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Bystander Liability Test
08-Oct-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, the Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan acquitted 10 individuals convicted in a 1988 Bihar community clash, holding that mere presence at the crime scene does not make a person part of an unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC. The Court clarified that liability arises only when the accused shares the common object of the assembly.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Zainul v. The State of Bihar (2025).
What was the Background of Zainul v. The State of Bihar (2025) ?
- On November 20, 1988, a violent clash occurred in Katihar District, Bihar, resulting in two deaths and five serious injuries over a dispute concerning settlement land. The incident began around 8:00 AM when Jagdish Mahato and his brother Meghu Mahato went to inspect their agricultural field after harvesting paddy crops from land officially assigned to them by the State Government. According to the prosecution, a large group of 400-500 armed persons from Mahila village were hiding near the settlement land with weapons including guns, pistols, spears, axes, swords, and sticks, intending to prevent Jagdish from harvesting his crops.
- When the brothers reached the field, the armed group allegedly surrounded them and began pelting stones. Meghu Mahato was shot dead during this attack. Several villagers rushed to help after hearing the commotion, but they too were attacked. Sarjug Mahato was also shot dead, while five others sustained serious injuries. The investigating officer recorded Jagdish Mahato's statement at 1:30 PM at the hospital, which became FIR No. 148 of 1988. Remarkably, 72 persons were named as accused, though only 24 were ultimately chargesheeted. The Trial Court convicted 21 accused persons to life imprisonment, while the High Court acquitted 7 more, upholding conviction of 12 persons. Eventually, 10 appellants reached the Supreme Court after two died during the appeal process.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Supreme Court elaborated comprehensively on principles governing Section 149 IPC, which prescribes constructive criminal liability for members of an unlawful assembly. The Court emphasized that the nucleus of Section 149 is the "common object" shared by assembly members, and mere presence at the crime scene does not automatically make someone a member of an unlawful assembly. The Court distinguished between passive onlookers present out of curiosity and actual members who participate with knowledge of the assembly's unlawful purpose.
- The Court laid down parameters to determine common object, including the time and place of assembly formation, conduct of members, collective behavior, motive, manner of occurrence, nature of weapons used, and extent of injuries inflicted. The Court stressed that common object must be inferred from circumstances and cannot be presumed from mere presence.
- The Court enunciated a crucial rule of prudence for mass crime cases, observing that in rural factional disputes, numerous curious spectators appear who have no role in the offense. Courts must exercise utmost care to avoid convicting innocent persons along with the guilty. Endorsing the principle from Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964), the Court held that where large numbers are involved, conviction should be sustained only when supported by consistent accounts of at least two or three reliable witnesses.
- The Court stressed that where evidence is partisan and witnesses belong to one faction, the possibility of innocent persons being falsely implicated cannot be ruled out. While partisan evidence cannot be rejected solely on that ground, it must be examined with utmost caution. Regarding injured witnesses, the Court held that while injuries lend credence to their presence, their testimony must still be free from material contradictions and must satisfy the court's conscience.
- Applying these principles to the present case, the Court found serious infirmities. Jagdish Mahato admitted falling unconscious after assault, contradicting his police statement claiming other injured persons informed him about 41 additional assailants. Material contradictions existed between court depositions and police statements. Medical evidence did not corroborate witness testimony—witnesses claimed being hit by sticks but medical evidence showed only incised wounds from sharp weapons.
- The Court expressed serious concern about FIR authenticity, noting that information reached police hours before the FIR was officially registered. The Court held this rendered the investigation tainted. Examining each appellant individually, most were identified only in an omnibus manner without specific overt acts attributed to them. The unexplained dropping of 48 accused persons from the original 72 named raised doubts about the case's genuineness.
- The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted all 10 appellants, holding they were entitled to benefit of doubt as the prosecution failed to establish they were members of the unlawful assembly or committed any overt act in furtherance of unlawful purpose.
