List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma held that, in an appeal filed by a convict, the appellate court is not empowered to enhance the sentence unless a separate appeal or revision has been filed by the State, the victim, or the complainant specifically seeking such enhancement. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sachin v. State Of Maharashtra (2025). 

What was the Background of Sachin v. State of Maharashtra (2025) Case? 

• The appellant was charged with offences under Section 3(a) punishable under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and under Sections 363-A and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 
• The case involved allegations that the appellant, who was a neighbor of the victim's family, induced a four-year-old minor victim to his house when her parents were away, undressed her, and committed the offence of rape. 
• The Special Judge, Warora, convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 3(a) and 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 of IPC, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for seven years plus a fine of Rs. 2,000. 
• The appellant filed Criminal Appeal No. 30/2015 before the High Court, challenging his conviction and sentence. The State did not file any appeal against the inadequacy of the sentence. 
• The High Court, while maintaining the conviction, noted that the Special Court had overlooked the provisions of Sections 5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC. The High Court issued a show cause notice to the appellant regarding sentence enhancement. 
• Despite objections from the appellant's counsel, the High Court remitted the case to the Special Court for reconsideration of the quantum of sentence. 
• The Special Court subsequently enhanced the sentence from seven years to life imprisonment plus a fine of Rs. 5,000. 
• The appellant filed Criminal Appeal No. 311/2021 before the High Court challenging this enhancement. The Division Bench suggested that the appellant approach the Supreme Court. 
• Due to these proceedings, the appellant, who was initially sentenced to seven years, had already served eleven years and eight months in prison. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that in an appeal filed by an accused against conviction, the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence when neither the State, victim, nor complainant has filed an appeal or revision seeking such enhancement. 
• The Court noted that Section 386(b)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly prohibits enhancement of sentence in an appeal filed by the convict against conviction. 
• The Supreme Court held that while exercising appellate jurisdiction at the instance of a convict, the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly when no appeal or revision has been filed by the State, victim, or complainant seeking enhancement of sentence. 
• The Court observed that for exercise of powers of the appellate court for enhancement of sentence, the CrPC provides specific procedures, and such enhancement can only be considered in an appeal filed by the State, victim, or complainant after giving the accused an opportunity to show cause against such enhancement. 
• The Supreme Court determined that the High Court erred in remanding the matter to the Special Court for enhancing the sentence imposed on the appellant, especially in an appeal filed by the accused seeking to set aside his conviction and sentence. 
• The Court found that the orders of the High Court and consequently of the Special Court were erroneous and had led to the appellant suffering incarceration exceeding the original sentence by more than four years. 
• The Supreme Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to restore the original sentence of seven years and ordered the immediate release of the appellant, as he had already served more than the originally imposed sentence. 

What is Section 427 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. BNSS ? 

• Section 427(c) specifically addresses the powers of the Appellate Court when dealing with an appeal for enhancement of sentence. 
• Before new Criminal laws the provision was covered Under Section 386 of  Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (CrPC)  
• The Appellate Court is empowered with three distinct courses of action in an appeal for enhancement:  
  • Under sub-clause (i), the Court may reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order a retrial by a competent Court. 
  • Under sub-clause (ii), the Court may alter the finding while maintaining the same sentence that was previously imposed. 
  • Under sub-clause (iii), the Court may, with or without altering the finding, modify the nature or extent, or both the nature and extent, of the sentence, either enhancing or reducing it. 
• The provision creates a clear framework under which enhancement of sentence can occur only when an appeal for enhancement has been specifically filed. 
• The statute explicitly distinguishes between appeals from conviction under clause (b) and appeals for enhancement under clause (c), establishing separate procedures and powers for each scenario. 
• The provision must be read in conjunction with the first proviso which mandates that no enhancement of sentence can be ordered without giving the accused an opportunity to show cause against such enhancement. 
• The second proviso places a limitation on the Appellate Court's power to enhance sentences by stipulating that it cannot impose a greater punishment than what could have been imposed by the original Court passing the order or sentence under appeal. 
• Clause (c) thereby creates a complete statutory scheme for sentence enhancement that is exercisable only within the framework of a properly constituted appeal specifically seeking enhancement. 
• The legislative intent clearly establishes that enhancement powers are restricted to appeals filed with the specific purpose of seeking enhancement, typically by the State, complainant, or victim, and not in appeals filed by the accused challenging conviction. 

