List of Current Affairs

Source: Rajasthan High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Chandra Prakash Shrimali held that a pregnant minor victim, having sufficient understanding, has the exclusive right to decide whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy. 

• The Rajasthan High Court held this in the matter of X v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of X v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2025) Case? 

• A mother filed a writ petition seeking court direction to terminate the pregnancy of her 17-year-old daughter, who was allegedly a victim of rape. 
• The minor daughter had left home on 12th January 2025 with one Dinesh Kumar, carrying relevant documents and Rs. 50,000 without informing anyone.  
• The police registered a complaint under Section 137(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023 (BNS) and subsequently secured both individuals from Jodhpur.  
• Upon medical examination, the minor's pregnancy test came positive, with the ultrasound revealing a pregnancy of 22 weeks and 3 days.  
• The mother alleged that her daughter became pregnant due to rape committed by the accused and requested referral to a government hospital for pregnancy termination under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP,1971) .  
• However, the minor victim categorically stated in her consent memo dated 5 June 2025 that she was not willing to abort the foetus.  
• The victim further told police that the pregnancy resulted from consensual intercourse with the accused, not coercion. It emerged that the victim and accused had known each other for nine years and had previously eloped in 2023, after which they were secured by police and the accused was jailed, but they eloped again in January 2025 when he was out on bail.  
• The medical board confirmed that while pregnancy termination was possible with usual procedural risks, the critical 20-week period for safe abortion had already passed. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that although the petitioner's daughter was a minor aged 17 years and 5 months, she was sufficiently mature and capable of understanding the consequences of her decision regarding the pregnancy.  
• The Court noted that the minor victim's unwillingness to abort the foetus and her willingness to raise the child independently reflected her clear understanding of the social and economic factors associated with child-rearing. The Court held that ignoring the minor's consent completely would lead to forcible termination of pregnancy, causing grave mental and physical trauma to her.  
• The Court further observed that Section 3(4)(a) of the MTP Act provides for natural guardian consent but does not address situations where there is divergence between the minor's and guardian's views, leaving interpretation open to courts based on case circumstances. 
• The Court emphasized that pregnant women have autonomy over their bodies and the right to make reproductive choices, with the consent of the pregnant woman being paramount and prevailing over guardian consent.  
• The Court concluded that the minor victim had the right to beget life, which is a facet of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and accordingly dismissed the petition while directing state authorities to bear medical expenses and provide compensation under the Rajasthan Victim Compensation Scheme, 2011. 

What is Legal Provision Related to Consent of Minor to Terminate Pregnancy? 

• Under Section 3(4)(a) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, no pregnancy of a woman who has not attained the age of eighteen years shall be terminated except with the consent in writing of her guardian.  
• However, the Act does not explicitly address situations where there is a divergence of views between the minor and her guardian regarding pregnancy termination. 
• While the statutory provision mandates guardian consent for minors, courts have recognised that where a sufficiently mature minor expresses unwillingness to terminate her pregnancy, her autonomous decision must be given paramount consideration as part of her reproductive rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
• The consent requirement under Section 3(4)(a) primarily applies to situations where a pregnant minor seeks to terminate her pregnancy, ensuring parental guidance in the decision-making process.  
• In cases where the minor categorically refuses termination despite guardian consent, forcing such termination would constitute a violation of her bodily autonomy and right to reproductive choice.  
• Therefore, the consent of a pregnant minor, even if under eighteen years of age, carries significant weight when she demonstrates sufficient maturity and understanding of the consequences of continuing the pregnancy, and such consent may prevail over guardian consent in specific circumstances as determined by courts on a case-by-case basis. 

Cases Referred  

• Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration (2009): 
  • The Supreme Court held that a woman's right to make reproductive choices is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, and no entity, including the state, can speak on behalf of a pregnant person and usurp her consent in matters of reproductive choices and abortion.  
• Ram Avatar v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2020): 
  • Recognised the autonomy of pregnant women, including minors, to decide on continuing their pregnancies and established that forced termination against a woman's wishes would violate her right to life and dignity under Article 21. 

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Prafulla Khubalkar held that a son and daughter-in-law have no legal right to reside in the self-acquired house of aged parents against their wishes, especially when relations are hostile. 

• The Bombay High Court held this in the matter of Chandiram Anandram Hemnani v. Senior Citizens Appellate Tribunal (2025). 

