List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Sandeep Mehta expressed concern over a series of Allahabad High Court orders wrongly treating the Witness Protection Scheme as a substitute for bail cancellation, holding it to be an alternative remedy. The Court noted that at least forty such identical, cyclostyled orders had been passed in the last year, a practice continuing for over two years, and strongly deprecated this approach. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Phireram v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Phireram v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) Case? 

• Phireram lodged FIR No. 137 of 2022 at Surajpur Police Station, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh against accused persons for offences under Sections 302 (murder), 201 (causing disappearance of evidence), 364 (kidnapping), 120-B (criminal conspiracy) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• The accused were arrested and subsequently granted bail by the Allahabad High Court on 29th April 2024 with conditions including:  
  • Not tampering with evidence, not threatening witnesses or complainant, attending court proceedings, not misusing bail liberty, and not intimidating any person familiar with case facts. 
• After bail, the second respondent allegedly threatened witnesses in violation of bail conditions. Two fresh FIRs (No. 262/2024 and No. 740/2024) were lodged by witness Chahat Ram at Surajpur Police Station alleging threats by the accused. 
• Phireram filed Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Cancellation Application No. 93 of 2025 under Section 439(2) CrPC seeking cancellation of bail due to violation of bail conditions through witness intimidation. 
• The Allahabad High Court disposed of the application on 11th April 2025 by directing the complainant to seek remedy under the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 instead of examining the bail cancellation on merits. 
• Aggrieved by this order, Phireram filed Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9082 of 2025 before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's approach. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 is curative in nature and not an alternative to bail cancellation provisions under Sections 437 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Scheme addresses psychological complexities of witness vulnerability that bail law alone cannot address. 
• The Court distinguished that witness protection is a remedial State obligation, while bail cancellation is a preventive judicial function. The existence of the Witness Protection Scheme cannot be grounds to decline bail cancellation when there is prima facie evidence of witness intimidation. 
• The Court emphasised that bail represents conditional liberty, not untrammelled freedom. Conditions imposed under Sections 437(3) or 439(2) CrPC (483 BNSS) constitute substantive obligations. Courts retain supervisory duty to revoke bail upon condition violation. 
• Violation of bail conditions constitutes grounds for cancellation as a matter of judicial duty. Courts cannot abdicate this role on the pretext that witness protection schemes exist. 
• The Supreme Court discovered forty recent orders from the Allahabad High Court treating the Witness Protection Scheme as substitute for bail cancellation. These were verbatim cyclostyled template orders representing an erroneous practice spanning over two years. 
• The Court noted that public prosecutors for urging courts to relegate complainants to witness protection schemes instead of examining bail cancellation on merits when accused violated bail conditions through witness intimidation. 
• The Court observed that bail cancellation requires overwhelming circumstances when supervening factors impede fair trial. Specific grounds include witness intimidation, evidence tampering, investigation interference, and misuse of bail liberty. 
• The Court stressed that fair trial requires both State initiative and judicial vigilance. Courts must act as sentinels ensuring trials proceed without intimidation. To ask witnesses to seek alternative remedies while ignoring clear bail violations would be grossly unjust and contrary to established legal principles. 

What is Section 483 BNSS? 

• High Court and Court of Session possess special powers to direct release of any accused person in custody on bail, with authority to impose necessary conditions for offences specified under sub-section (3) of section 480. 
• These superior courts have discretionary power to set aside or modify any bail conditions previously imposed by a Magistrate when releasing a person on bail. 
• Before granting bail for offences triable exclusively by Session Court or punishable with life imprisonment, the High Court or Session Court must give notice to the Public Prosecutor, unless it records in writing that giving such notice is impracticable. 
• For offences under section 65 or sub-section (2) of section 70 of BNS, the court must provide notice to the Public Prosecutor within fifteen days of receiving the bail application. 
• The presence of the informant or his authorised representative is mandatory during bail hearings for offences under section 65 or sub-section (2) of section 70 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 
• High Court and Session Court retain continuing jurisdiction to direct arrest and committal to custody of any person previously released on bail under this Chapter. 
• The provision establishes a supervisory mechanism where superior courts can intervene in bail matters decided by lower courts through modification or cancellation powers. 
• The section creates specific procedural safeguards for serious offences by mandating prosecutorial notice and informant presence during bail proceedings, ensuring proper representation of State interests and victim concerns. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra held that an arbitral tribunal can award pendente lite interest unless expressly barred by the contract, ruling that a clause excluding interest on delayed payments does not restrict this power, while dismissing ONGC’s appeal. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. M/S G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd (2025). 

What was the Background of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. M/S G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd (2025) Case ? 

• Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) entered a contract with M/s G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Private Limited for drilling services. Under this contract, G & T Beckfield raised multiple invoices for services rendered, but ONGC withheld payments on various grounds. 
• The contract contained Clause 18.1, which specified that ONGC would arrange payment within 30 days of receiving properly certified invoices. The clause also provided that if ONGC questioned any items in an invoice, it could withhold payment of the disputed amount until the matter was resolved, but amounts not in dispute were to be paid within the stipulated period. Crucially, the clause stated: "No interest shall be payable by ONGC on any delayed payment/disputed claim." 
• When disputes arose over unpaid invoices totaling approximately USD 6,56,272.34, the matter was referred to a three-member arbitral tribunal on 12th December 1998. G & T Beckfield claimed payment for various invoices including charges for tools lost in drilling operations, demobilisation charges, and sought release of improperly deducted performance bond amounts. 
• The arbitral tribunal, in its award dated 21st November 2004, allowed most of G & T Beckfield's claims but rejected claims for interest on individual invoices from the date each cause of action arose. However, the tribunal awarded interest at 12% per annum on the total awarded amount from 12th December 1998 (the date when the statement of claim was affirmed before the tribunal) until recovery, along with costs of Rs. 5 lakhs. 
• ONGC challenged this award before the District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, arguing that the award was non-reasoned and that Clause 18.1 prohibited any interest payment. The District Judge allowed ONGC's application and set aside the arbitral award on these grounds. 
• G & T Beckfield then appealed to the Gauhati High Court under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act, which reversed the District Judge's decision and affirmed the arbitral award in its entirety. This led ONGC to approach the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition, with the notice limited specifically to the question of whether interest on the total awarded amount could be granted. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court held that arbitral tribunals can award pendente lite interest (during arbitration) unless contractual agreements explicitly or impliedly prohibit such awards. 
• Under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, tribunals have jurisdiction to award interest for three distinct periods: pre-reference (before arbitration), pendente lite (during arbitration), and post-award. Whilst pre-reference and pendente lite interest are subject to party agreements, post-award interest is statutory and parties cannot contract out of it. 
• The Court found that Clause 18.1 only barred ONGC from paying interest on delayed payments but did not explicitly prohibit the tribunal's statutory power to award pendente lite interest. The tribunal had appropriately distinguished between different types of interest - denying pre-reference interest but awarding pendente lite interest from the claim filing date. 
• The Court distinguished this from precedents like Sayeed Ahmed & Co. and THDC cases, where comprehensive prohibitions used phrases like "in any respect whatsoever" or "under any head." These cases involved explicit contractual bars extending beyond mere delayed payment scenarios. 
• The Court noted that the 12% interest rate was reasonable, being lower than the then-statutory rate of 18% per annum. The tribunal's exercise of discretion was found to be within legal bounds. 
• The Court emphasised that arbitral tribunals can only be denuded of their power to award pendente lite interest when agreements are worded to explicitly or by necessary implication prohibit such awards. A clause merely barring interest on delayed payments will not be readily inferred as prohibiting pendente lite interest. 
• The Court concluded that Clause 18.1 lacked the comprehensive prohibitory language necessary to limit the tribunal's statutory discretion, finding no error warranting judicial interference with the arbitral award. 

What are Interest Provisions in Arbitral Awards? 

• About: 
  • Section 31(7) of the Arbitration Act establishes comprehensive provisions for awarding interest in monetary arbitral awards, encompassing both pre-award and post-award interest calculations. 
• Pre-Award Interest [Sub-section 7(a)]:  
  • Unless parties agree otherwise, arbitral tribunals possess discretionary authority to include interest on monetary awards. 
  • The tribunal may award interest at rates it deems reasonable on the entire sum or any portion thereof, covering the period from when the cause of action arose until the award date.  
  • This provision ensures compensation for the time value of money during dispute resolution proceedings. 
• Post-Award Interest [Sub-section 7(b)]:  
  • Once an arbitral award is made, any directed payment automatically carries interest from the award date until actual payment, unless the award specifically directs otherwise. 
  • The interest rate is statutorily fixed at two percent above the prevailing current interest rate on the award date.  
  • This mandatory provision incentivizes prompt compliance with awards and compensates successful parties for delayed payments. 
• Key Features: 
  • Pre-award interest is discretionary and requires tribunal determination 
  • Post-award interest is automatic unless explicitly excluded 
  • Different rate mechanisms apply for each phase 
  • Tribunals have flexibility in pre-award interest calculations 
  • Post-award rates are standardized and market-linked 
  • These provisions balance judicial discretion with statutory certainty, ensuring fair compensation while encouraging timely award compliance. The dual approach recognizes different policy considerations for compensation during proceedings versus enforcement phases. 

