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Mercantile Law

Conviction u/s 138 of NIA

 03-Sep-2025

Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh & Anr. 

“Once the complainant has signed the compromise deed accepting the amount in full and final settlement of the default sum the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot hold water, therefore, the concurrent conviction rendered by the Courts below has to be set-aside.” 

Justices Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta held that that a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 (NI Act) cannot be sustained once the complainant signs a compromise deed acknowledging full settlement, setting aside a High Court order that had dismissed the accused's application for modification. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh & Anr. (2025) ? 

  • Harpal Singh filed a complaint under NI Act against Gian Chand Garg, alleging that the appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-. 
  • For repayment of the borrowed amount, the appellant issued a cheque (Ex. C-1) which, upon presentation, was returned with the endorsement "funds insufficient" (Ex. C-2). 
  • The complainant issued a legal notice (Ex. C-4) to the appellant as required under the statutory provisions. 
  • The complaint was filed before the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 138 of the NI Act. 
  • After trial, the appellant was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) in Criminal Case No. 90 of 2009 vide order dated 21.04.2010. The appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a default sentence of fifteen days' simple imprisonment. 
  • The Additional Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction in Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2010 vide order dated 14.09.2010. Subsequently, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the revision petition in Criminal Revision Petition No. 2563 of 2010 vide order dated 27.03.2025. 
  • After the dismissal of the revision petition, both parties entered into a compromise/settlement agreement on 06th April 2025. Under this settlement, the complainant indicated no objection to the appellant seeking acquittal. 
  • The compromise was reached in consideration of:  
    • Two Demand Drafts bearing numbers 004348 dated 04th April 2025 and 004303 dated 11.02.2025 for Rs. 2.5 lakhs each. 
    • Three cheques bearing numbers 354412 dated 10th May 2025, 354413 dated 10.06.2025, and 354414 dated 10.07.2025 of Rs. 1 lakh each. 
  • The appellant filed an application (CRM No. 15127/2025) seeking modification of the High Court's order dated 27th March 2025, but the High Court dismissed this application on 09th April 2025 on grounds of non-maintainability. 
  • Consequently, the appellant approached the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8050 of 2025. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Supreme Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is primarily a civil wrong that has been clothed with criminal consequences to strengthen the credibility of negotiable instruments. 
  • The Court noted that Section 147 of the NI Act, inserted by the 2002 amendment, specifically makes the offence under Section 138 compoundable, allowing parties to settle disputes at any stage of proceedings. 
  • The Court reiterated the characterization of Section 138 offences as "Civil Sheep in Criminal Wolf's Clothing," indicating that while the provision carries criminal sanctions, the underlying disputes are essentially of a private civil nature. 
  • The Court observed that when parties voluntarily enter into compromise agreements, they do so with open eyes, understanding the risks and benefits. Such settlements subsume the original complaint and cannot be reversed by pursuing both the original and subsequent complaints. 
  • The Court noted that when parties enter into agreements to compound offences and save themselves from litigation processes, courts cannot override such compounding and impose their will against the parties' voluntary decision. 
  •  The Court observed that once a complainant signs a compromise deed accepting an amount in full and final settlement of the disputed sum, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot sustain, and concurrent convictions must be set aside. 
  • The Court emphasized that the legislature, through Section 147 of the NI Act, has expressly permitted compounding of such offences notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, especially when parties have voluntarily arrived at a compromise. 
  • The Court specifically noted that the compromise in this case was entered into without any coercion, voluntarily, and at the complainant's own will, making it legally binding and effective. 

What is Section 138 of NI Act ? 

About:  

  • Section 138 creates an offence when a cheque drawn by a person on his account with a banker for payment to another person is returned unpaid due to insufficient funds or exceeding the agreed overdraft limit, making the drawer liable for criminal prosecution. 
  • The drawer shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both such imprisonment and fine. 
  • The cheque must be presented to the bank within six months from the date it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, failing which no offence under this section can be constituted. 
  • The payee or holder in due course must give a written notice to the drawer demanding payment within thirty days of receiving information from the bank regarding the cheque's dishonour for the offence to be established. 
  • The drawer must be given fifteen days from receipt of the demand notice to make payment, and only upon failure to pay within this period does the criminal liability crystallize under Section 138. 
  • The section applies only to cheques issued for discharge of legally enforceable debt or other liability, ensuring that the provision covers genuine commercial transactions and not gratuitous payments. 

