List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News?

Recently, Justice G. Girish quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused under Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) (sexual intercourse by husband during separation), holding that as per Section 198B CrPC, cognizance can only be taken on a complaint filed by the wife and not on a police report. The Court found the Magistrate had acted contrary to this legal mandate. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the matter of XXX v. State of Kerala and Ors.(2025).  

What was the Background of XXX v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The petitioner and de facto complainant were legally married under personal law. 
• The petitioner pronounced talaq upon the de facto complainant and communicated the same to the Juma Masjid Committee on 02.11.2016. 
• Following the talaq pronouncement, the parties were living under separation, though the divorce had not yet come into legal effect as per personal law requirements. 
• The de facto complainant had filed a domestic violence complaint before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Malappuram. 
• By virtue of the Magistrate's order in the domestic violence proceedings, the de facto complainant was permitted to reside in the same house as the petitioner. 
• On 16.12.2016, while the parties were living under separation but still legally married, the petitioner allegedly committed sexual intercourse against the consent of the de facto complainant. 
• Subsequently, on 25.12.2016, the petitioner allegedly expelled the de facto complainant from the matrimonial house in violation of the Magistrate's order. 
• The Malappuram Police registered Crime No. 763/2016 covering both incidents in a single FIR. 
• The petitioner was charged with offences under Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code (sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation) and Section 31(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (penalty for breach of protection order). 
• The Magistrate took cognizance of both offences based on the final report submitted by the police. 
• The case was committed to the Fast Track Special Court, Manjeri as S.C No. 826/2017. 
• The petitioner challenged the proceedings by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Kerala High Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court observed that Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code is attracted when an offender commits rape upon his wife while they are living separately under a decree of separation or otherwise. 
• The Court noted that for the application of Section 376B IPC, the marital status of the victim as the wife of the accused must be subsisting at the time when the offence is committed. 
• The Court observed that under the personal law applicable to the parties, divorce by way of talaq comes into effect only upon expiry of 90 days from the date of pronouncement of talaq. 
• The Court found that the marital status of the de facto complainant as the wife of the petitioner was subsisting on 16.12.2016, when the alleged sexual intercourse took place. 
• The Court emphasized that Section 198B of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that cognizance of offence under Section 376B IPC can be taken by the Court only upon a complaint filed by the wife. 
• The Court observed that Section 198B CrPC creates a legal embargo and expressly bars taking cognizance of offence under Section 376B IPC in any manner other than upon a complaint by the wife. 
• The Court found that the learned Magistrate had erroneously taken cognizance of the offence under Section 376B IPC based on the final report filed by the police, which violated the mandatory requirement under Section 198B CrPC. 
• Regarding the offence under Section 31(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the Court observed that the alleged expulsion of the complainant occurred on 25.12.2016, which was nine days after the alleged rape incident. 
• The Court noted that the act of expulsion from the matrimonial home constituted a distinct offence that took place at a later point in time. 
• The Court observed that the Investigating Agency had committed an error by registering both offences in the same FIR, given their distinct nature and different timelines. 
• The Court agreed with the petitioner's contention that offences under Section 31(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act should be dealt with by the Judicial First Class Magistrate. 
• The Court clarified that while quashing the current proceedings, this order would not preclude the institution of prosecution proceedings against the petitioner in conformity with the procedures prescribed by law. 

What are the Legal Provisions? 

• Section 198B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
  • No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code where the persons are in a marital relationship. 
  • Cognizance can only be taken upon prima facie satisfaction of the facts which constitute the offence. 
  • Such cognizance is permissible only upon a complaint having been filed or made by the wife against the husband. 
  • This provision creates an absolute bar against taking cognizance through any other means including police final report. 
  • The statutory bar under Section 198B CrPC is mandatory and cannot be bypassed by courts. 
  • Police investigation and final report cannot substitute the requirement of wife's complaint for taking cognizance. 
  • The legislative intent is to protect the sanctity of marriage while ensuring wife's autonomy in pursuing criminal remedies. 
  • Cognizance through police challan or final report in marital rape cases under Section 376B IPC is legally impermissible.
• Section 376B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: 
  • This section deals with sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation. 
  • The offence is attracted when the husband commits rape upon his wife while they are living separately under a decree of separation or otherwise. 
  • The marital status of the victim as the wife of the accused must be subsisting at the time of commission of the offence. 

Source: Andhra Pradesh High Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justice Dr. Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa in the case of V D Moorthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others. (2025) clarified the jurisdictional limitations of police officers under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), particularly regarding their power to secure witness attendance from persons residing outside their territorial jurisdiction. 

