List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

The bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. M/s Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2025) held that the objections regarding the CBI's lack of state consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, must be raised at the earliest stage, usually right after the FIR is registered. It clarified that once the investigation is complete, a chargesheet is filed, and a magistrate takes cognizance, such objections cannot be used belatedly to invalidate the proceedings, except where a quashing petition was already pending before cognizance was taken. 

What was the Background of Central Bureau of Investigation v. M/s Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The first respondent, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, was initially granted a credit limit of Rs.10.50 crores by UCO Bank, which was increased progressively. 
• The credit limit was later extended to Rs.37 crores by UCO Bank, while Punjab National Bank and Corporation Bank also extended facilities of Rs.33.5 crores and Rs.40 crores respectively. 
• These banks subsequently formed a consortium and sanctioned an aggregate limit of Rs.110.5 crores to the Company. 
• The Company's account was declared as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) by all consortium banks on 31.03.2013. 
• Recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal were initiated following the NPA declaration. 
• A Joint Lenders Meeting was held on 23.03.2017, where the compromise proposal given by the Company was found unacceptable. 
• The banks proposed to file a criminal complaint after rejecting the compromise proposal. 
• A One Time Settlement (OTS) was also proposed subsequently, but the Company failed to honour the same. 
• The complaints made by the banks led to registration of FIR No.RC2222020A0002/2020 on 05.11.2020, under Sections 420 read with 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
• After investigation, CBI filed a chargesheet and one supplementary chargesheet before the Special Magistrate, CBI, Indore, under Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 471 IPC. 
• The charges under Prevention of Corruption Act were dropped as no bank official or public servant could be prosecuted for want of requisite sanction. 
• While the CBI Court had taken cognizance of the chargesheet, the Company approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore on 16.07.2024. 
• The petition was filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashing of the FIR dated 05.11.2020, chargesheet and proceedings in ST No. 16/2023. 
• The High Court vide judgment dated 08.08.2024 allowed the petition and quashed the entire proceedings on two grounds.

What were the Court's Observations? 

On State Consent Requirement: 

• The Supreme Court held that both reasons given by the High Court were misconceived and misdirected. 
• The Court emphasized that lack of consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 ought to have been raised soon after registration of FIR. 
• Once the investigation is complete, chargesheet has been filed, and the court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance, such plea cannot be raised to vitiate the validity of an order taking cognizance. 
• The Court carved out limited exceptions where such plea may be raised:  
  • When it causes severe miscarriage of justice 
  • Where proceedings for quashing of FIR have been initiated and chargesheet has been filed during pendency of the quashing proceedings 
• In the latter case, the aggrieved person may have justification in contending that filing of chargesheet during pendency of quashing proceedings will not prejudice their right. 

On Merit-Based Examination: 

• The Supreme Court found that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction while assuming the role of a Trial Court. 
• The Court noted that there were debatable issues which ought to have been left to the wisdom of the Trial Court. 
• The High Court should not have entered into merit-based examination of allegations at the stage of quashing proceedings.

Court's Directions: 

• The impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside on both counts. 
• The XXVII Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, before whom ST No.16/2023 was pending, was directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 
• The Court clarified that if in the ongoing proceedings, the Trial Court finds prima facie case to prosecute bank officials under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or any other penal provision, there shall be no impediment to summon such officials. 
• The respondents were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 28.10.2025 and furnish bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. 
• Upon furnishing of bail bonds, the orders dated 21.03.2025 and 05.05.2025 passed by Supreme Court attaching personal and family assets of the Managing Director and Director of the respondent Company would stand vacated. 
• The Court specifically clarified that it had not gone into the merits of the allegations.

What is Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946? 

About: 

• Extent: Applies to the whole of India. 
• Date of Enactment: 19th November 1946 

Purpose and Objective: 

• To constitute a special police force in Delhi for investigation of certain offences in Union territories. 
• To provide for superintendence and administration of this special police force, 
• To enable extension of powers and jurisdiction of this force to other areas for investigation of specified offences. 

Constitution of Delhi Special Police Establishment: 

• Creation: Central Government may constitute a special police force called the Delhi Special Police Establishment. 
• Purpose: Investigation of offences notified under Section 3 in any Union territory. 
• Powers: Members have all powers, duties, privileges and liabilities that police officers of that Union territory have for investigation and arrest. 
• Rank Authority: Members of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may exercise powers of officer in charge of a police station. 

Offences to be Investigated: 

• Central Government specifies offences or classes of offences through notification in Official Gazette. 
• These offences are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment.

