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Criminal Law

Couple’s Consent to Live in Relationship

 08-May-2025

Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.  

“The long-drawn relationship of the appellant and the second respondent including the circumstance of their living together and cohabiting with each other, that too, in a separate rented accommodation, would give rise to a presumption that their relationship was based on a valid consent.” 

Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra held that when two able-minded adults reside together as a live-in couple for more than a couple of years, a presumption arises that they voluntarily chose that relationship aware of its consequences. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr (2025) Case?   

  • The second respondent filed a First Information Report (FIR) at Police Station Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar on 23rd November 2023, against the appellant. 
  • According to the FIR, the informant met the appellant through Facebook on 6th February 2021, and they began a live-in relationship. 
  • The appellant rented a room in Khatima where they established a physical relationship multiple times with the appellant promising to marry the informant. 
  • The physical relationship continued, though the informant was allegedly sometimes abused and beaten. 
  • When the informant insisted on marriage, the appellant refused and threatened the informant, forcibly establishing a physical relationship on 18th November 2023. 
  • The FIR was registered under Sections 376, 323, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
  • The appellant filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 922 of 2024 before the High Court to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
  • In this application, the appellant claimed both parties were adults who voluntarily lived together for over two years and had a consensual physical relationship. 
  • The appellant also stated they had codified an agreement/settlement on 19th November 2023, and alleged the FIR was mala fide and intended to blackmail the appellant and his family. 
  • The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the allegations in the FIR disclosed commission of a cognizable offense and therefore could not be quashed. 
  • The appellant has now appealed this High Court order.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent (informant) existed since 2021, involving living together as a couple in a rented accommodation. 
  • The FIR did not specifically allege that the physical relationship was established solely because of a promise of marriage. 
  • The physical relationship continued for over two years without any complaint during this period. 
  • The Court held that when two able-minded adults reside together as a live-in couple for more than a couple of years, a presumption arises that they voluntarily chose that relationship aware of its consequences. 
  • The Court referenced Pramod Suryabhan Pawar case, which established that a mere breach of promise cannot be considered a false promise to establish misconception of fact. 
  • In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013), the Court distinguished between rape and consensual sex, emphasizing the need to examine if the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives. 
  • The Court cited Sonu @ Subash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) where an FIR was quashed due to the consensual nature of the relationship. 
  • The Court noted that in modern times, more women are financially independent and can make conscious decisions about their lives, leading to proliferation of live-in relationships. 
  • The settlement agreement dated 19th November 2023, which was not disputed by the second respondent, indicated that the parties had been in love. 
  • The Court concluded that on the ground of refusal to marry, the appellant could not be subjected to prosecution for rape. 
  • The allegations of assault and abuse were not supported by any material particulars. 
  • The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings, calling them an abuse of the court process.

What is Live in Relationship?

  • There is a difference between “live in relationship” and the “relationship in the nature of marriage”.  
  • Necessarily all live in relationships will not amount to ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ as contemplated under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act).  
  • The DV Act uses the terminology ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and not ‘live in relationship’. 
  • In the case of D Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), the Court observed the following:  
    • In a feudal society a relationship outside marriage was seen as a taboo and regarded with terror and disgust.  
    • However, the Indian society is changing and this change is evident and recognized by the Parliament in the DV Act.   
    • The Court further held that if a relationship in the marriage of marriage is akin to common law marriage it must satisfy the following:  
      • The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses  
      • They must be of legal age to marry  
      • They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried and  
      • They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as akin to spouses for a significant period of time. 

Civil Law

Dispute over Full and Final Settlement Arbitrable

 08-May-2025

Arabian Exports Private Limited v. National Insurance Company Limited   

“The question as to whether the appellant was compelled to sign the standardized voucher/advance receipt forwarded to it by the respondent out of economic duress is clearly within the domain of arbitral tribunal.” 

Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that the question of whether the appellant was compelled to sign the standardized voucher out of economic duress is clearly within the domain of arbitral tribunal.  

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of Arabian Exports Private Limited v. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2025). 

What was the Background of Arabian Exports Private Limited v. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2025) Case?   