What Is the Test to Determine That Whether the Bystander Shared a Common Object with the Unlawful Assembly?
- a. Time and Place of Assembly Formation
- The Court held that examining when and where the unlawful assembly was formed reveals whether there was prior planning and coordination. If members gathered at a specific time and strategic location, it indicates premeditation and shared intent rather than spontaneous or chance presence.
- b. Conduct and Behaviour at or Near the Scene
- Individual conduct at the scene is a significant indicator of shared purpose. If an accused person's actions demonstrate active participation, encouragement, or support for the unlawful activity, it shows shared common object. Merely standing by without participating indicates an innocent bystander.
- c. Collective Conduct of the Assembly
- The Court distinguished between individual and collective conduct. If members acted in concert—moving together, attacking together, or acting synchronously—it demonstrates shared common object. Coordinated collective action strengthens the inference of common purpose, while independent actions weaken it.
- d. Motive Underlying the Crime
- Motive is critical in determining common object. If an accused had the same motive as other members—such as settling a dispute, taking revenge, or asserting dominance—it indicates shared common object. Shared motive proves the person was not a spectator but an active participant with reasons to further the assembly's purpose.
- e. Manner in Which the Occurrence Unfolded
- The Court emphasized examining the sequence of events and how different members participated. If the occurrence shows systematic execution with role distribution, it indicates shared common object. The manner reveals whether there was organized action or chaotic violence, and whether the attack was sustained and coordinated.
- f. Nature of Weapons Carried and Used
- Similar weapons among members suggest prior preparation and shared purpose. If members came armed with deadly weapons, it indicates knowledge that violence was contemplated. The type of weapons also reveals the seriousness of the common object—whether to threaten, injure, or commit murder.
- g. Nature, Extent, and Number of Injuries Inflicted
- The pattern of injuries provides crucial evidence about common object. If multiple victims received similar injuries from different members, it shows collective assault pursuant to common purpose. The severity indicates whether the object was simple hurt or grievous harm or death. Multiple injuries on vital body parts suggest shared murderous intent.
Criminal Law
Section 25 Evidence Act
08-Oct-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale acquitted three individuals accused of murder, ruling that only the portion of their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to recovery of the weapon is admissible. The Court clarified that statements linking the recovered weapon to the crime amount to inadmissible confessions under Sections 25 and 26.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc (2025).
What was the Background of Rajendra Singh And Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc (2025)?
- On the morning of June 3, 2000, Rajendra Singh and his son Bhupender Singh began digging the field of Diler Singh (father of deceased Pushpendra Singh) for laying down a plinth, which led to an altercation between the two parties.
- At approximately 1:30 p.m. on the same day, the deceased Pushpendra Singh was sitting at Jogither diversion when three persons—Rajendra Singh, his son Bhupender Singh, and son-in-law Ranjeet Singh—allegedly arrived on a motorcycle armed with swords and a kanta (sharp-edged weapon).
- According to the prosecution, the three appellants confronted and chased the deceased, who ran towards the northern fields raising an alarm. The deceased entered the house of Mukhtyar Singh to save himself, but the appellants allegedly followed him inside and inflicted fatal blows, causing his death on the spot.
- Diler Singh lodged an FIR at 2:50 p.m. at Police Station Nanak Matta under Section 302 IPC. The police conducted investigation, prepared panchnama, recorded witness statements, and sent the body for post-mortem examination.
- The appellants were arrested on June 5 and 7, 2000. Weapons—swords and kanta—were allegedly recovered based on their disclosure statements. A chargesheet was filed on June 14, 2000, charging all three accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
- The Trial Court acquitted all three accused in Session Trial No. 215 of 2000. However, the High Court reversed this acquittal vide judgment dated January 2, 2013, in Government Appeal No. 347 of 2007, convicting them under Section 302 IPC with life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- each.