Case Laws: 

  • M/s. Meters and Instruments Private Limited & Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018): 
    • The Court held that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is mainly a civil wrong and has been made specifically compoundable by Section 147 of the NI Act inserted by the 2002 amendment. The object of the statute was to facilitate smooth functioning of business transactions as dishonour of cheque causes incalculable loss to the payee and affects credibility of business transactions. 
  • P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. M/s. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021): 
    • The Court characterized the offence under Section 138 NI Act as a "Civil Sheep in Criminal Wolf's Clothing." Issues agitated by parties under this provision are of private nature which are brought within the sweep of criminal jurisdiction to strengthen the credibility of negotiable instruments. 
  • M/s. Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel (2021): 
    • When parties voluntarily enter into a compromise agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse the effects by pursuing both the original complaint and subsequent complaint arising from non-compliance. The settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint, and complainants enter into settlements with open eyes undertaking associated risks. 
  • B.V. Seshaiah v. State of Telangana & Anr. (2023): 
    • When parties enter into an agreement and compound the offence, they do so to save themselves from the process of litigation. Courts cannot override such compounding and impose their will against the parties' voluntary decision when the law allows such compounding. 

Family Law

Maintenance Pendente Lite during Stay of Proceedings

 03-Sep-2025

Ankit Suman v. State of U.P. and Another 

"The Court emphasized that mere staying of proceedings does not amount to termination of proceedings and the liability to pay maintenance continues unless the order is set aside, varied or modified." 

Justice Manish Kumar Nigam

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justice Manish Kumar Nigam in the case of Ankit Suman v. State of U.P. and Another (2025) dismissed a petition challenging a recovery warrant for maintenance pendente lite, holding that stay of matrimonial proceedings due to a transfer petition does not absolve the husband of his liability to pay maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).  

What was the Background of Ankit Suman v. State of U.P. and Another (2025) Case? 

  • The husband-petitioner filed a divorce petition on 20th July 2018 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against his wife in the Family Court, Pilibhit. 
  • The wife filed a written statement denying the allegations and subsequently filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for maintenance pendente lite on 26th March 2019. 
  • The Family Court initially dismissed the wife's maintenance application on 30th October 2020, but this order was set aside by the Allahabad High Court on 18th November 2021. 
  • The High Court awarded Rs. 10,000/- per month to the wife and Rs. 10,000/- to the minor daughter, along with Rs. 30,000/- as litigation costs. 
  • The husband challenged this order before the Supreme Court, which modified the maintenance amount to Rs. 10,000/- for the wife and Rs. 5,000/- for the minor daughter on 29th November 2022. 
  • The wife filed an execution case for recovery of maintenance arrears, claiming Rs. 2,50,000/- till 26th August 2024. 
  • Meanwhile, the wife had filed a transfer petition to move the divorce case from Pilibhit to Bareilly, and the High Court stayed the divorce proceedings on 18th September 2023. 
  • The husband contended that since the proceedings were stayed, he was not liable to pay maintenance for the period of stay. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • The Court analyzed Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which provides for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings during matrimonial proceedings. 
  • Justice Nigam emphasized that the object of Section 24 is to provide immediate relief to financially weak parties in matrimonial proceedings to prevent them from becoming unprovided for during litigation. 
  • The Court distinguished between "quashing" and "staying" of proceedings, citing Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association (1992), holding that staying an order does not wipe it out from existence but only suspends its operation. 
  • The Court noted that the Supreme Court's order dated 29th November 2022 for maintenance payment remained valid and had neither been recalled nor set aside. 
  • The judgment established that transfer proceedings themselves constitute "proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act". 
  • The Court referenced multiple precedents showing that Section 24 applications are maintainable even during restoration applications, revision proceedings, and other ancillary proceedings. 
  • The Court rejected the husband's contention as "wholly misconceived" and held that mere stay of proceedings does not amount to termination, thus not absolving maintenance liability. 

What is Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? 

About:  

  • Section 24 of HMA provides for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. Maintenance is both a human and legal right.  
  • The section ensures temporary maintenance to spouses during pending litigation. 

Meaning of Maintenance:  

  • Financial support provided by fathers to children or husbands to wives for expenses and necessities of dependents.  
  • Also known as alimony, it covers payments for living expenses. Maintenance is granted regardless of whether parties live together or divorce has been granted under Hindu Laws. 

Meaning of Pendente Lite:  

  • "Pendente lite" means "pending the litigation" or "during the pendency of the case."  
  • It governs interim maintenance for livelihood support and necessary expenses during proceedings under HMA when there is insufficient or no independent income. 

Meaning of Maintenance Pendente Lite:  

  • Providing living expenses and financial support to wife and children while the suit is pending between parties.  
  • The provision offers gender-neutral rights, allowing both husbands and wives to apply for this remedy. 

Provisions of Section 24 of the HMA:  

  • When any spouse lacks independent income sufficient for litigation proceedings, courts may order respondents to pay petitioner's proceeding expenses and maintenance considering respondent's income.  
  • Applications must be disposed of within 60 days from notice service date. 

