List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that a partition suit claiming joint family property cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (CPC) when factual disputes, such as benami exceptions, require trial. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of  Smt. Shaifali Gupta v. Smt. Vidya Devi Gupta & Ors (2025). 

What was the Background of Smt. Shaifali Gupta v. Smt. Vidya Devi Gupta & Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The present case arose from a family dispute involving partition of alleged joint family properties. Smt. Vidya Devi Gupta (plaintiff No.1) and her son Shri Sudeep Gupta (plaintiff No.2) instituted Regular Suit No.630A/2018 against the elder son Sandeep Gupta (defendant No.1) and his wife Smt. Shaifali Gupta (defendant No.2), along with other family members and subsequent purchasers. 
• The foundation of the dispute traces back to Shanti Prakash Gupta, who was engaged in tailoring business until his death in 1977.  
• He left behind no immovable or movable property at the time of his demise. In 1982, his two sons jointly commenced a tailoring business named 'Himalaya Tailors' from a rented shop in New Market, TT Nagar, Bhopal, using funds generated from selling their mother's jewellery. Though operated jointly, the younger brother was designated as the sole proprietor. 
• The family initially resided together in a house purchased in Harshwardhan Nagar around 1990, continuing their joint residence until approximately 2011. 
• Subsequently, the elder son and his family moved to a house in Shalimar Park, which was allegedly purchased jointly by the family in 2014 from the income of their joint family business. 
• Parallel to the tailoring business, the elder son established a fabric business called 'Hemi Textiles' in 1986. The family acquired a shop in New Market, TT Nagar, Bhopal, from the combined income of both Himalaya Tailors and Hemi Textiles businesses. 
• The plaintiffs alleged that numerous properties were purchased using joint family funds or income derived from their joint family businesses, though registered in the names of different family members. They contended that all such properties constituted joint Hindu family assets liable for partition.  
• The suit specifically challenged the sale of certain properties (Serial Nos. 19, 20, and 21) by defendant No.2 to subsequent purchasers, claiming such transactions were void. 
• The subsequent purchasers (defendant Nos. 5 and 6) filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, contending that the suit was not maintainable under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988.  
• Notably, the primary contesting defendants (the elder brother and his family) never raised any objection regarding the maintainability of the suit or claimed it was barred by any statutory provision. 
• Both the trial court and High Court rejected the application to dismiss the plaint, leading to the filing of Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court by defendant No.2 and one of the subsequent purchasers. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court established that for rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, the test is whether from the plaint statements, it appears without doubt that the suit is statutorily barred. Where factual disputes exist regarding property nature, such determination cannot be made at the preliminary stage. 
• The Court noted that while Section 4 of the Benami Act bars suits regarding benami properties, whether a property is benami constitutes a question of prime consideration requiring factual determination beyond mere plaint averments. 
• The Court observed that plaint allegations consistently described suit properties as joint Hindu family properties purchased from nucleus funds or joint family business income, not as benami transactions. Therefore, these could not ex-facie be held as benami properties rendering the suit unmaintainable under Section 4. 
• Regarding Sections 2(8) and 2(9) of the Benami Act, the Court emphasized that certain property categories are excluded from benami definition, including properties held in fiduciary capacity for another's benefit. 
• The Court stressed that benami property determination must consider not merely Section 4 but also exceptions under Sections 2(8) and 2(9). Only where property is benami and doesn't fall within statutory exceptions can a suit be barred. 
• The Court observed that whether property is benami and not covered by exceptions must be decided based on evidence, not plaint averments alone. Defendants bear the burden to prove property is benami. 
• The Court noted that defendant No.2, having neither moved an Order VII Rule 11 application nor challenged the trial court's order in revision, was not a person aggrieved and could not assail the impugned orders, having acquiesced to trial court jurisdiction. 

What is Partition Suit? 