What was the Background of Chandiram Anandram Hemnani v. Senior Citizens Appellate Tribunal, (2025) Case ? 

• The petitioners, Chandiram Anandram Hemnani (67 years) and Sushila Chandiram Hemnani (66 years), are senior citizens who own a bungalow property in Nandurbar purchased in 2008 with their own funds.  
• Their son Mukesh Chandiram Hemnani and daughter-in-law Ritu Mukesh Hemnani had performed a love marriage and requested permission to stay in the parents' house, which was granted considering their immediate needs after marriage. 
• However, disputes arose between the son and daughter-in-law, leading the daughter-in-law to harass the elderly parents and filed criminal cases against them. 
• The daughter-in-law initiated matrimonial proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and criminal proceedings for offences under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against her husband and in-laws. 
• Feeling constrained and deprived of enjoying their own property while still repaying the loan taken to purchase it, the senior citizen parents approached the Senior Citizens Tribunal under Sections 5 read with 20 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, seeking eviction of their son and daughter-in-law.  
• The Tribunal initially allowed their application on 18th February 2019, directing the son and daughter-in-law to vacate within 30 days.  
• The daughter-in-law challenged this order before the Senior Citizens Appellate Tribunal, claiming the right to reside in the property due to pending matrimonial proceedings.  
• The Appellate Tribunal allowed her appeal on 7th August 2020, treating the matter as a civil dispute and directing the parents to approach civil courts for eviction. 
• During the proceedings, it was revealed that the daughter-in-law had purchased her own house property in August 2021 but continued occupying the parents' property. 
• The parents were ultimately constrained to approach the High Court challenging the Appellate Tribunal's order. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The court observed that the Appellate Tribunal adopted a perverse approach that defeated the object and purpose of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which ensures protection to senior citizens' rights.  
• The court noted that the daughter-in-law failed to establish any legal right to reside in the suit property, as there was no court order or decree granting her maintenance or residence rights, and the criminal case against the parents had resulted in acquittal. 
• The court emphasized that merely allowing the son and daughter-in-law to reside in the house cannot confer any legal right in their favour, particularly when relations have turned hostile, and they cannot compel parents to allow them residence against their desire. 
• The court observed that the competing rights of the daughter-in-law cannot be compromised at the cost of senior citizens' rights to enjoy their own property independently, and any matrimonial rights she may have can be enforced independently without defeating the parents-in-law's protected rights.  
• The court found that the Appellate Tribunal's inference that eviction is merely a civil right requiring approach to civil courts was erroneous and defeated the purpose of Sections 4, 5 read with Section 22 of the Act.  
• The court noted the Appellate Tribunal's failure to consider established legal precedents and its adoption of an unduly hyper-technical approach, displaying indifference towards senior citizens' issues despite being vested with statutory powers under the beneficial legislation. 
• The court deprecated the daughter-in-law's conduct in continuing to occupy the property without any legal right and ignoring court orders, including the directive to pay Rs. 20,000 per month during the petition's pendency. 

What are the legal Provisions Referred? 

• Definition and Scope: Under Section 2(a) and 2(b), the Act defines "children" to include son, daughter, grandson and grand daughter but excludes minors, while "maintenance" encompasses provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. 
• Entitlement to Maintenance: Section 4(1) provides that a senior citizen including a parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of property owned by him shall be entitled to make an application under Section 5, with parents or grandparents having the right to proceed against one or more children who are not minors. 
• Obligation of Children and Relatives: Section 4(2) and 4(3) establish that the obligation of children or relatives to maintain a senior citizen extends to meeting the needs of such citizen so that the senior citizen may lead a normal life, with this obligation specifically covering both father and mother as the case may be. 
• Property-Based Maintenance Liability: Section 4(4) stipulates that any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such citizen or would inherit the property of such senior citizen, with maintenance payable in proportion to inheritance rights where multiple relatives are entitled. 
• Application Process and Authority: Section 5(1) provides that an application for maintenance may be made by the senior citizen or parent themselves, or if incapable, by any authorized person or organization, and the Tribunal may also take cognizance suo motu (on its own motion). 
• Interim Relief Powers: Section 5(2) empowers the Tribunal to, during pendency of proceedings regarding monthly allowance for maintenance, order children or relatives to make monthly allowance for interim maintenance and pay the same to the senior citizen as directed by the Tribunal. 
• Time-Bound Disposal: Section 5(4) mandates that applications for monthly allowance for maintenance and expenses must be disposed of within ninety days from the date of service of notice, with the Tribunal having power to extend this period once for a maximum of thirty days in exceptional circumstances with recorded reasons. 
• Enforcement Mechanisms: Section 5(8) provides that if children or relatives fail without sufficient cause to comply with maintenance orders, the Tribunal may issue warrants for levying amounts due and may sentence such persons to imprisonment for up to one month or until payment is made, whichever is earlier. 
• Joint Liability Provisions: Section 5(5) and 5(6) establish that where maintenance orders are made against multiple persons, the death of one does not affect the liability of others to continue paying maintenance, and children or relatives may implead other liable persons in maintenance applications. 
• Payment Timeline and Recovery: Section 5(7) and 5(8) provide that allowances for maintenance and expenses are payable from the date of the order or from the date of application for maintenance, with warrant recovery applications required within three months from when amounts became due under the proviso to Section 5(8). 

