List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that the amended Section 6 of the POCSO Act cannot be applied retrospectively and modified the sentence to life imprisonment under the unamended provision. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Satauram Mandavi v. The State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Satauram Mandavi v. The State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. Case? 

• On 26th June 2019, the father of the prosecutrix lodged FIR No. 37/2019 at Police Station Vishrampur, Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh.  
• The complainant stated that on 20th May 2019, he had gone to attend a marriage ceremony in the village along with his wife and mother, leaving their two children at home. 
• The prosecutrix, who was approximately 5 years old at the time, was playing outside the house during their absence. When the family returned and the mother was unable to locate their daughter, she approached the appellant's house to inquire about the child's whereabouts. 
• Upon being questioned by the mother about the missing child, the appellant fled from the scene, which raised suspicions about his involvement in the incident. 
• Registration of Case 
• The FIR was registered against the appellant with allegations that he had lured the minor prosecutrix to his house and committed rape upon her. The case was registered under serious provisions dealing with sexual offences against children. 
• Trial Court Proceedings 
  • The Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.  
    • After considering both oral and documentary evidence presented during the trial, the court recorded findings regarding the appellant's conduct. 
  • The appellant was convicted and sentenced under Section 6 of the POCSO Act to life imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, along with a fine of ₹10,000/-. 
• High Court Appeal 
  • The appellant challenged his conviction before the High Court of Chhattisgarh. However, on 5th September 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed both the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court. 
  • The High Court observed that given the victim was a five-year-old child and considering the grave and heinous nature of the crime committed, no leniency could be shown to the appellant. 
• Supreme Court Appeal 
  • Aggrieved by the High Court's decision upholding his conviction and sentence, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by order dated 30th September 2024, issued notice limited specifically to the question of sentence, indicating that the conviction aspect was not being challenged. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India provides absolute protection against retrospective application of criminal laws. 
  • The constitutional provision clearly states that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the act, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence. 
• The Court observed that the incident occurred on 20th May 2019, while the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019 came into force on 16th August 2019. The amendment enhanced the minimum sentence to 20 years and redefined "imprisonment for life" to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. 
• The Court noted that the Trial Court erred in applying the amended provisions retrospectively, as the incident in question took place prior to the amendment coming into effect. 
• The Court observed that under the unamended Section 6 of the POCSO Act, which was in force at the time of the offence, the punishment provision read: "Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine." 
• The Court found that the Constitutional bar against retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty under Article 20(1) is clear and absolute.  
  • The Trial Court, by applying the enhanced sentence introduced by the 2019 Amendment to Section 6 of the POCSO Act, had effectively subjected the appellant to a punishment greater than that which was permissible under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence. 
• This application was held to be clearly violative of the bar contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. 
• The Court observed that the sentence of "imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life," as per the amended provision, did not exist in the statutory framework on 20th May 2019, the date of the incident.  
  • Under the unamended Section 6, the maximum punishment permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense and not imprisonment till the remainder of natural life. 
• While upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the Court modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under the unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. The fine of ₹10,000/- was maintained. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred ? 

Section 6 of POCSO Act (Original vs Amended) 

Original Section 6 (before 2019 amendment): 

• Punishment: Rigorous imprisonment for not less than 10 years but may extend to imprisonment for life 
• "Imprisonment for life" meant conventional life imprisonment (typically 14 years with remission possibilities) 

Amended Section 6 (after August 16, 2019): 

• Punishment: Rigorous imprisonment for not less than 20 years but may extend to imprisonment for life or death 
• "Imprisonment for life" redefined to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life (no remission) 
• Significantly harsher penalty structure 

Article 20(1) of the Constitution 

This fundamental right provides two key protections: 

• No Ex-Post-Facto Law: No conviction except under law in force at time of offense 
• No Enhanced Penalty: No penalty greater than what was permissible when the offense was committed 

Retrospective Effect Analysis 

The Constitutional Bar 

Article 20(1) creates an absolute and clear bar against: 

• Applying new criminal laws retrospectively 
• Imposing harsher penalties retroactively 
• This protection is fundamental and cannot be waived 

Application in the Supreme Court Case 

Facts: 

• Offense committed: 20th May, 2019 
• Amendment came into force: 16th August, 2019 
• Trial court applied amended provision retrospectively 

Supreme Court's Ruling: The Court held that applying the 2019 amendment was constitutionally impermissible because: 

1. Temporal Violation: The enhanced penalty didn't exist when the offense was committed 
2. Constitutional Breach: Violated Article 20(1)'s prohibition against retrospective criminal penalties 
3. Unfair Application: Subject imposed a punishment greater than legally permissible at the time of the offense 

