumerates six specific grounds on which a court may reject a plaint: 
  • Where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action (Rule 11(a)). 
  • Where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the court-specified timeframe (Rule 11(b)). 
  • Where the plaint is insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff fails to supply the requisite stamp paper within the court-specified timeframe (Rule 11(c)). 
  • Where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint itself to be barred by any law, including limitation laws (Rule 11(d)). 
  • Where the plaint is not filed in duplicate (Rule 11(e)). 
  • Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 regarding copies of the plaint (Rule 11(f)). 
• The rule includes a proviso that restricts the court's ability to extend time for correcting valuation or supplying stamp paper unless the plaintiff was prevented by exceptional circumstances and a refusal would cause grave injustice. 

Case Laws Referenced in the Judgment 

• Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another (2024 ) - Established that when a plaintiff claims to have gained knowledge of essential facts at a particular point in time, it must be accepted at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, and limitation will run from the date of knowledge. 
• Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar (2018) - Held that in suits for cancellation of sale deeds, the limitation period commences from the date of knowledge, and where such date is pleaded in the plaint, it becomes a triable issue that cannot be determined summarily. 
• Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar & Others (2021)- Emphasized that rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is a drastic power and when a plaintiff claims knowledge of essential facts at a particular time, this must be accepted at the preliminary stage. 
• Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another (2020) - Clarified that for Order VII Rule 11 purposes, only averments in the plaint are relevant and matters requiring mixed questions of fact and law cannot be decided summarily. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A five bench of Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice BR Gavai, Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Viswanathan (minority) by a majority of 4:1 laid down the circumstances when the Court can exercise its limited power under Section 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) to modify the arbitral award.  

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025). 

What was the Background of Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) Case?   

• In this case a 5-judge bench was constituted to answer the following questions: 
  • Whether the powers of the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act will include the power to modify an arbitral award? 
  • If the power to modify the award is available, whether such power can be exercised only where the award is severable, and a part thereof can be modified? 
  • Whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act, being a larger power, will include the power to modify an arbitral award and if so, to what extent? 
  • Whether the power to modify an award can be read into the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act? 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that there were limited powers vested with the Court under Sections 34 and 37 to modify the arbitral award. This limited power is exercised in following circumstances: 
  • When the award is severable by severing the invalid portion from the valid portion. 
  • By correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record. 
  • Post award interest may be modified in some circumstances. 
    • Under Section 31(7)(a), arbitral tribunals have the authority to include interest at a reasonable rate for the period between when the cause of action arose and when the award is made, which is known as pendente lite interest. 
    • Section 31(7)(b) provides that if an arbitral award doesn't specifically mention post-award interest, a default rate automatically applies, which is 2% higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award. 
    • Courts retain the power to modify post-award interest rates when the facts of the case justify such modification, particularly in situations where delays or other circumstances warrant adjustment. 
    • In cases where the arbitral award does not include any post-award interest, courts possess the authority to grant post-award interest, demonstrating that this power is not exclusively held by arbitrators 
    • This limited power of courts to modify interest rates helps avoid additional rounds of litigation by allowing adjustment of erroneous interest rates rather than requiring the entire award to be set aside or a fresh arbitration to be ordered. 
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) applies, albeit the power must be exercised with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power 
    • The Court held that the power under Article 142 of COI must not be exercised where the effect of the order passed by the Court would be rewrite the award or modify the award on merits. 
    • However, power can be exercised where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end. 
    • Not only would this end protracted litigation, but it would also save the parties’ money and time. 

What is the Power to Set Aside Arbitral Award under Section 34? 

• Section 34 (1) provides that recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).    
• Section 34(2) provides that arbitral award may be set aside only if:   
  • The party making the application establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that-   
    • A party was under some incapacity, or   
    • The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or   
    • The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or   
    • The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:   
    • Provided that if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside.   
      • The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part, or   
  • The Court finds that-   
    • The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or   
    • The arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.   
      • Explanation 1 provides that for the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if, —   
        • The making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or   
        • It is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or   
        • It is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.   
      • Explanation 2 provides that for the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.  
• Section 34 (2A) provides for setting aside of arbitration award other than international commercial arbitration i.e. domestic arbitration.    
  • This provision provides that an arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.   
    Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.   
• Section 34 (3) provides that an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:    
• Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.    
• Section 34 (4) provides that on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.   
• Section 34 (5) provides that an application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement.   
• Section 34 (6) provides that an application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.