Source: Madhya Pradesh High Court  

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Rajendra Kumar Vani dismissed a habeas corpus petition filed by a father based in USA and stated that the petitioner has an alternated remedy under Section 13 and Section 14 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). 

• The Madhya Pradesh High Court held this in the case of Vishnu Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2025). 

What was the Background of Vishnu Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2025) Case?   

• The petitioner (father) seeks issuance of a habeas corpus writ under Article 226, directing Respondent No. 1 (child’s custodian) to produce their son and hand him over to the petitioner, enforcing a U.S. court order dated 4th April 2023. 
• In the alternative, he asks Respondent No. 2 (the mother) to cooperate in arranging for the child’s travel to the U.S. with the petitioner or his appointee within a fixed timeframe. 
• The petitioner and Respondent No. 2 married on 1st February, 2013 in Vidisha, following which they moved to Austin, Texas, establishing their matrimonial home. 
• Their son, Agastya Gupta, was born on February 14, 2015. 
• Due to marital discord, the mother returned to India in July 2018 with the child and has since resided in Sehore, Madhya Pradesh. 
• The petitioner alleges the mother has obstructed all his efforts to contact or see the child, rejecting such attempts and ignoring reports from the U.S. Consulate and child‑protection agencies. 
• The petitioner instituted divorce and custody proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey; on 4th April 2023, the court granted divorce and awarded him sole physical and legal custody of Agastya. 
• Despite this U.S. court order, the child remains in India with the mother, prompting the petitioner to invoke habeas corpus before this Court. 
• The petitioner relies on Indian Supreme Court rulings to support the principle of enforcing foreign custody orders via habeas corpus in the child’s best interests. 
• The mother opposes the petition, arguing it is non‑maintainable—as it essentially seeks enforcement of a foreign judgment when domestic remedies (such as under the Code of Civil Procedure or Guardians and Wards Act, 1890) are available. 
• She contends that the petitioner’s allegations are false, asserts that their marriage failed due to his misconduct, and that her efforts to reconcile were ignored. 
• She refers to 18th December, 2024 co‑ordinate bench ruling that declined psycho‑social aid for the petitioner, indicating that guardianship matters are within civil jurisdiction, not writ jurisdiction. 
• A Family Court in Sehore also dismissed a 17th October , 2024 guardianship petition filed by the petitioner’s parents under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act. 
• The mother additionally relies on Indian Supreme Court decisions which limit the scope of habeas corpus petitions in India for enforcing foreign custody orders. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court reiterated that a writ of habeas corpus is a procedural remedy meant to address illegal or unlawful custody, particularly where the liberty of a person is in question. In child custody matters, this is not about legal rights but whether the current custody is illegal and contrary to the child’s welfare. 
•  Referring to Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) and other precedents, the Court emphasized that in habeas corpus petitions concerning minors, the sole and overriding consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child—not enforcement of foreign court orders. 
•  The Court held that merely because a foreign court (in this case, the U.S. court) has passed an order granting custody to one parent, it does not render the custody with the other parent (here, the mother) unlawful. Such foreign orders are only persuasive and not binding. 
•  Since the mother is the biological and natural guardian, the custody with her is presumed lawful unless exceptional circumstances warrant transferring custody. 
• The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used to simply execute foreign court orders. The High Court cannot convert itself into a forum for enforcing such orders under habeas corpus. 
• The petitioner has other remedies under Indian law, including under: 
  • Section 44A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) (execution of foreign judgments), 
  • Sections 13 and 14 of CPC (recognition and exceptions to conclusiveness of foreign judgments), 
  • and under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. 
•  In light of these principles, and the fact that the child’s welfare is best served with the mother at present, the habeas corpus petition was dismissed. 
•  However, the Court noted that the father may still request to meet the child, and it is up to the mother (Respondent No. 2) to allow such interaction—personally or via video call—as a matter of personal discretion, not a legal command. 
• The Court preferred the reasoning in Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another (2017), Kanika Goel v. State of Delhi and another (2018), and Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta and others (2018), all of which caution against mechanical enforcement of foreign custody orders and prioritize the child's welfare. The Court found that the judgment in Yashita Sahu did not consider these earlier binding precedents. 
• The writ petition was disposed of with the above observations, without granting the relief sought by the petitioner. 