• A partition suit is a legal proceeding filed to divide joint family property among coparceners, resulting in the dissolution of joint family status and creation of separate nuclear families with individual property rights. 
• Any coparcener including sons, daughters (post-2005 amendment), grandsons, and great-grandsons can file a partition suit at any time with or without reason, while minors require guardians to file on their behalf. 
• Partition suits are governed by Hindu Succession Act 1956 and follow either Mithakshara Law (applicable in most Indian states) or Dayabhaga Law (applicable only in Assam, Bengal, and Tripura). 
• The suit encompasses all joint family property including movable and immovable assets, but excludes separate/self-acquired property of individual members and impartible estates like family idols and places of worship. 
• While female members like father's wife, widowed mother, and paternal grandmother cannot initiate partition suits, they are entitled to equal shares when partition is actually effected by male coparceners. 
• Purchasers of undivided shares in coparcenary property (whether through court sale or private transaction with consent) must file partition suits to obtain separate possession of their purchased interest. 
• Partition suits result in two types of decrees - a preliminary decree that determines rights and shares of parties, followed by a final decree that physically divides the property by metes and bounds. 
• Courts ensure equitable distribution where each coparcener receives shares in both movable and immovable property, with monetary compensation provided when physical division would destroy the property's intrinsic value. 
• Upon completion of partition, coparceners become free from joint family obligations and responsibilities, with their shares becoming fixed and no longer subject to fluctuations due to births and deaths in the family. 

Case Referred  

Pawan Kumar v. Babu Lal (2019): 

• The Court held that where exceptions to benami transactions are pleaded, it becomes a disputed question of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. Consequently, plaints cannot be rejected at Order VII Rule 11 stage. 

Source: Kerala High Court   

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice A. Badharudheen held that the formal requirements for executing a gift deed under the Transfer of Property Act,1882 (TPA) equally apply to a settlement deed. 

• The Kerala High Court   held this in the matter of Abraham, S/o Chacko and others v. Ajitha Jayakumar and others (2025). 

What was the Background of Abraham, S/o Chacko and others v. Ajitha Jayakumar and others (2025) Case? 

• The plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration of her title over a plaint scheduled property and recovery of possession from the defendants who had allegedly trespassed upon it. 
• The plaintiff's claim was primarily based on a settlement deed (Ext. A1) executed by one late Ramachandran in her favour, which she contended gave her legal title to the property. 
• Late Ramachandran was the husband of the 3rd defendant and father of the 4th defendant, and he had executed the settlement deed on 28.07.1986 before his death on 03.01.1991. 
• The defendants 1 and 2 contended that they were bona fide purchasers who had acquired valid title to the property through sale deeds executed by defendants 3 and 4. 
• Defendants 3 and 4 claimed that after Ramachandran's death, the property devolved upon them as his legal heirs, being his widow and son respectively. 
• The defendants argued that the settlement deed relied upon by the plaintiff was a false and concocted document that was never genuinely executed by Ramachandran. 
• According to the defendants, the total property extent was 1 acre and 44 cents, out of which 27 cents were acquired by the Government for the Kallada Irrigation Project. 
• The plaintiff alleged that while she had been possessing and enjoying the property under the settlement deed, the defendants trespassed upon it in December 1994 after executing a partition deed and subsequent sale deeds. 
• The trial court, after examining the evidence including testimony from the document writer (PW3) and the plaintiff herself, declared that the plaintiff had perfected title over the property through the settlement deed. 
• Aggrieved by the trial court's decree and judgment dated 31st July 2004, defendants 1, 2, 7 and 8 filed this appeal before the Kerala High Court challenging the findings. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that even though Ext.A1 is a settlement deed, the essentials to complete a gift as mandated under Section 122 of the TPA would apply to settlement deeds as well, despite there being a slight difference between gift deeds and settlement deeds. 
• The Court noted that it is not mandatory to examine an attesting witness to prove a settlement deed when there is no specific denial of its execution, relying on the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 123 of the TPA 
• The Court found that the plaintiff had successfully proved the execution and acceptance of the settlement deed, with the production of the original deed in her possession serving as vital evidence of acceptance. 
• Regarding the claim of defendants 1 and 2 as bona fide purchasers, the Court observed that they failed to exercise due diligence by not obtaining an encumbrance certificate to verify the property's liabilities before purchase. 
• The Court held that since the entire plaint schedule property had been transferred by Ramachandran through the settlement deed, nothing remained for defendants 3 and 4 to inherit, making their subsequent partition and sale deeds invalid. 
• The Court concluded that the appeal was meritless and deserved dismissal, upholding the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had perfected title over the property through the valid settlement deed. 

