List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, (2025) set aside trial court orders that segregated a sitting MLA's trial from co-accused solely based on his political status, emphasizing that such segregation violated constitutional principles of equality and fair trial. 

• The Court emphasized that joint trials are mandatory when offences arise from the same transaction, and political status alone cannot justify separate trials.

What was the Background of Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana (2025) Case? 

• The appellant Mamman Khan is a sitting Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Ferozepur Jhirka Constituency in Haryana. 
• He was arrayed as one of the accused in FIR Nos. 149 and 150, both dated 01.08.2023, registered at Police Station Nagina, District Nuh. 
• The FIRs were registered in connection with large-scale communal violence that occurred in Nuh District on 31.07.2023. 
• The charges included sections 148, 149, 153A, 379A, 395, 397, 427, 436, 506, 201, 120B, and 107 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 
• During investigation, multiple individuals were named as accused, and joint proceedings commenced before the trial court. 
• By orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024, the Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh directed the Station House Officer to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant and segregated his trial from co-accused. 
• The trial court's reasoning was that as a sitting MLA, his case needed to be taken up on a day-to-day basis following Supreme Court directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (2024). 
• The appellant challenged the segregation orders through Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which were dismissed on 12.12.2024. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

Key Observations: 

• The Supreme Court found that the segregation was directed solely on account of the appellant's status as an MLA, without any legally recognized justification. 
• The Court noted that no notice was issued to the appellant prior to passing the segregation order, nor was there any application filed by the prosecution seeking such action. 
• The segregation was ordered suo motu, without affording the appellant an opportunity of hearing, violating principles of natural justice. 
• The Court emphasized that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet, as this discretion lies exclusively with the investigating agency. 
• The Court observed that the prosecution's case rested on an overarching conspiracy with interlinked evidence, making segregation legally impermissible. 
• The Court clarified that Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay directions emphasize expeditious disposal but do not authorize deviation from mandatory legal norms governing joint trials. 
• The Court held that the appellant's status as a sitting MLA cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial, as all accused stand equal before the law. 
• The Court directed that the matter be remitted to the trial court with instructions to conduct a joint trial in accordance with law. 

Key Legal Propositions on Joint Trials: 

• Interpreting Section 223 of CrPC (now Section 243 BNSS), the Supreme Court held that a joint trial is permissible where multiple accused are involved in offences arising out of the same transaction, and a separate trial would be warranted only if the acts attributed to each accused are distinct and severable. 
• The Court laid down five fundamental propositions regarding joint trials that establish the framework for future cases involving multiple accused persons. 

(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 CrPC a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219 – 223 CrPC are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion. 

(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons. 

(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time. 

(iv) Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated. 

(v) An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown. 

What is Section 243 of BNSS? 

This section outlines five scenarios where a single person can be tried for multiple offences in one trial: 

1. Same Transaction Rule (Sub-section 1):

• When multiple offences arise from one series of connected acts forming the same transaction. 
• All such offences can be tried together in a single trial. 

2. Criminal Breach of Trust with Falsification (Sub-section 2):

• When someone is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of property. 
• AND also commits falsification of accounts to facilitate or conceal the primary offence. 
• Both sets of offences can be tried together. 

3. Multiple Legal Definitions (Sub-section 3):

• When the same acts constitute offences under different legal definitions or laws. 
• The accused can be charged and tried for each such offence in one trial. 

4. Combined Acts Creating Different Offence (Sub-section 4):

• When individual acts constitute separate offences, but when combined create a different offence. 
• The person can be tried for both the combined offence and the individual component offences. 

5. Savings Clause (Sub-section 5):

• This section doesn't affect Section 9 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

The Allahabad High Court in Himanshu Dubey v. State of U.P. and Another (2025) delivered by Justice Vikram D. Chauhan quashed criminal proceedings under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), emphasizing that mere talking to a victim cannot constitute enticing away for kidnapping charges when the victim voluntarily left home due to family harassment. 

What was the Background of Himanshu Dubey v. State of U.P. and Another (2025) Case? 

• An FIR was lodged on 25.12.2020 under Section 363 of IPC at Police Station Gauri Bazar, District Deoria, alleging that on 24.12.2020 at 7:30 PM, the applicant had enticed away the niece of the informant, who was aged about 16 years. 
• The alleged victim's family members had beaten her and given electric shock upon discovering her phone conversations with the applicant, leading her to voluntarily leave home on 23.12.2020 at 6:30 PM. 
• During investigation, the victim's statement under Section 161 CrPC revealed she left home alone due to family harassment and went to Siwan, remaining there for two days before being brought to the police station. 
• Medical examination was conducted on 28.12.2020, where the victim denied internal and external examination and stated before the doctor that she had left home voluntarily due to family harassment. 
• X-ray conducted on 29.12.2020 determined the victim's age as approximately 18 years according to the Chief Medical Officer. 
• The victim's statement under Section 164 CrPC recorded on 1.1.2021 clearly stated she left the house voluntarily and that her family members had wrongly implicated the applicant. 
• The Investigating Officer submitted a chargesheet on 19.1.2021 under Section 363 IPC, and the Magistrate took cognizance on 7.7.2023. 
• Notably, the victim was not made a witness in the prosecution's chargesheet, with only the informant and victim's mother cited as witnesses. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

Legal Framework Analysis: 

• The Court examined Section 361 of IPC which defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship, requiring taking or enticing any minor under 18 years (female) out of lawful guardian's keeping without consent. 
• Justice Chauhan emphasized that for Section 361 to apply, there must be "promise, offer, inducement or force" from the accused resulting in the minor being taken away or enticed from lawful guardianship. 

Supreme Court Precedents: 

• The Court relied on Thakorlal D. Yadgdama v. State of Gujarat (1973), which established that if a minor leaves parental home "completely uninfluenced by any promise, offer or inducement emanating from the guilty party," no offence under Section 361 IPC is committed. 
• Reference was made to S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (1965), distinguishing between "taking" and "allowing a minor to accompany," requiring "some kind of inducement" or "active participation" in forming the minor's intention to leave.

What is Section 363 of Indian Penal Code?

About:  

• Section 363 of IPC prescribes punishment for kidnapping, which encompasses two types under Section 359 - kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. 

Punishment:  

• Section 363 provides for imprisonment which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 

Section 137 BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023): 

• Equivalent provision to Section 363 IPC in the new criminal code. 
• Same scope: Covers punishment for kidnapping offences. 
• Continuation: Maintains similar punishment framework as IPC.