Cases Referred 

• Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1975) :  
  • This case addressed whether the High Court, in revision under Section 401 Cr.P.C., has jurisdiction to enhance a sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State against inadequacy of sentence under Section 377.  
  • The Supreme Court held that the High Court has undoubted jurisdiction to act suo motu in criminal revision in appropriate cases, even when the State has not preferred an appeal under Section 377.  
  • The Court noted that Section 401 expressly preserves the High Court's power to call for records without the intervention of another agency, keeping alive the exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to its knowledge. 
• Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) :  
  • In this case, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the submission that the High Court could not invoke its revisional powers under Section 401 Cr.P.C. to enhance the sentence suo motu. 
  •  The Court clarified that the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, had not abolished the High Court's power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction suo motu. 
  • The Court held that the High Court's power of enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases by exercising suo motu power of revision still exists under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice R Mahadevan and Justice JB Pardiwala held that suits filed before 20th August 2022 without following Section 12A cannot be rejected unless specific exceptions in Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers (2022) apply. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India (2025). 

What was the Background of M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India (2025) Case?   

• On 9th August 2019, the Union of India filed Money Suit in the Commercial Court at Alipore against the appellant to recover ₹8,73,36,976 towards differential freight and penalty. 
• No urgent interim relief was sought by the Union of India in the said suit. 
• On 20th December 2019, the appellant, as the defendant, filed a written statement raising a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the suit due to non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018, which came into force on 3rd July 2018. 
• On 30th September 2020, the appellant filed Interim Application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint for failure to undergo the mandatory pre-institution mediation. 
• On 21st December 2020, the Commercial Court rejected the application, stating it was filed at a belated stage and rejecting the plaint would delay justice instead of facilitating it. 
• The Commercial Court noted that the suit was filed shortly after the establishment of the Commercial Court on 5th July 2019, at a time when proper infrastructure for pre-institution mediation and a standard operating procedure (SOP) had not yet been put in place by the Calcutta High Court. 
• The Court ordered the dispute to be referred for mediation and appointed Mr. Jayanta Mukherjee, an advocate, as the mediator, directing both parties to attend mediation proceedings starting from 4th January 2021 and complete the process by 11th January 2021. 
• Dissatisfied with the rejection of the application, the appellant filed a civil revision before the High Court. 
• In its judgment, the High Court held that rejection of the plaint at that stage would not align with the objective of Section 12A and instead directed the suit to be kept in abeyance, allowing the plaintiff to now comply with mediation. 
• The High Court considered that as of December 2020, the SOP and mediation infrastructure were not yet fully notified or operational in West Bengal, justifying the initial non-compliance. 
• The High Court also noted that the panel of trained commercial mediators was prepared only after the suit was filed. 
• The High Court set aside the Commercial Court’s appointment of the mediator and directed the plaintiff to approach the District Legal Services Authority in accordance with the SOP dated 11th December 2020, within two weeks of the order. 
• The suit was directed to be kept in abeyance for seven months or until receipt of the mediation report, whichever was earlier. 
• Aggrieved by the High Court’s order, the appellant (original defendant) filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The following conclusions were laid down by the Court: 
  • The Supreme Court in Patil Automation held that Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) is mandatory. 
  • This mandatory nature applies from the date the amendment came into force. 
  • As per paragraph 113.1 of Patil Automation, suits filed without following Section 12A must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, but this applies only to suits filed on or after 20th August 2022. 
  • If a suit involves a prayer for urgent interim relief, it can be filed without going through mediation under Section 12A. 
  • Unlike Section 80(2) of the CPC, there is no need to get prior permission from the court to skip mediation under Section 12A. 
  • Courts must assess whether the plaintiff genuinely needs urgent interim relief based on the nature of the case. 
  • Courts must be cautious of plaintiffs using fake urgent relief claims to avoid mediation. 
  • Even if the interim relief is ultimately denied, the suit can still proceed without mediation if the urgent need was genuine. 
  • Suits filed before 20th August 2022 without following Section 12A cannot be rejected unless specific exceptions in Patil Automation apply. 
  • In such older suits, if the defendant objects or any party wants mediation, the court should pause the case and send it for time-bound mediation under Section 12A. 
• The Court concluded in the facts of the present case that if the suit was instituted prior to 20th August 2022 without complying with Section 12 A of CCA and the same does not fall within the exceptional categories as mentioned in the judgment of Patil Automation, it would be open to the Court to keep the suit in abeyance and direct the parties to explore the possibility of mediation in accordance with CCA.

What is Pre Institution Mediation and Settlement?

• Pre Institution Mediation and Settlement (PIMS) is provided for under Section 12A of the CCA. 
• This Section provides for the following: 
  • Clause (1): A suit that does not involve any urgent interim relief cannot be filed unless the plaintiff first goes through the process of pre-institution mediation, as per the rules set by the Central Government. 
  • Clause (2): The Central Government can authorize authorities established under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, to conduct pre-institution mediation. 
  • Clause (3): The authorized authority must complete the mediation process within three months from the date the plaintiff applies. This period can be extended by two more months if both parties agree. 
  • Clause (3) – Second Proviso: The time spent in pre-institution mediation will not be counted when calculating limitation periods under the Limitation Act, 1963. 
  • Clause (4): If the parties reach a settlement during mediation, it must be recorded in writing and signed by both parties and the mediator. 
  • Clause (5): A settlement reached under Section 12A will be treated as if it were an arbitral award on agreed terms under Section 30(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and will have the same legal effect. 