- The three convicted accused challenged their conviction before the Supreme Court through Criminal Appeal Nos. 476-477 of 2013.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- On Identity and Eyewitness Testimony:
- The Court held that the primary issue was determining whether the appellants were the actual perpetrators through ocular evidence. While the morning altercation provided motive, cogent evidence was essential to establish involvement.
- The Court found Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7), an independent witness in whose house the incident occurred, to be trustworthy. She testified three persons killed the deceased with weapons and her clothes were bloodstained when she intervened. However, she critically stated she did not know the accused persons' names and could not identify them—she had only seen three unknown persons. No identification parade was conducted.
- On Contradictions in Prosecution Evidence:
- The Court found striking contradictions between PW-7 and Diler Singh (PW-1, father of deceased). PW-7's credible testimony showed PW-1 arrived approximately half an hour after the incident, making him not an actual eyewitness.
- The Court noted it was unnatural that PW-1's bloodstained clothes were neither offered to police nor seized despite visiting the police station. He allegedly washed and wore them again, indicating his story was concocted.
- PW-1 was deemed a chance witness, as his presence at Jogither diversion was unnatural since it was not on his route. PW-4 did not corroborate PW-1's claim of visiting his flour mill, making PW-1's presence doubtful.
- Jwala Singh (PW-2), being 60-70 steps behind PW-1, was also a chance witness. Since PW-1's presence was doubtful, PW-2's presence stood belied. No independent witnesses were called to corroborate the evidence.
- On Recovery of Weapons and Section 27 Evidence Act:
- While weapons were recovered based on appellants' disclosure, no forensic laboratory report established they were actually used in the murder.
- The Court rejected the State's contention that appellants' statements admitting they committed the offence with recovered weapons could be used against them. Under Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, only the statement portion leading to weapon recovery is admissible, not the part alleging the weapons were used in the crime.
- Citing Pulukuri Kottaya vs. King Emperor and Manjunath vs. State of Karnataka, the Court held that information leading to recovery is admissible, but not information that the crime was committed with those weapons.
- Final Determination:
- The Court concluded the appellants' identity was not established by either ocular evidence or weapon recovery. Acquittal orders are not open to interference unless Trial Court findings are perverse. The High Court erred in reversing the acquittal without concluding the Trial Court findings were perverse.
- The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, allowed the appeals, and acquitted the appellants by granting benefit of doubt.
What is Section 25 of Evidence Act?
- Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Confession to Police Officer Not to Be Proved
- This provision establishes an absolute bar on the admissibility of confessions made to police officers. No confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. This substantive provision protects accused persons from potential coercion or undue influence during police custody, recognizing the inherent power imbalance between police officers and persons in their custody.
- Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Confession by Accused While in Custody of Police Not to Be Proved Against Him
- This provision extends protection beyond confessions made directly to police officers. No confession made by any person whilst in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such person, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This safeguard ensures that any confession during police custody—regardless of to whom it is made—remains inadmissible unless recorded before a Magistrate, providing judicial oversight.
- The Explanation clarifies that "Magistrate" excludes village headmen discharging magisterial functions unless they are Magistrates exercising powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, ensuring only properly constituted judicial magistrates can record admissible confessions.
- Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - How Much of Information Received from Accused May Be Proved
- This provision creates a limited exception to the absolute bar imposed by Sections 25 and 26. When any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from an accused person while in police custody, so much of such information—whether it amounts to confession or not—as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
- The scope of Section 27 is narrowly confined: only that portion of information which directly and distinctly relates to the discovery of the fact is admissible. Any additional statement amounting to confession of guilt or admission of involvement in the crime remains inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26.
- Interplay Between Sections 25, 26, and 27:
- Sections 25 and 26 are substantive provisions establishing the general rule of exclusion of confessions made to or in the custody of police officers. Section 27 operates as an exception to this general rule but does not nullify the protections afforded by Sections 25 and 26. The exception is limited strictly to information leading to discovery of material facts, and does not extend to confessional statements about the use of discovered objects in commission of the offence.