  • The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the business of exporting meat and meat products. 
  • On 8th October 2004, the appellant took a comprehensive Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy from the respondent to insure their meat processing facility, building, plant, machinery, furniture, fixtures, and fittings at Taloja plant for Rs.3,28,55,000.00 covering the period from 9th October 2004 to 3rd October 2005. 
  • The appellant also took a Fire Declaration Policy insuring all stock-in-trade and finished products stored in the cold storage facility for Rs.5,76,85,000.00 covering the period from 15th March 2005 to 15th March 2006. 
  • On 26th July 2005, unprecedented heavy rainfall caused flooding at the factory premises in Taloja, submerging it underwater for several hours. 
  • Due to communication lines breaking down, the incident remained unnoticed until 28th July 2005. 
  • The appellant informed the respondent on 29th July 2005 about the damage and requested a surveyor to assess the damage. 
  • The appellant claimed Rs.56,07,027.00 for damage to plant and machinery under the Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy and Rs.5,15,62,527.00 for damage to stock in cold storage under the Fire Declaration Policy. 
  • On 28th July 2005, Dr. A.S. Patil inspected the factory premises and certified that the stock-in-trade was unfit for human consumption. 
  • On 29th November 2005, the surveyor appointed by the respondent, Chempro Inspection Private Limited, conducted a survey and acknowledged the loss suffered by the appellant. 
  • After considerable delay, the appellant was presented with an undated standardized voucher/advance receipt for Rs.1,88,14,146.00 in December 2008. 
  • Due to financial strain and pressure from bankers and creditors, the appellant signed and submitted the voucher on 12th December 2008 and received the payment on 19th December 2008. 
  • On 24th December 2008, the appellant called upon the respondent to settle the balance amount of Rs.3,83,55,408.00 while reserving the right to invoke the arbitration clause. 
  • On 17th April 2009, the appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the insurance policy and nominated Mr. Ramakant W. Gudal as the sole arbitrator. 
  • The respondent refused to accept arbitration through letters dated 18th May 2009 and 12th October 2009. 
  • The appellant filed applications under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Bombay High Court for appointment of an arbitrator. 
  • The High Court dismissed both applications, holding that no arbitrator could be appointed as the appellant had accepted the amount in full and final settlement.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The two insurance policies contained an identically worded arbitration clause for resolving disputes regarding the quantum to be paid when liability is admitted. 
  • In the letter dated 24th December 2008, the appellant stated they accepted the inadequate amount of Rs.1,88,14,146.00 (against their claim of Rs.5,71,69,554.00) only due to financial strain and pressure from bankers and creditors. 
  • The appellant invoked the arbitration clause on 17th April 2009, nominating Mr. Ramakant W. Gudal as the Sole Arbitrator. 
  • The respondent refused arbitration on 12th October 2009, claiming the appellant had accepted the amount in "full and final settlement" which amounted to "accord and satisfaction." 
  • The High Court observed that the payment was accepted without prejudice on 19th December 2008, and ruled no arbitrator could be appointed given this acceptance in full and final settlement. 
  • The Supreme Court referred to Nathani Steels case, which established that parties cannot invoke arbitration after reaching an amicable settlement unless that settlement is set aside in proper proceedings. 
  • In Boghara Polyfab case, the Court distinguished between voluntary bilateral settlements and discharge vouchers taken as a condition for releasing admitted dues, with disputes in the latter category being arbitrable. 
  • The Court held that the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is firmly embedded in Indian arbitration jurisprudence, where arbitral tribunals are competent to rule on their own jurisdiction. 
  • The Supreme Court concluded the High Court was wrong in rejecting the Section 11(6) applications, as questions about economic duress and sustainability of claims are within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. 
  • The Court set aside the High Court's order and appointed Justice (Retd.) Suresh Chandrakant Gupte as the sole arbitrator, with parties directed to report to him by 15th May 2025.

When Should the Disputes be Referred to Arbitration? 

  • Duro Felguera SA v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. (2017): 
    • A two judge bench in this case held that the Court should look into only one aspect i.e. existence of the arbitration agreement. 
    • Thus, the Court held that the questioned to be examined is only this- nothing more nothing less. 
    • The legislative policy and purpose is essentially to minimize the court’s intervention at the stage of appointing the arbitrator. 
  • Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021): 
    • The Court held that the subject matter qua arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage of Sections 8 or 11 of the 1996 Act unless it is a clear case of dead wood. 
    • The Court under Sections 8 and 11 has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie case of nonexistence of a valid arbitration agreement. 
    • The Court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis. The rule should be: when in doubt, do refer. 
  • Oriental Insurance Company Ltd v. Dicitex Furnishing Ltd. (2020): 
    • In this case an objection was raised that the claimant had signed the discharge voucher and had accepted the amount offered, thus signifying ‘accord and satisfaction’ which in turn meant that there was no arbitrable dispute.