What is Section 13 of CPC? 

• Section 2(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) defines foreign Judgement. It states that foreign Judgement means the Judgement of a foreign Court. 
• As per Section 2(5) of CPC, a foreign Court means a Court situated outside India and not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government. 
• Section 13 of CPC states that a foreign Judgement shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except— 
  (a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; 
  (b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case; 
  (c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable; 
  (d) where the proceedings in which the Judgement was obtained are opposed to natural justice; 
  (e) where it has been obtained by fraud; 
  (f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India. 
• This section provides that a foreign Judgement may operate as res judicata except in the aforementioned six clauses. 

(a) Foreign Judgement Not by a Competent Court 

• A Judgement of a foreign court to be conclusive between the parties must be a Judgement pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
• A competent court implies a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. 
• The court of a foreign country has jurisdiction in the following cases: 
• Where at the time of the commencement of the action the defendant was resident or present in such country, so as to have the benefit and be under the protection of laws. 
  • Where the defendant is at the time of the Judgement in action, subject or citizen of such country. 
  • Where the party objecting to the jurisdiction of the courts of such country has by his own conduct, submitted to such jurisdiction by 
    • Appearing as plaintiff in the action or counterclaiming, or 
    • Voluntarily appearing as defendant in such action, or 
    • Having expressly or impliedly contracted to submit to the jurisdiction of such courts. 
• In the case of Bharat Nidhi Limited v. Megh Raj Mahajan (1964), it was held that a foreign Judgement has to be passed only by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction to operate as res judicata in the Indian courts. 

(b) Foreign Judgement Not on Merits 

• In order to be conclusive, the foreign Judgement must be on the merits i.e., which involves the application of the mind of the court to the truth or falsity of the case. 
• The Actual test for deciding whether the Judgement has been given on merits or not is to see whether it was merely passed as a matter of course, or by way of penalty of any conduct of the defendant or is based upon a consideration of the truth or falsity of the plaintiff's claim. 

(c) Foreign Judgement Against Indian or International Law 

• A Judgement based upon an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize law of India where such law is applicable is not conclusive. 
• The mistake must be apparent on the face of the proceeding. 

(d) Foreign Judgement Opposed to Natural Justice 

• The Judgement must observe the minimum requirements of natural justice, that is it must give reasonable notice to the parties to the dispute and afford each party adequate opportunity of presenting his case. 
• It may be noted that the mere fact that the foreign court did not follow the procedure of Indian courts will not invalidate a foreign Judgement on the ground of proceedings being opposed to natural justice. 
• In the case of Sankaran v. Lakshmi (1974), the Supreme Court held that the expression natural justice relates to the irregularities in procedure rather than to the merits of the case. 

(e) Foreign Judgement Obtained by Fraud 

• It is a well settled principle of Private International Law that if foreign Judgements are obtained by fraud, it will not operate as res judicata. 
• Fraud in any case, bearing on jurisdictional facts, vitiates all judicial acts. 
• The fraud may be either fraud on the party invalidating a foreign Judgement in whose favor the Judgement is given or fraud on the court pronouncing the Judgement. 
• In the case of Satya v. Teja Singh (1975), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had misled the foreign court as to its having jurisdiction over the matter, although it could not have had the jurisdiction, the Judgement and decree was obtained by fraud and hence inconclusive. 

(f) Foreign Judgement founded on Breach of Indian Law 

• Section 13(f) does not require that the procedure of the foreign court should be identical with or similar to the procedure of the courts in India. 

However, when a foreign Judgement is founded on a breach of any law in force in India, it would not be enforced in India.