What is a Gift ? 

Section 122: “Gift” Defined 

A gift is a legal transfer of ownership of certain existing movable or immovable property.  

• Voluntary: The transfer must be made willingly, not under compulsion. 
• Without Consideration: No money or other form of payment is given in exchange. 
• Parties Involved: 
  • Donor: The person who gives the gift. 
  • Donee: The person who receives the gift. 
• Acceptance: The gift must be accepted by the donee (or someone on his/her behalf). 
  • Timing: Acceptance must occur during the donor’s lifetime and while the donor is capable of giving. 
  • If Not Accepted: If the donee dies before accepting, the gift is void.

Section 123: How Transfer is Effected 

The method for transferring a gift depends on the type of property: 

• Immoveable Property (e.g., land, buildings) 
  • Must be by Registered Instrument: The gift must be made through a registered document. 
  • Signed and Attested: The document must be signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. 
• Moveable Property (e.g., jewelry, vehicles) 
  • By Registered Instrument: Can be transferred through a registered document as above, or 
  • By Delivery: The property can simply be delivered to the donee, in the same way goods are delivered when sold. 

Source: Delhi High Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula held that not all forms of use of a mark amount to “use” in the legal sense contemplated under trademark law. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of Inder Raj Sahni Proprietor v. Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. (2025). 

What was the Background of Inder Raj Sahni Proprietor v. Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. (2025) Case?   