Key Legal Principles Established 

1. Prospective Application Only: Criminal law amendments, especially those enhancing penalties, apply only to future offenses 
2. Date of Offense Controls: The law in force on the date of commission determines applicable penalties 
3. No Judicial Discretion: Courts cannot apply harsher retrospective penalties even for heinous crimes 
4. Constitutional Supremacy: Article 20(1) overrides legislative intent to apply enhanced penalties retrospectively 

This judgment observed the constitutional principle that while the legislature can enhance penalties for future deterrence, it cannot retroactively impose harsher punishments, even for the most serious crimes involving children. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently Justices Sanjay Kumar and SC Sharma observed that "acknowledgment of partial debt would not extend the limitation period for the entire debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963" while upholding the Chhattisgarh High Court's decision in a debt recovery case. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of M/S. Airen and Associates v. M/S. Sanmar Engineering Services Limited (2025). 

What was the Background of M/S. Airen and Associates v. M/S. Sanmar Engineering Services Limited (2025) Case? 

• The appellant filed a suit seeking recovery of Rs. 3,07,115.85 (Rupees three lakhs seven thousand one hundred fifteen and eighty-five paisa only) along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 
• The debtor (respondent) acknowledged only a partial debt of Rs. 27,874.10 (Rupees twenty seven thousand eight hundred seventy four and ten paisa only) out of the total claimed amount. 
• The appellant sought extension of limitation for the full amount based on the partial acknowledgment by the debtor. 
• The trial court dismissed the suit on limitation grounds, finding that the claim was time-barred. 
• The appellant then appealed to the Chhattisgarh High Court, which allowed the appellant's claim only with respect to the acknowledged amount. 
• The High Court held that the benefit of Section 18 cannot be extended to the entire claim as the same was not fully acknowledged by the debtor. 
• The respondent's reply never admitted the appellant's full claim and only explicitly disputed the contract value while acknowledging only the smaller amount as due. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and SC Sharma upheld the Chhattisgarh High Court's decision, denying the benefit of Section 18 to the appellant for the entire claim. 
• The Supreme Court observed that "there was no acknowledgment of the full amount claimed by the appellant, in terms of the requirement prescribed in Section 18 of the Act of 1963, the question of extending the period of limitation for the entire suit claim of the appellant did not arise." 
• The Court clarified that Section 18 could not revive the time-barred claim for the unacknowledged balance since only a partial amount was acknowledged. 
• The Court emphasized that limitation is extended only for the admitted sum, not the entire claim, reinforcing established jurisprudence on debt acknowledgment. 
• A reference was made to the precedent case of J.C. Budhraja vs. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & Anr., (2008) 2 SCC 444, where the Court had similarly held that limitation is extended only for the admitted sum. 
• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that partial acknowledgment cannot benefit the entire claim under Section 18. 

What are the Legal Principles Established by Case ? 

Partial v. Full Acknowledgment: 

• Partial acknowledgment of debt does not extend limitation for the entire claim but only for the acknowledged portion. 
• The debtor must acknowledge the full liability claimed by the creditor for Section 18 to apply to the entire debt. 
• Disputed portions of the claim remain subject to the original limitation period and cannot benefit from acknowledgment of undisputed amounts. 

What is Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963? 

About: 

• Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the "Effect of acknowledgment in writing" and provides for extension of the limitation period in cases where debt is acknowledged. 
• The section states that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period, the person liable for any debt or legacy acknowledges his liability in respect of such debt or legacy by any writing signed by him and addressed to the person entitled thereto or to his agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when such acknowledgment was so signed. 
• The acknowledgment must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous regarding the liability of the debtor. 
• The acknowledgment must be made before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period. 
• The acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person liable for the debt. 

Requirements for Valid Acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Act : 

• The acknowledgment must be clear and unambiguous about the extent of liability. 
• It must be made in writing and signed by the person liable. 
• The acknowledgment must be made before the limitation period expires. 
• Conditional or qualified acknowledgments may not satisfy the requirements of Section 18. 

Effect on Limitation Period: 

• A valid acknowledgment starts a fresh limitation period from the date of acknowledgment. 
• The fresh period applies only to the acknowledged debt, not to any additional or disputed amounts. 
• Time-barred claims for unacknowledged portions cannot be revived through partial acknowledgment. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra held that a clause stating arbitration "may be sought" is merely permissive and does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (Jv) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited (2025). 

What was the Background of BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (Jv) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited Case? 