What was the Background of V D Moorthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others. (2025) Case? 

• The petitioner, V D Moorthy, is a 65-year-old Director of Sigma Supply Chain Solutions Private Limited, residing in Noida, Uttar Pradesh. 
• A case (Crime No.21/2024) was registered at CID Police Station, Mangalagiri under Sections 420, 409 read with 120-B of IPC, corresponding to Sections 318, 316(5) read with Section 61(2) of BNS, 2023. 
• The petitioner was not an accused but was issued notice dated 15.08.2025 under Section 179 of BNSS to appear for investigation on 18.08.2025. 
• Despite attending twice at the investigating officer's request, he received another notice dated 19.08.2025 to attend at the S.I.T office in Vijayawada on 21.08.2025. 
• The petitioner challenged this action, citing his advanced age (above 65 years), health issues including Cervical Radiculopathy, and the jurisdictional limitations under BNSS. 
• He sought examination at his residence in Noida or any neutral place there, in the presence of his advocates, with audio-video recording facility. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court noted that the petitioner had already attended twice before the investigating officer, honouring the notices under Section 179 of BNSS. 
• The investigation agency did not dispute that the petitioner resided in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, which is outside their territorial jurisdiction. 
• Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa observed that the power of a police officer under Section 179(1) of BNSS is "territorially restricted" and "does not extend to persons residing beyond his jurisdiction." 
• The Court examined the key differences between Section 160 of CrPC and Section 179 of BNSS: 
  • The age limit for male persons was reduced from 65 years (in CrPC) to 60 years (in BNSS). 
  • BNSS introduced a second proviso allowing persons to express willingness to attend police stations. 
• Regarding the application of provisos, the Court clarified: "The Police Officer can issue an order in writing to them by virtue of the power under Section 179(1) of BNSS, but he cannot secure their presence before him as a matter of right." 
• The Court emphasized that vulnerable persons "have no legal obligation to appear before him in obedience to the notice under Section 179(1) of BNSS" and that "such persons, being vulnerable, cannot be troubled by the Police Officer in the name of investigation." 

What is Section 179 of BNSS? 

About:  

• Section 179 of BNSS replaced Section 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973(CrPC) with certain modifications. 
• It empowers police officers to secure attendance of witnesses during investigation through written orders. 
• Police officers conducting investigations can issue written orders requiring any person to attend before them. 
• Section 179 balances investigative needs with protection of vulnerable persons, while strictly limiting police jurisdiction to their territorial boundaries.  
• Protected categories retain the right to be examined at their residence but can voluntarily waive this protection if they prefer to attend the police station. 

Territorial Limitation:  

• Only applies to persons within the limits of their own police station or any adjoining station. 
• Person must appear to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. 
• Such persons are legally bound to attend as required. 

Protected Categories (First Proviso):  

The following vulnerable groups cannot be required to attend anywhere other than their place of residence: 

• Male persons under 15 years or above 60 years 
• Women (regardless of age) 
• Mentally or physically disabled persons 
• Persons with acute illness 

Voluntary Attendance (Second Proviso): 

• Protected persons may voluntarily choose to attend at the police station if they wish. 
• This respects individual autonomy while maintaining protective measures. 

Financial Provision: 

• State governments may make rules for police officers to pay reasonable expenses of persons attending at places other than their residence. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Joymalya Bagchi has held that a Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) can alienate joint family property for legal necessity such as a daughter’s marriage, even if the sale occurs after the wedding. It set aside the Karnataka High Court’s ruling and upheld the purchaser’s defence that the sale was to meet marriage expenses. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa(d)by LRS. & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa(d)by LRS. & Ors. (2025) Case ? 