What are the Landmark Cases on PIMS? 

• M/s Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers (2022) 
  • The Court held that Section 12A of CCA is mandatory in nature and any suit instituted violating the mandate of Section 12A shall be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). 
• Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 
  • The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is mandatory, requiring pre-litigation mediation before filing a suit, unless urgent interim relief is sought. 
  • A plaintiff cannot bypass the requirement of pre-litigation mediation simply by requesting urgent interim relief. 
  • The Commercial Court must assess whether the plea for urgent interim relief is genuine or merely a pretext to avoid mediation. 
  • The Court emphasized that any claim of urgency must not be a "disguise or mask" to escape the obligations under Section 12A. 
  • Section 12A clearly states that if a suit does not involve urgent interim relief, it cannot be filed without first undergoing pre-institution mediation. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh held that ambiguously drafted arbitration clauses amount to a criminal wastage of judicial time and must be rejected at the threshold by judicial forums. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited (2025). 

What was the Background of South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited (2025) Case? 

• The case arose from disputes regarding three separate Concession Agreements executed between Municipal Corporation(s) of Delhi and private contractors for development of parking and commercial complexes. 
• The primary contention centered on the interpretation of Article 20 in these Agreements, specifically whether these provisions constituted valid arbitration clauses. 
• In the South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited case, a Concession Agreement was executed on 24th April 2012 for construction of a multistoried parking facility at Defence Colony, New Delhi. 
• Disputes arose when SMS Limited alleged that SDMC failed to grant timely approvals for architectural drawings, causing substantial losses. 
• The Defence Colony Welfare Association filed a writ petition challenging the Concession Agreement, leading to a status quo order that halted project progress. 
• SMS Limited subsequently sought termination of the Agreement and refund of deposited amounts, along with compensation claims. 
• Similar disputes occurred in M/s DSC Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi regarding a parking facility at Greater Kailash I, and in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited concerning a complex at South Extension. 
  • Each case involved extensive litigation stretching nearly a decade, primarily debating whether Article 20 of the respective Agreements constituted an arbitration clause or merely prescribed mediation 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court on 15 May 2025 delivered a significant judgment regarding arbitration law in India, expressing strong disapproval of ambiguously phrased arbitration clauses. 
• The Court observed that such imprecise drafting constitutes a "criminal wastage of judicial time" and the very purpose of arbitration mechanisms. 
• The bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh emphasized that arbitration clauses must be framed with "piercing precision and clarity" rather than "couched in ambiguous phraseology." 
• The Court stated that responsibility for clear drafting rests with legal counsel, advisors, and practitioners, who must "shoulder this duty most dutifully." 
• The judgment urged courts and judicial fora to reject "shoddily drafted clauses" at the threshold stage and invoke suo moto powers in appropriate cases where deliberate ambiguity is detected. 
• The Court warned that personal liability may soon be assigned for such "unscrupulous acts," along with "sanctioning of the harshest punitive measures against the actors." 
• While acknowledging progress in the Indian legal ecosystem regarding arbitration, the Court noted that significant improvements remain necessary to ensure effective dispute resolution. 
• The judgment concluded that Article 20 in all three Concession Agreements failed to constitute valid arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 

What is Section 7 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act)? 

• Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act defines what constitutes an "arbitration agreement" under the law. This section is crucial because a valid arbitration agreement forms the foundation for arbitration proceedings. 
• The key elements of Section 7 are: 
  • Definition: An arbitration agreement is an agreement between parties to submit certain disputes to arbitration, whether these disputes have already arisen or may arise in the future. 
  • Form: An arbitration agreement can be either an arbitration clause within a contract or a separate standalone agreement. 
  • Writing requirement: The agreement must be in writing to be valid. 
• What constitutes "in writing": The section specifies that an agreement is considered "in writing" if it is:  
  • Contained in a document signed by the parties 
  • Found in exchanges of letters, telex, telegrams, or other telecommunication means (including electronic communications) that provide a record of the agreement 
  • Present in an exchange of claim and defense statements where one party alleges the existence of an agreement and the other doesn't deny it 
• Incorporation by reference: A reference in a written contract to a document containing an arbitration clause can constitute an arbitration agreement if the reference incorporates that clause into the contract. 
• This section lays out the formal requirements that must be met for an arbitration agreement to be legally recognized and enforceable under the Act.