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Criminal Law

Section 31 of DV Act

 02-May-2025

Akshay Thakur v. State of H.P. & Ors. 

“As per section 31 of the DV Act, a penalty is only imposed on the breach of “protection order” or “interim protection order” and not on the breach of any other order.” 

 Justice Rakesh Kainthla 

Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla has held that Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) applies only to breaches of protection orders, not to non-compliance with maintenance, compensation, or residence orders. 

  • The Himachal Pradesh High Court held this in the matter of Akshay Thakur v. State of H.P. & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Akshay Thakur v. State of H.P. & Ors. (2025) Case ? 

  • The petitioner, Akshay Thakur, filed a petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 9/2018 dated 7th January 2018 registered at Police Station Manali, District Kullu, for an alleged offence punishable under Section 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
  • The complainant, Pooja Devi, had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manali. 
  • In her application, the complainant asserted that the learned Trial Court had previously directed the petitioner on 30th June 2017 to provide separate accommodation, compensation of ₹10,000, and maintenance of ₹4,000 per month. 
  • The complainant alleged that the petitioner failed to pay the arrears of maintenance amounting to ₹12,000 and the compensation amount of ₹10,000, despite her requests. 
  • The learned Trial Court, on 30th December 2017, passed an order sending the application to the Station House Officer, Police Station Manali, under Section 156(3) of CrPC with directions to submit a status report. 
  • Following the directions of the Trial Court, the police registered an FIR against the petitioner under Section 31 of the DV Act. 
  • The police conducted an investigation, found violation of Section 31 of the DV Act, and subsequently submitted a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court. 
  • The petitioner married the complainant on 20th January 2014, and differences subsequently arose between the parties. 
  • The petitioner contended that the complainant had filed a false case under Section 12 of the DV Act, and the learned Trial Court had erred in directing registration of an FIR for non-compliance with monetary and residence orders. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The High Court observed that Section 31 of the DV Act specifically penalizes the breach of a "protection order" or an "interim protection order" as defined in Section 2(o) read with Section 18 of the Act. 
  • The Court noted that the DV Act clearly segregates different types of reliefs under separate provisions (Sections 18-22), including protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders, and compensation orders. 
  • Applying the principle of literal interpretation, the Court held that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain meaning irrespective of consequences. 
  • The Court emphasized that criminal statutes must be strictly construed as they deprive citizens of life and liberty, and no act which does not fall within the purview of the criminal statute can be added by way of interpretation. 
  • The Court observed that had the legislature intended Section 31 to apply to all orders under the DV Act, it would have explicitly stated so rather than specifically mentioning only "protection orders" and "interim protection orders." 
  • The Court concluded that non-compliance with monetary orders and residence orders cannot constitute an offence under Section 31 of the DV Act, which is specifically limited to breach of protection orders passed under Section 18. 
  • Accordingly, the Court found that the learned Magistrate erred in referring to the application to the police under Section 156(3) of CrPC for registration of an FIR for breach of monetary and residence orders. 

What is Section 31 of DV Act? 

  • Section 31(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 creates a specific statutory offence for the breach of a protection order or an interim protection order by the respondent. 
  • The provision prescribes a maximum punishment of imprisonment for a term up to one year, or a fine extending to twenty thousand rupees, or both, for contravention of such orders. 
  • Section 31(2) establishes jurisdictional preference by stipulating that the offence shall, as far as practicable, be tried by the same Magistrate who issued the protection order that has allegedly been breached. 
  • The provision in Section 31(3) empowers the Magistrate to frame additional charges under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) or other relevant provisions of the Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, if the facts disclose the commission of offences under those provisions. 
  • This section creates a mechanism for enforcement of protection orders through criminal sanctions, thereby strengthening the protective framework established under the Act. 
  • The provision must be strictly construed as it creates a penal consequence, and its application is limited specifically to breaches of protection orders or interim protection orders as defined under the Act. 
  • The plain language of Section 31 does not extend its applicability to other orders that may be passed under different provisions of the Act, such as residence orders, monetary relief orders, or compensation orders. 
  • The legislative intent appears to distinguish between different types of orders passed under the Act, with specific penal consequences attached only to the breach of protection orders aimed at preventing acts of domestic violence. 

Constitutional Law

Rejection of Plaint & Article 227 of COI

 02-May-2025

Valarmathi v. Kumaresan

“Power of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory and is exercised to ensure courts and tribunals under its supervision act within the limits of their jurisdiction conferred by law. This power is to be sparingly exercised in cases where errors are apparent on the face of record, occasioning grave injustice by the court or tribunal assuming jurisdiction which it does not have, failing to exercise jurisdiction which it does have, or exercising its jurisdiction in a perverse manner. ” 

 Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi   held that a High Court cannot reject a plaint under its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI), as it cannot usurp the functions of the trial court. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan (2025). 