• The appellant, BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV), and the respondent, Eastern Coalfields Limited, entered into a contract relating to transportation and handling of goods, during the subsistence of which disputes arose between the parties. 
• The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions, which was appended to the e-tender notice and formed part of the contract, with the appellant relying upon this clause as constituting an arbitration agreement. 
• Clause 13, titled "Settlement of Disputes," established a multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism requiring contractors to first settle disputes at company level, make written requests to the Engineer-in-charge within 30 days, and follow a two-stage resolution process involving Area CGM/GM and a committee constituted by the owner. 
• The crucial provision in Clause 13 stated that for parties other than government agencies, "the redressal of the dispute may be sought through Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as amended by amendment act of 2015." 
• Treating the underscored portion of Clause 13 as an arbitration agreement, the appellant filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of an arbitrator for settlement of disputes between the parties. 
• Eastern Coalfields Limited objected to the prayer for appointment of an arbitrator on the ground that Clause 13 lacked the essential ingredients to constitute a valid arbitration agreement and did not establish a binding commitment to arbitration. 
• The respondent also relied upon Clause 32 of the Instructions to Bidders, which provided that matters relating to disputes arising out of the tender and subsequent contract would be subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court where the subject work was to be executed, arguing that disputes were intended to be resolved through regular court proceedings rather than arbitration. 
• The High Court accepted the respondent's objection and dismissed the appellant's application by emphasizing the use of the word "may" before "be sought" in Clause 13, concluding that this language did not demonstrate a clear intention of the parties to refer disputes to arbitration, and the appellant subsequently approached the Supreme Court challenging this decision dated 19th January 2024. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that Section 11 confines the Court's jurisdiction to the examination regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement, with the use of the term "examination" connoting that the scope of power is limited to a prima facie determination without requiring a laborious or contested inquiry. 
• The Court noted that the intention of parties to enter into an arbitration agreement must be gathered from the terms of the agreement, and words used should disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration rather than merely contemplating the possibility of going for arbitration, as where there is merely a possibility of parties agreeing to arbitration in future there is no valid and binding arbitration agreement. 
• The Court observed that Clause 13 does not bind parties to use arbitration for settlement of disputes, as the use of words "may be sought" implies that there is no subsisting agreement between parties that they would have to seek settlement of disputes through arbitration, making it merely an enabling clause requiring further agreement between parties. 
• The Court distinguished that mere use of the word "arbitration" or "arbitrator" in a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement if it requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the parties for reference to arbitration, noting that such clauses merely indicate a desire or hope to have disputes settled by arbitration rather than a binding commitment. 
• The Court observed that in cases where one party relies on a single clause as constituting an arbitration agreement while the other disputes this characterization, a plain reading of the clause would suffice to determine whether it constitutes an arbitration agreement without holding a mini-trial or inquiry, as such limited exercise serves to weed out frivolous claims for appointment of arbitrators. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court was justified in holding that Clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement and in rejecting the application seeking appointment of an arbitrator, since the phraseology of Clause 13 was not indicative of a binding agreement that any party could independently seek redressal of disputes through arbitration. 

What is Section 11 and Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ? 

• Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, deals with the appointment of arbitrators and provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring that arbitration proceedings can commence even when parties fail to agree on the appointment procedure or when the agreed procedure breaks down, while establishing that persons of any nationality may serve as arbitrators unless parties agree otherwise. 
• The section primarily empowers parties to agree on their own procedure for appointing arbitrators but provides judicial intervention mechanisms through the Supreme Court, High Court, or designated institutions when such agreements fail, parties default in following agreed procedures, or deadlocks occur in the appointment process. 
• Section 11 distinguishes between arbitration with three arbitrators, where each party appoints one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators select the third presiding arbitrator, and arbitration with a sole arbitrator, where parties must mutually agree on the appointment within specified timeframes. 
• Section 11(6A), introduced by the 2015 Amendment Act, specifically restricts the scope of judicial examination when courts consider applications for appointment of arbitrators under sub-sections (4), (5), or (6), mandating that courts shall confine their examination solely to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement. 
• This provision represents a legislative clarification aimed at limiting judicial intervention to a prima facie determination of whether an arbitration agreement exists, thereby preventing courts from conducting detailed inquiries into the validity or merits of arbitration agreements at the appointment stage and ensuring courts do not exceed their jurisdictional limits. 
• Section 11(6A) serves as a procedural safeguard that balances the need for judicial oversight in ensuring genuine arbitration agreements exist while preventing unnecessary delays that could arise from extensive judicial scrutiny, with such detailed analysis being reserved for the arbitral tribunal itself under the competence-competence doctrine. 
• The introduction of Section 11(6A) was intended to states the arbitrator appointment process by clearly delineating the limited scope of judicial examination, thereby reducing delays and promoting the pro-arbitration approach while upholding the doctrine of competence-competence, wherein arbitral tribunals have primary authority to determine their own jurisdiction including ruling on the existence, validity, and scope of arbitration agreements.