List of Current Affairs

Source: Telengana High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice BR Madhusudhan Rao held that Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 cannot be used for unsettling the award.  

• The Telangana High Court held this in the case of X v. Y (2025). 

What was the Background of X v. Y (2025) Case?   

• The case involves a Civil Revision Petition filed against an order dated 9th December 2024 passed by the Commercial Court at Hyderabad. 
• The petitioners are Judgment-debtors who were unsuccessful in an arbitration proceeding that resulted in an Award dated 27th February 2019. 
• The respondent is the Award-holder who was awarded Rs.140,89,01,800 for claim No.1 and Rs.39,50,00,000 as bonus annuity along with 12% interest per annum. 
• The arbitration arose from a Concession Agreement dated 17th August 2007 for design, construction, and maintenance of an expressway in Hyderabad. 
• The respondent filed an Execution Petition on 16th September 2019 for enforcement of the Award. 
• The petitioners filed a petition to set aside the Award, which was dismissed by the Commercial Court on 21st March 2022. 
• The petitioners filed an appeal against this dismissal, which is still pending. 
• A Division Bench granted conditional stay of the Award execution on 17th October 2023, requiring the petitioners to deposit 50% of the awarded amount within 6 weeks. 
• The petitioners failed to deposit the required amount and subsequently filed applications to recall the conditional stay order. 
• These applications were dismissed by the High Court on 5th January 2024, and the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners' Special Leave Petition on 9th April 2024. 
• The petitioners then filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) to dismiss the Execution Petition, which was rejected by the Commercial Court on 9th December 2024. 
• This rejection forms the subject matter of the present Civil Revision Petition, which was dismissed on 2nd May 2025.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court found that Section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) bars filing of Civil Revision Applications against interlocutory orders of Commercial Courts. 
• The Court acknowledged that while Section 8 cannot impinge upon the High Court's supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, these powers should be exercised sparingly. 
• The Court determined that the petitioners exhausted all legal options except for their pending appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act). 
• The Court noted that the petitioners failed to deposit 50% of the awarded amount as directed, despite the deadline passing more than a year ago. 
• The Court affirmed that the A & C Act is a complete code in itself with comprehensive mechanisms for dispute resolution. 
• The Court held that Section 36 of the A & C Act only refers to the CPC for the limited purpose of enforcement of awards, not for equating awards with decrees. 
• The Court ruled that objections available under Section 47 of the CPC are distinct from those available under Section 36 of the A & C Act. 
• The Court found no reason to interfere with the Commercial Court's decision, as it was well-reasoned and legally sound. 
• The Court determined that the petitioners' conduct showed "blatant disregard of the law" and desperation to avoid payment obligations through "vexatious proceedings." 
• The Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition as not maintainable and imposed costs of Rs.5 Lakhs on the petitioners, noting that the respondent had been deprived of the fruits of the Award since 2019. 

What is Section 47 of CPC? 

• The Court executing a decree has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising between parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. 
• Such questions must be decided by the executing Court itself and cannot be the subject of a separate suit. 
• The executing Court has the authority to determine whether any person is or is not a representative of a party for the purposes of this section. 
• A plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are both considered parties to the suit under this section. 
• A purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree is deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree was passed. 
• All questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to the purchaser or their representative are considered questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. 

Source:  High Court of Chhattisgarh 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Bibhu Datta Guru held all mothers—biological, adoptive, or surrogate—are equally entitled to maternity leave as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,1950 (COI). 

• The High Court of Chhattisgarh held this in the matter of Lata Goyal v. The Union of India & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Lata Goyal v. The Union of India & Anr.(2025) Case? 

