Section 25 Evidence Act

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale acquitted three individuals accused of murder, ruling that only the portion of their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to recovery of the weapon is admissible. The Court clarified that statements linking the recovered weapon to the crime amount to inadmissible confessions under Sections 25 and 26. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc (2025). 

What was the Background of Rajendra Singh And Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc (2025)? 

• On the morning of June 3, 2000, Rajendra Singh and his son Bhupender Singh began digging the field of Diler Singh (father of deceased Pushpendra Singh) for laying down a plinth, which led to an altercation between the two parties. 
• At approximately 1:30 p.m. on the same day, the deceased Pushpendra Singh was sitting at Jogither diversion when three persons—Rajendra Singh, his son Bhupender Singh, and son-in-law Ranjeet Singh—allegedly arrived on a motorcycle armed with swords and a kanta (sharp-edged weapon). 
• According to the prosecution, the three appellants confronted and chased the deceased, who ran towards the northern fields raising an alarm. The deceased entered the house of Mukhtyar Singh to save himself, but the appellants allegedly followed him inside and inflicted fatal blows, causing his death on the spot. 
• Diler Singh lodged an FIR at 2:50 p.m. at Police Station Nanak Matta under Section 302 IPC. The police conducted investigation, prepared panchnama, recorded witness statements, and sent the body for post-mortem examination. 
• The appellants were arrested on June 5 and 7, 2000. Weapons—swords and kanta—were allegedly recovered based on their disclosure statements. A chargesheet was filed on June 14, 2000, charging all three accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 
• The Trial Court acquitted all three accused in Session Trial No. 215 of 2000. However, the High Court reversed this acquittal vide judgment dated January 2, 2013, in Government Appeal No. 347 of 2007, convicting them under Section 302 IPC with life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. 
• The three convicted accused challenged their conviction before the Supreme Court through Criminal Appeal Nos. 476-477 of 2013.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• On Identity and Eyewitness Testimony: 
  • The Court held that the primary issue was determining whether the appellants were the actual perpetrators through ocular evidence. While the morning altercation provided motive, cogent evidence was essential to establish involvement. 
  • The Court found Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7), an independent witness in whose house the incident occurred, to be trustworthy. She testified three persons killed the deceased with weapons and her clothes were bloodstained when she intervened. However, she critically stated she did not know the accused persons' names and could not identify them—she had only seen three unknown persons. No identification parade was conducted. 
• On Contradictions in Prosecution Evidence: 
  • The Court found striking contradictions between PW-7 and Diler Singh (PW-1, father of deceased). PW-7's credible testimony showed PW-1 arrived approximately half an hour after the incident, making him not an actual eyewitness. 
  • The Court noted it was unnatural that PW-1's bloodstained clothes were neither offered to police nor seized despite visiting the police station. He allegedly washed and wore them again, indicating his story was concocted. 
  • PW-1 was deemed a chance witness, as his presence at Jogither diversion was unnatural since it was not on his route. PW-4 did not corroborate PW-1's claim of visiting his flour mill, making PW-1's presence doubtful. 
  • Jwala Singh (PW-2), being 60-70 steps behind PW-1, was also a chance witness. Since PW-1's presence was doubtful, PW-2's presence stood belied. No independent witnesses were called to corroborate the evidence. 
• On Recovery of Weapons and Section 27 Evidence Act: 
  • While weapons were recovered based on appellants' disclosure, no forensic laboratory report established they were actually used in the murder. 
  • The Court rejected the State's contention that appellants' statements admitting they committed the offence with recovered weapons could be used against them. Under Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, only the statement portion leading to weapon recovery is admissible, not the part alleging the weapons were used in the crime. 
  • Citing Pulukuri Kottaya vs. King Emperor and Manjunath vs. State of Karnataka, the Court held that information leading to recovery is admissible, but not information that the crime was committed with those weapons. 
• Final Determination: 
  • The Court concluded the appellants' identity was not established by either ocular evidence or weapon recovery. Acquittal orders are not open to interference unless Trial Court findings are perverse. The High Court erred in reversing the acquittal without concluding the Trial Court findings were perverse. 
  • The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, allowed the appeals, and acquitted the appellants by granting benefit of doubt. 

What is Section 25 of Evidence Act? 

• Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Confession to Police Officer Not to Be Proved 
  • This provision establishes an absolute bar on the admissibility of confessions made to police officers. No confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. This substantive provision protects accused persons from potential coercion or undue influence during police custody, recognizing the inherent power imbalance between police officers and persons in their custody. 
• Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Confession by Accused While in Custody of Police Not to Be Proved Against Him 
  • This provision extends protection beyond confessions made directly to police officers. No confession made by any person whilst in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such person, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This safeguard ensures that any confession during police custody—regardless of to whom it is made—remains inadmissible unless recorded before a Magistrate, providing judicial oversight. 
  • The Explanation clarifies that "Magistrate" excludes village headmen discharging magisterial functions unless they are Magistrates exercising powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, ensuring only properly constituted judicial magistrates can record admissible confessions. 
• Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - How Much of Information Received from Accused May Be Proved 
  • This provision creates a limited exception to the absolute bar imposed by Sections 25 and 26. When any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from an accused person while in police custody, so much of such information—whether it amounts to confession or not—as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. 
  • The scope of Section 27 is narrowly confined: only that portion of information which directly and distinctly relates to the discovery of the fact is admissible. Any additional statement amounting to confession of guilt or admission of involvement in the crime remains inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26. 
• Interplay Between Sections 25, 26, and 27: 
  • Sections 25 and 26 are substantive provisions establishing the general rule of exclusion of confessions made to or in the custody of police officers. Section 27 operates as an exception to this general rule but does not nullify the protections afforded by Sections 25 and 26. The exception is limited strictly to information leading to discovery of material facts, and does not extend to confessional statements about the use of discovered objects in commission of the offence.