What was the Background of K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan (2025) Case? 

  • The appellants are the legal heirs (wife and daughters) of one Kathiresan (deceased). 
  • Kathiresan, during his lifetime, purchased certain nanja lands with his own funds but registered them in the name of the respondent (his nephew) based on astrological advice. 
  • Kathiresan maintained possession of the suit land during his lifetime, and after his death, the appellants claim to have continued possession. 
  • Following Kathiresan's death, disputes emerged between the appellants and Kathiresan's sisters regarding ownership of the suit land and other business interests. 
  • The respondent, who is the son of one of Kathiresan's sisters, initiated negotiations for the sale of the suit land. 
  • This prompted the appellants to institute O.S. No. 1087 of 2018 seeking a declaration of title and consequential injunction against the respondent from encumbering the suit land. 
  • The appellants also filed another suit (O.S. No. 201 of 2018) concerning other lands purchased by Kathiresan in the name/joint name of other family members. 
  • The respondent approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking rejection of the plaint in both suits. 
  • The High Court, through the impugned order, rejected the plaint in O.S. No. 1087 of 2018 on the ground that it was barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. 
  • For the other suit (O.S. No. 201 of 2018), the High Court held it was not barred under the Benami Act and declined relief. 
  • The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court to reject the plaint in the exercise of its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The power of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory in nature and is exercised to ensure courts and tribunals under its supervision act within the limits of their jurisdiction conferred by law. 
  • This supervisory power is to be sparingly exercised in cases where errors are apparent on the face of record, occasioning grave injustice by the court or tribunal either assuming jurisdiction which it does not have, failing to exercise jurisdiction which it does have, or exercising its jurisdiction in a perverse manner. 
  • The essence of power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. 
  • It cannot be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy available under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 
  • The existence of an appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 
  • The Civil Procedure Code is a self-contained Code, with Order VII Rule 11 enumerating specific circumstances in which a trial court may reject a plaint. 
  • Rejection of a plaint amounts to a deemed decree which is appealable before the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. 
  • The High Court, by rejecting the plaint on the ground it was barred by law, not only substituted itself as the court of first instance but also rendered nugatory a valuable right of appeal available to the appellant. 
  • The Court distinguished its earlier judgment in Frost (International) Ltd. v. Milan Developers, noting that observations therein were not relevant as the High Court in the present case had not exercised supervisory power to correct a jurisdictional error but had usurped original jurisdiction. 
  • Procedural law provides the necessary legal infrastructure upon which the edifice of rule of law is built, and short-circuiting of procedure to reach hasty outcomes subverts certainty and consistency in law. 
  • No offence under criminal law was involved in this case, as it was purely a civil dispute regarding property rights and jurisdictional matters.

What is the Scope and Limitation of the High Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction Under Article 227 in Relation to Rejection of Plaints? 

  • Article 227 of the COI establishes the High Court's power of superintendence over all subordinate courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction.  
  • This supervisory power is an important constitutional safeguard that ensures judicial accountability and maintains standards across the judicial hierarchy. 
  • The High Court's superintendence powers under Article 227 include: 
    • Overseeing all courts and tribunals in its jurisdiction. 
    • Calling for returns from subordinate courts. 
    • Making rules and prescribing forms to regulate court practices. 
    • Prescribing forms for record-keeping by court officers. 
    • Setting fee tables for court officers and legal practitioners. 
    • These powers come with limitations, including: 
      • Any rules made must not conflict with existing laws. 
      • The governor's approval is required for rules, forms, and fee tables. 
      • The High Court has no superintendence over military tribunals. 
  • Regarding Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, it provides grounds for rejection of plaints, including: 
    • Failure to disclose a cause of action. 
    • Undervaluation of relief with failure to correct within time. 
    • Insufficient court fee stamps with failure to correct within time. 
    • When the suit appears barred by law. 
    • Non-filing of duplicate plaint. 
    • Non-compliance with Rule 9 provisions. 
  • The Supreme Court in K. Akbar Ali v. Umar Khan (2021) has clarified that these grounds are not exhaustive, and courts may reject plaints on other appropriate grounds as well. 
  • The power of plaint rejection is a preliminary screening mechanism that helps courts filter out legally untenable cases at the threshold, while the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 serves as a constitutional safeguard to ensure proper administration of justice throughout the judicial system.