• Sharanappa was the father and Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family comprising four sons: Kashiraya (plaintiff), Bhimaraya, Mahalingappa, and Ravichandra. 
• The family owned various immovable properties, including the suit land measuring 9 acres 1 gunta in Survey No. 49/2, Bablad Village, Gulbarga District, Karnataka. 
• Sharanappa was addicted to alcohol and had developed expensive and wasteful habits. 
• To finance his wayward lifestyle, he had previously sold multiple parcels of the family's joint property for inadequate consideration. 
• When his son Kashiraya objected to these sales, Sharanappa promised to create fixed deposits in all his sons' names and assured that the suit land would not be sold. 
• He further promised that the suit land would be divided between Kashiraya and Bhimaraya, while larger monetary settlements would be made for the other two sons. 
• Contrary to his promises, Sharanappa did not create any fixed deposits for Kashiraya and Bhimaraya but deposited substantial amounts in favour of his other two sons. 
• On 26th July 1995, Sharanappa executed a sale deed for the suit land in favour of the 5th defendant without proper consideration or genuine family necessity. 
• Kashiraya remained unaware of this sale transaction until December 1999, as possession had not been transferred to the purchaser. 
• Upon discovering the sale, Kashiraya was assured by the father and other defendants that the sale deed would be cancelled. 
• When the defendants failed to cancel the deed and attempted to alienate the property to third parties, Kashiraya filed a suit in 2000. 
• He sought a declaration that the sale deed dated 26th July 1995 was null and void, and also prayed for partition and separate possession of his share in the suit land. 
• During the pendency of the suit, Sharanappa (the Karta) died. 
• The 5th defendant contested the suit, claiming that Sharanappa had agreed to sell the land for valuable consideration. 
• He alleged that on 18th June 1994, he paid Rs. 1,00,000/- and executed an agreement for sale, with documents signed by Sharanappa's wife, daughter Kashibai, and one of the sons. 
• The remaining consideration was allegedly paid on 26th July 1995 when the final sale deed was executed, showing consideration of Rs. 72,000/- for court fee purposes. 
• The purchaser claimed the sale was necessitated by the marriage expenses of Kashibai, Sharanappa's daughter. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The right of a Karta to sell joint family property is well established in law, and a Karta enjoys wide discretion regarding the existence of legal necessity and the way such necessity may be fulfilled. 
• Marriage expenses of daughters constitute a recognized legal necessity under Hindu law, and families commonly incur substantial debts to perform marriages which have cascading effects on family finances over subsequent years. 
• The onus to prove that a sale was made for legal necessity lies upon the alienee or purchaser, but this burden cannot extend to proving facts within the special knowledge of coparceners under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
• The purchaser successfully discharged his burden by establishing a clear nexus between the sale transaction and marriage expenses through cross-examination and documentary evidence, including money receipts signed by family members. 
• The plaintiff's delay of five years in challenging the sale transaction raised serious doubts about his bona fides, particularly when mutation certificates and land records clearly established the purchaser's possession. 
• The mere fact that all coparceners did not receive the sale consideration cannot be grounds to challenge an alienation by the Karta, as proving non-receipt lies within the special knowledge of coparceners and cannot burden a stranger-purchaser. 
• The High Court erred in reversing well-reasoned findings of the Trial Court without proper appreciation of evidence, particularly regarding the cascading financial effects of marriage expenses. 
• The fact that a marriage took place prior to the property sale does not invalidate the transaction if the sale was intended to meet debts incurred for the marriage, contrary to the High Court's flawed reasoning. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred to ? 

Section 109 of BSA: 

• Section 109 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) : Burden of Proving Fact Especially Within Knowledge. 
• Previously it was covered under 106 of Evidence Act.  
• Basic Principle: When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact shifts to that person, not the opposing party. 
• Rationale: This section prevents unfair advantage where one party has exclusive or special access to information that others cannot reasonably obtain or know. 
• Application Test: The fact must be "especially" within knowledge - meaning it's not general knowledge but specific information only that person would possess or have easy access to. 
• Criminal Law Application: In criminal cases, if certain facts about the accused's actions, mental state, or circumstances are only known to the accused, they must prove those facts (e.g., self-defense claims, alibi). 
• Civil Law Application: In civil matters, parties with special professional knowledge, access to records, or exclusive information about events must prove facts within their special domain. 
• Judicial Interpretation: Courts apply this section reasonably and don't impose impossible burdens - the person must only prove facts they can reasonably be expected to know. 
• Limitation: This provision is an exception to the general rule "he who asserts must prove" and should be applied judiciously to ensure fairness in proceedings. 

Case Laws 

• Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar (1996): Established that a joint Hindu family is capable of acting through its Karta or adult member in management of joint Hindu family property, and coparceners cannot seek injunction against Karta restraining him from dealing with joint family property. 
• Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy vs. V. Manjunath & Anr. (2021): Held that where a Karta has alienated joint Hindu family property for value either for legal necessity or benefit of the estate, it binds the interest of all undivided members even when they are minors or widows. 
• Kehar Singh v. Nachittar Kaur (2018): Clarified that once the factum of existence of legal necessity is proved, no co-coparcener has a right to challenge the sale made by the Karta of his family, and the existence of legal necessity depends upon facts of each case. 
• Rani v. Santa Bala Debnath (1970): Established the principle that the onus to prove that a sale made by the Karta on behalf of other coparceners of Hindu Undivided Family for legal necessity lies on the alienee or purchaser.