Source: Gujarat High Court 

Why in News?

The Division Bench of Justices AY Kogje and Justice NS Sanjya Gowda in the case of X v. Y (2025) held that a marital dispute between two Hindus whose marriage was conducted in India can be entertained only under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) and foreign family law shall not be applicable even if the couple are domiciled or have citizenship of a foreign country. 

What was the Background of X v. Y (2025) Case? 

• The couple got married in 2008 in Ahmedabad according to Hindu customs and ceremonies under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
• They moved to Australia where the husband was a permanent resident and had a child in 2013. 
• In 2014, marital differences arose, and the husband returned to India, obtaining an OCI card in 2015. 
• The wife continued to stay in Australia and obtained Australian citizenship in 2015. 
• On September 10, 2015, the wife along with their son returned to India. 
• In 2016, the husband filed for divorce before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Sydney. 
• On September 23, 2016, the wife filed a petition under Section 125 of the CrPC and a suit under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court at Ahmedabad. 
• On November 24, 2016, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Sydney granted the divorce; the wife's review was also dismissed. 
• On July 5, 2017, the wife was granted an OCI Card. 
• On July 11, 2018, the wife filed a family suit seeking declaration that the decree passed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Sydney is null and void. 
• On March 31, 2023, the family court rejected her pleas, leading to this appeal. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

Key Observations: 

• The Gujarat High Court held that citizenship has "absolutely no relevance" to Hindu marriages performed in India, with only the Hindu faith of parties being relevant.  
• The court noted that allowing foreign law to govern such marriages would create "anomalous results" and found that the husband sought Australian divorce to avoid Hindu Marriage Act provisions.  
• The court also observed that even the Australian Court had jurisdictional doubts about recognition of its decree in India. 

Legal Principles Established: 

• The court established that Hindu marriages conducted in India are exclusively governed by the Hindu Marriage Act regardless of subsequent citizenship or domicile changes, making foreign law application "impermissible".  
• Following Supreme Court precedent in Y. Narasimha Rao case, only the law under which parties are married applies to matrimonial disputes.  
• The court also prohibited forum shopping where parties seek foreign jurisdiction to avoid Indian matrimonial laws. 

Court's Directions: 

• The Gujarat High Court set aside the family court's orders rejecting the wife's pleas and directed the family court to decide her case as per law, recognizing her valid cause of action.  
• The court stayed its order for two weeks upon the husband's counsel's request. 

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions in Relation to Marriage under HMA? 

Introduction: 

• Marriage is a sacred sacrament under Hindu Law and one of the necessary samskaras. 
• Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) governs Hindu marriages and reformed Hindu Marriage Law. 
• Applies to all Hindus, including Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains. 

Solemnization of Marriage (Section 7): 

• Marriage is valid if performed according to customary ceremony and rituals of either party. 
• Saptapadi (seven steps around sacred fire) makes marriage complete and binding when seventh step is taken. 
• Customary ceremonies vary by community - from simple garland exchange to elaborate yajna rituals. 

Essential Conditions for Valid Marriage (Section 5): 

Monogamy (Section 5(i)): 

• Neither party should have a living spouse at the time of marriage. 
• Violation makes marriage null and void under Section 11. 
• Bigamy punishable under IPC Sections 494-495 and HMA Section 17. 

Consent of Parties (Section 5(ii)): 

• Both parties must give free and informed consent. 
• Marriage is voidable if either party is forced or unable to consent due to mental illness. 

Age Requirements (Section 5(iii)): 

• Current minimum age: 21 years for bridegroom, 18 years for bride. 
• Originally 18 years for boys, 15 years for girls; amended in 1978. 
• Punishment: Up to 2 years rigorous imprisonment or fine up to ₹1 lakh, or both (Section 18). 

Degrees of Prohibited Relationship (Section 5(iv)): 

Prohibited marriages between: 

• Lineal ascendants/descendants. 
• Former spouses of lineal ascendants/descendants. 
• Specific in-law relationships (brother's wife, uncle's wife, etc.) 
• Brother-sister, uncle-niece, aunt-nephew, children of siblings 
• Punishment: Simple imprisonment up to 1 month or fine of ₹1,000, or both (Section 18(b)). 

Sapinda Relationship (Section 5(v)): 

• Prohibition extends to: 3rd generation through mother's line, 5th generation through father's line 
• Punishment: Imprisonment up to 1 month or fine of ₹1,000, or both (Section 18(b)) 

Registration of Marriage (Section 8): 

• State Governments empowered to make registration rules. 
• State can mandate registration universally or for specific areas/cases. 
• Fine for violation: Up to ₹25