Fundamentals of Section 24 of HMA: 

  • Expenses of Proceedings: Covers expenses during pending HMA proceedings including lawyer fees, court fees, stamp duties, traveling expenses, and related expenditures. Ensures financially weaker spouses can participate effectively in legal processes without cost burden. 
  • Discretion of the Court: Courts have discretionary power to grant maintenance pendente lite and expenses. This allows consideration of individual case circumstances for fair determination of maintenance amounts. Courts assess income sufficiency, assets, and needs of both parties. 
  • Temporary Nature: Maintenance under Section 24 is temporary, providing financial support only during pending legal proceedings. Courts have discretion to decide final maintenance when concluding cases. 

Difference Between Section 24 of HMA & Section 125 of CrPC (144 of BNSS): 

Section 24 of HMA 

Section 125 CrPC (144 of BNSS) 

Applicable only to Hindus 

Applicable to all citizens regardless of religion, caste, beliefs 

Maintenance during divorce petition pendency only 

Maintenance during and post-divorce 

Only spouses entitled 

Spouses, children (legitimate/illegitimate), parents eligible 

Awards based on living standards, income, needs 

Awards based on claimant needs and respondent's ability to pay 


Family Law

Unmarried Daughter Can't Claim Maintenance

 03-Sep-2025

Anurag Pandey v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another

“If a daughter becomes major during the pendency of the application under S. 125 CrPC, maintenance can be allowed to her in the same proceedings by the family court by invoking the provisions of Section 20(3) of the 1956 Act.” 

Justice Rajnish Kumar 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Rajnish Kumar held that a mentally and physically fit major unmarried daughter cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and must instead file under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The ruling came while setting aside a Family Court order directing maintenance to a major daughter under Section 125 CrPC. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Anurag Pandey v. State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another (2025). 

What was the Background of Anurag Pandey v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another (2025)? 

  • Kumari Neha Pandey, an unmarried major daughter, filed an application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) seeking maintenance from her father, Anurag Pandey. 
  • At the time of filing the application, the daughter had already attained majority age, which was disclosed in the application itself. 
  • The Family Court, despite noting that she was a major at the time of filing, directed the father to pay maintenance of ₹10,000 per month, relying on Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
  • The father challenged this order through a criminal revision, arguing that the trial court had misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Abhilasha v. Parkash (2020). 
  • The father contended that the major daughter is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC and such relief can only be obtained by filing a civil suit under Section 20(3) of the 1956 Act. 
  • The counsel for the daughter fairly conceded that the legal position argued by the father was correct and suggested that the matter be remitted to the Family Court for conversion into proceedings under Section 20(3) to avoid multiplicity of cases. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • Only minor children or major children with physical/mental abnormality can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. A mentally and physically fit major unmarried daughter cannot claim maintenance under this provision. 
  • Major unmarried daughters must seek maintenance under Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which requires civil court proceedings with proper pleadings and evidence. 
  • Section 125 CrPC provides immediate relief through summary proceedings, while Section 20(3) HAMA involves larger rights requiring civil court determination. 
  •  Maintenance under Section 20(3) requires consideration of specific factors under Sections 23 and 24 of the 1956 Act, including parties' status, claimant's reasonable wants, and property value. 
  • The Family Court cannot award maintenance under Section 20(3) HAMA in Section 125 CrPC proceedings without following proper civil procedure and considering mandatory factors. 
  • If daughter becomes major during pendency of Section 125 proceedings, conversion is permissible. However, if application is filed after attaining majority, it must be converted to civil suit under Section 20(3) HAMA. 
  • The Court directed conversion of the Section 125 CrPC application into a civil suit under Section 20(3) HAMA to avoid multiplicity of cases, with expeditious disposal within six months. 

Can a Major Unmarried Daughter Claim Maintenance Under Section 125 CrPC or Must She File Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act? 

  • Age Restriction Under Section 125 CrPC: A major unmarried daughter who is mentally and physically fit cannot claim maintenance under Section 125(1)(b) CrPC, which specifically provides maintenance only for "minor children" unable to maintain themselves. 
  • Exception Limited to Disability: Section 125(1)(c) CrPC permits maintenance for major children only if they suffer from "physical or mental abnormality or injury" making them unable to maintain themselves, excluding healthy major daughters. 
  • Legislative Intent Clear: The Criminal Procedure Code deliberately restricts maintenance claims to minors or disabled major children, indicating that healthy major unmarried daughters fall outside its protective scope. 
  • Summary Proceedings Limitation: Section 125 CrPC is designed for immediate relief through summary proceedings and cannot accommodate the complex considerations required for major daughter's maintenance claims. 
  • Alternative Legal Remedy Available: Major unmarried daughters must pursue maintenance claims under Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which specifically addresses their maintenance rights through civil proceedings. 
  • Jurisdictional Boundary Respected: Family Courts cannot exercise civil jurisdiction under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act while conducting summary criminal proceedings under Section 125 CrPC without proper conversion of the case. 
  • Procedural Safeguard Maintained: The legal framework ensures that major daughters' maintenance claims undergo proper civil trial with evidence and pleadings, rather than being decided in expedited criminal maintenance proceedings meant for immediate relief.