• Lata Goyal, employed as Assistant Administrative Officer at IIM Raipur since 2013, adopted a two-day-old infant girl on 20th November 2023. 
• Following the adoption, the petitioner applied for Child Adoption Leave for 180 days with effect from 20th November 2023. 
• The respondent institution (IIM Raipur) by order dated 18th December, 2023, denied the requested leave citing absence of such provision in the institute's HR policy. 
• IIM Raipur granted the petitioner 60 days of commuted leave instead, referring to their policy which provides maximum 60 days leave to female staff with fewer than two living children who adopt a child less than one year old. 
• The petitioner made multiple representations to higher authorities contending that as per Clause 1 of IIM's HR Policy, where rules are silent, Central Government Rules should be followed. 
• When her grievances remained unaddressed, the petitioner approached the State Women Commission, which recommended grant of 180 days Child Adoption Leave and 60 days Commuted Leave. 
• IIM Raipur challenged the Women Commission's order before the High Court, which set aside the Commission's order but granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal recourse. 
• The petitioner subsequently filed Writ Petition No. 6831 of 2024 before the Chhattisgarh High Court seeking declaration of her entitlement to Child Adoption Leave and Child Care Leave as per Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The High Court observed that the petition revolves around constitutional entitlement and protection, denial of which would violate the petitioner's rights under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. 
• The Court noted that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities, citing Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. 
• The Court observed that IIM Raipur's HR Policy expressly states that for matters not specifically covered in their manual, the Institute shall be guided by rules prescribed by the Government of India. 
• The Court emphasized that adoptive mothers, like biological mothers, experience deep bonds of love and affection with their children, which are crucial for a child's emotional and psychological well-being. 
• The Court held that women's participation in the workforce is not a privilege, but a constitutional entitlement protected by Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. 
• The Court observed that Child Adoption Leave is not merely a benefit but a fundamental right supporting a woman's need to care for her family, and denial of such leave offends her right to life. 
• The Court found no justification for discrimination between biological and adoptive mothers with respect to maternity benefits, as the object of such leave is to protect the dignity of motherhood. 
• The Court referred to international conventions including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, emphasizing that protective legislation related to maternity benefits must be construed beneficially. 
• The Court concluded that the restrictive interpretation adopted by the respondent institution in denying Child Adoption Leave constituted an offence against the petitioner's fundamental rights. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred? 

• Child Adoption Leave 
  • Child Adoption Leave is a type of leave granted to government employees when they adopt a child under Rules 43-B. Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972. 
• Current Provisions (as of August 2009) 
  • Duration:  
    • Enhanced from 135 days to 180 days (per notification dated 20th August 2009). 
    • Applies to female government servants with fewer than two surviving children. 
  • Eligibility:  
    • Granted when adopting a child up to one year of age. 
    • Also applies to accepting a child in pre-adoption foster care. 
  • Pay during leave:  
    • Leave salary equal to the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on leave. 
  • Combination with other leave:  
    • Can be combined with leave of any other kind. 
    • In continuation of Child Adoption Leave, adoptive mothers may also be granted leave of any kind due and admissible (including Leave Not Due and Commuted Leave not exceeding 60 days without medical certificate). 
    • This additional leave can be up to one year, reduced by the age of the adopted child on the date of adoption. 
  • Other features:  
    • Child Adoption Leave is not debited against the leave account. 
    • If pre-adoption foster care is not followed by valid adoption, the leave already availed is debited from other leave available to the employee. 
  • Paternity Leave for Adoptive Fathers (As per the 2009 notification): 
    • Male government servants (including apprentices) with less than two surviving children may be sanctioned Paternity Leave for 15 days. 
    • This must be taken within 6 months from the date of valid adoption 
    • Applies when adopting a child below the age of one year. 
• Definition of "Child" (As per the note in the Rule 43-B of CCS Leave Rules): 
  • "Child" includes a child taken as ward under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 or applicable personal law. 
  • Provided the ward lives with the government servant and is treated as a family member. 
  • And the government servant has conferred upon that ward the same status as a natural born child through a special will. 
  • This leave provision aims to give adoptive parents, particularly mothers, adequate time to bond with their newly adopted child, similar to the maternity leave provided to biological mothers. 

Relevant Case laws 

• Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. (2023) - Established that fundamental rights under Articles 19/21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities. 
• B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore and others (1977) - Held that beneficial construction should be extended to beneficial legislation like the Maternity Benefits Act which effectuates directive principles of state policy. 
• Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India (1984) - Expanded the scope of right to life to include the right to motherhood and the right of every child to full development. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar has held that the Constitution, not Parliament, is supreme, and that judicial review is a constitutionally conferred duty of the judiciary. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, (2025).

What was the Background of Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India,(2025) Case? 