• Nature of Dispute: 
  • The suit involves a trademark dispute over the use of the mark “NEHA” in the personal care sector, where both parties claim prior commercial use in different but overlapping product categories. 
• Plaintiff's Background: 
  • Vikas Gupta (Plaintiff No. 1) is the Director of Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. (Plaintiff No. 2), a company incorporated in 2007, engaged in the manufacture and trade of Mehandi and allied herbal products. 
• Initial Use of Mark “NEHA”: 
  •  Plaintiff No. 1 began using the trademark “NEHA” in 1992 through a proprietorship named M/s Neha Enterprises. In 2012, the business was transferred to Plaintiff No. 2 through an assignment deed. 
• Trademark Registrations by Plaintiffs: 
  • The Plaintiffs hold a registration for the word mark “NEHA” (Registration No. 1198061 in Class 3) claiming use since April 1, 1992. 
  • They also own a registration for “NEHA HERBALS” (Registration No. 3752588) claiming use since April 1, 2012. 
  • An earlier registration for “NEHA RACHNI MEHANDI” was removed due to non-renewal. 
• Expansion Attempts: 
  • Plaintiffs applied for registration of “NEHA” in 2019 for various cosmetic and personal care goods (Application No. 4182573), which remains pending. 
• Cause of Action: 
  • In May 2019, the Plaintiffs discovered cold creams bearing the “NEHA” mark being sold by a third party and alleged infringement by the Defendant. 
• Defendant’s Background: 
  • The Defendant, Mr. Inder Raj Sahni, is the proprietor of M/s Sahni Cosmetics and claims to have adopted the trademark “NEHA” for creams since 1990. 
• Defendant’s Trademark Applications: 
  • The Defendant does not have any valid trademark registration for “NEHA”. His applications were either refused or abandoned and were not contested further. 
• Defendant’s Claims: 
  • The Defendant asserts honest and concurrent use since 1990, supported by a manufacturing license and invoices. He also challenges the Plaintiff’s use from 1992 to 2010 due to lack of a valid manufacturing license. 
• Allegation of Acquiescence: 
  • The Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff was aware of his use of “NEHA” since 2003 and accuses the Plaintiff of belatedly initiating litigation to disrupt a long-standing business. 
• Legal Proceedings: 
  • The Plaintiffs filed suit CS(COMM) 1833/2019 (renumbered CS(COMM) 207/2023) seeking injunction, passing off, and damages. 
  • An initial interim injunction was granted but later vacated by the District Court in November 2019. 
  • The Plaintiffs challenged this vacation order up to the Supreme Court, which directed the Trial Court to dispose of the suit on merits. 
• Cancellation Petitions: 
  • The Defendant filed two petitions to cancel the Plaintiff’s trademark registrations. 
• Transfer and Consolidation: 
  • Following the abolition of the IPAB in 2021, the cancellation petitions were transferred to the High Court. The suit was also transferred and consolidated with the petitions for joint hearing. 
• Final Proceedings: 
  • All three matters were heard together before the Delhi High Court. The evidence from the suit was agreed to be used in the cancellation petitions. Final arguments concluded, and the matters were reserved for judgment. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court in this case discussed the following issues: 
  • Defence of Prior Use: 
    • Not all uses of a mark qualify as legal trademark use. To be protectable, the mark must be used in a manner that identifies the source of goods and distinguishes them in the marketplace. 
    • Courts require actual use in the public domain—not just internal or preparatory activity. Rights arise from commercial and trading activities that link the mark to a specific source. 
    • Merely including a mark in a business name doesn't constitute trademark use. However, consistent and public use of a trade name can lead to proprietary rights under the common law of passing off. 
    • Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2001): This case establishes that a trade name used in commerce can acquire protectable goodwill. 
    • Although early invoices or product packaging from 1992 are missing, other evidence like tax returns, advertisements, and turnover records from 1994 support the Plaintiffs’ use of the mark “NEHA.” 
    • A licence under the D&C Act to manufacture cosmetics doesn’t prove trademark use. Trademark law requires proof of goods being sold under the mark, not just licensed for manufacture. 
    • The Defendant’s witness admitted that goods were manufactured only under 5-6 out of 18–20 licensed marks, and not under the “NEHA” mark as claimed. 
    • The earliest invoices showing use of the mark “NEHA” are from 2003. No documents show commercial use of the mark from 1990 to 2002, despite the Defendant’s claims. 
    • The Defendant filed for registration only from 2006 onwards, with inconsistent and conflicting claimed first-use dates. None of the applications succeeded. 
    • As per Sudir Engineering Co. v. Nitco Roadways Ltd. (1995), a document must not only be admitted but also formally proved. Court evaluation requires contextual analysis. 
    • Conclusion: The Plaintiffs demonstrated prior and consistent use of the mark “NEHA” from at least 1994 and are the registered proprietors. The Defendant failed to prove earlier commercial use, and its defence under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (TM Act) is rejected.
  • Infringement and Passing off Action: 
    • The Court held in this case that neither passing off nor trademark infringement has taken place. 
    • The goods—herbal mehendi and cosmetic creams—are dissimilar in nature, purpose, and consumer perception. 
    • The Plaintiffs failed to prove reputation across categories or likelihood of confusion. 
    • Thus, the Defendant's use of "NEHA" does not violate the Plaintiffs’ trademark rights. 

What Constitutes Trademark? 

• Section 2(zb) of the Trade Mark Act, 1999 (TM Act) defines a trademark as a mark capable of graphical representation that distinguishes goods or services and indicates a trade connection with the proprietor or permitted user. 
• Section 2(m) of the TM Act defines a "mark" to include a wide range of identifiers like devices, names, labels, signatures, numerals, packaging, and combinations of colors. 
• Not all use of a mark qualifies as legal "use" under trademark law; only use that identifies the source of goods or services and distinguishes them from others is protected. 
• Such "use in the trademark sense" must be public and connected to actual commercial or market-facing activity, not merely internal or preparatory use. 
• Trademark rights do not arise in the abstract; they are created through tangible trade and consumer-facing actions that establish a mark’s distinctiveness and source-identifying function. 
• Sporadic, incidental, or isolated uses that lack commercial context or market intention do not qualify as valid trademark use.