• The instant matter pertains to a Writ Petition (No. 466/2025) filed by one Vishal Tiwari under Article 32 read with Article 129 of the Constitution of India. 
• The petitioner sought initiation of suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against Respondent No. 4, Nishikant Dubey, who is a Member of Parliament belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party. 
• The petition was filed in response to certain comments made by Respondent No. 4 against the Supreme Court of India and the Chief Justice of India. 
• The impugned comments were made in the context of the Supreme Court's intervention in petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. 
• Respondent No. 4 had allegedly stated that the Chief Justice of India was "responsible for all the civil wars happening in India" and that the "Supreme Court is only responsible for inciting religious wars in the country." 
• The petitioner further sought directions to the Union of India and Ministry of Home Affairs to lodge a First Information Report under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against Respondent No. 4. 
• Additionally, the petitioner prayed for directions to the Union of India and Ministry of Home Affairs to issue an advisory to all Chief Secretaries to curb hate and provocative speeches by political parties and their leaders relating to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, and its hearing before the Supreme Court. 
• The context of these statements appears to be related to ongoing debates about the relationship between different branches of government, specifically regarding Parliamentary supremacy versus Constitutional supremacy. 
• The Vice President, Jagdeep Dhankhar, had previously made statements claiming that "Parliament is supreme" and criticizing the judiciary for allegedly trying to become a "super Parliament." 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court of India determined that the statements made by Respondent No. 4 were highly irresponsible and reflected a desire to attract attention by casting aspersions on the Supreme Court and its Judges. 
• The Court observed that the statements demonstrated ignorance about the role of constitutional courts and their duties and obligations under the Constitution. 
• The Court affirmed that in a constitutional democracy, all branches of the State—legislature, executive, and judiciary—act within the framework of the Constitution, which is supreme. 
• The Court emphasized that the Constitution imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in all three organs of the State. 
• The Court reiterated that the power of judicial review is expressly conferred upon the judiciary by the Constitution under Articles 32 and 226. 
• The Court stated that when constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution, not beyond it. 
• The Court observed that judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles, not political, religious, or community considerations. 
• The Court noted that when citizens approach the court seeking judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights, and the court's consideration of such prayers fulfills its constitutional duty. 
• The Court held that the impugned statements, prima facie, tended to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, and had the tendency to interfere with and obstruct the administration of justice. 
• The Court determined that Sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which provide exceptions to contempt, were not attracted in the present case. 
• The Court observed that while technically an offence of contempt may have been committed, the exercise of contempt powers is discretionary, and not every commission of contempt need result in punishment. 
• The Court affirmed that courts and judges possess sufficient fortitude to withstand criticism, and that public confidence in judiciary cannot be easily shaken by "absurd statements." 
• The Court emphasized that any attempt to spread communal hatred or engage in hate speech must be dealt with firmly, as such speech erodes tolerance and open-mindedness essential for a multi-cultural society committed to equality.

What is Judicial Review?

• Judicial review is a court proceeding wherein a judge examines the lawfulness of decisions or actions made by public bodies, challenging the process rather than the conclusion. 
• The power of judicial review enables courts to scrutinize the actions of the legislature, executive, and administrative arms to ensure conformity with constitutional provisions. 
• The Supreme Court in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) held judicial review to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 
• Judicial review manifests in three forms: review of legislative actions, review of administrative actions, and review of judicial decisions. 
• Article 13 of the Constitution establishes that any law contravening the provisions of Fundamental Rights shall be void, providing a foundation for judicial review. 
• Articles 32 and 226 entrust the Supreme Court and High Courts with the responsibility of protecting fundamental rights through writs and other remedies. 
• There is no direct and express provision in the Constitution empowering courts to invalidate laws, but this power is derived from various constitutional provisions. 
• In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court held that any provision violating the basic structure of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. 
• Judicial review ensures constitutional supremacy over parliamentary sovereignty in the Indian legal framework. 
• The constitutional validity of legislation or executive orders may be challenged on grounds of violation of Fundamental Rights, exceeding legislative competence, or contravention of constitutional provisions. 
• Article 137 confers special power upon the Supreme Court to review its own judgments or orders. 
• While exercising judicial review, courts examine the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision itself. 
• Judicial review performs dual functions: legitimizing government action and protecting the Constitution against undue encroachment. 
• The concept of checks and balances in the Indian constitutional scheme recognizes judicial review as essential for maintaining constitutional equilibrium. 
• The Supreme Court, through judicial review, serves as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and final arbiter of constitutional disputes.