Superintendence and Administration: 

Superintendence: 

• For Prevention of Corruption Act cases: Vests in the Central Vigilance Commission 
• For all other matters: Vests in the Central Government 

Administration: 

• Vests in an officer appointed as Director by the Central Government. 
• Director exercises powers similar to Inspector-General of Police as specified by Central Government. 

Appointment of Director: 

Committee Composition: 

• Chairperson: Prime Minister 
• Member: Leader of Opposition in House of the People (or Leader of single largest Opposition Party if no recognized Leader of Opposition). 
• Member: Chief Justice of India or Judge of Supreme Court nominated by CJI. 

Selection Criteria: 

• Panel recommended based on seniority, integrity and experience in investigation of anti-corruption cases. 
• Officers chosen from Indian Police Service. 

Validity: 

• Appointment not invalid merely due to vacancy or absence of a Committee Member. 

Terms and Conditions of Director: 

Tenure: 

• Minimum period of 2 years from date of assumption of office. 
• Period may be extended up to one year at a time in public interest on Committee's recommendation with recorded reasons. 
• Maximum total period including extensions: 5 years. 

Transfer: 

• Director cannot be transferred except with previous consent of the Committee under Section 4A. 

Director of Prosecution: 

Appointment and Rank: 

• Officer not below rank of Joint Secretary to Government of India. 
• Appointed by Central Government on recommendation of Central Vigilance Commission. 
• Heads the Directorate of Prosecution. 

Function: 

• Conducts prosecution of cases under this Act. 
• Functions under overall supervision and control of the Director. 

Tenure: 

• Minimum period of 2 years from date of assumption of office.

Appointment of Senior Officers 

Covered Posts: 

• Posts of level of Superintendent of Police and above (except Director). 

Appointing Committee: 

• Chairperson: Central Vigilance Commissioner 
• Members: Vigilance Commissioners 
• Members: Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 
• Members: Secretary, Department of Personnel 

Process: 

• Committee must consult Director before submitting recommendation. 
• Central Government passes orders on receiving recommendation. 
• Committee also recommends extension or curtailment of tenure of such officers. 

Extension of Powers to Other Areas 

Authority: 

• Central Government may extend powers and jurisdiction to any area (including Railway areas) in a State (not being a Union territory). 
• Extension done through order for investigation of offences specified in Section 3 notification. 

Powers When Extended: 

• Members may discharge functions of police officer in that area. 
• Deemed to be member of police force of that area. 
• Vested with powers, functions, privileges and liabilities of police officer of that area. 
• Sub-Inspector and above may exercise powers of officer in charge of police station. 

State Consent Requirement (Section 6) 

Critical Provision: 

• No member of Delhi Special Police Establishment can exercise powers and jurisdiction in any State (not being a Union territory or railway area) without consent of State Government. 
• This protects federal structure and State autonomy. 
• Consent can be general or case specific. 

Central Government Approval for Certain Cases (Section 6A) 

Prior Approval Required For: 

Investigation of offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 when allegation relates to: 

• Employees of Central Government of level of Joint Secretary and above. 
• Officers appointed by Central Government in corporations, government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by Central Government. 

Exception to Approval Requirement: 

• Not required for spot arrests on charge of accepting or attempting to accept gratification (other than legal remuneration). 

Source:  Rajasthan High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand held that delay rules should not defeat substantive rights, quashing the Board of Revenue’s rejection of an Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) plea for lacking an initial delay-condonation application. The Court observed that limitations of laws are meant to ensure timely remedies, not to destroy legal rights. 

• The Rajasthan High Court held this in the matter of Arjun Lal & Ors. v Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Arjun Lal & Ors. v Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. (2025) ? 

• The petitioners were defendants in a revenue suit filed by the respondents before the Assistant Collector, Jaipur City-II. 
• The petitioners had been regularly appearing in the proceedings before the trial court. 
• On 06th April 2022 and 11th April 2022, the petitioners remained absent from the court hearings. 
• On 13.04.2022, due to the illness of petitioner No.2 (the mother), the petitioners could not appear before the court. 
• Consequently, an ex-parte order was passed against the petitioners on 13th April 2022. 
• Subsequently, an ex-parte decree was drawn on 29th April 2022. 
• The petitioners were unaware of the passing of the ex-parte order and decree initially. 
• Upon gaining knowledge of the ex-parte proceedings, the petitioners filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on 06.06.2022 to set aside the ex-parte order and decree. 
• The delay in filing the application was approximately six days beyond the limitation period. 
• The reasons for the delay were explained in the application under Order XI Rule 13 CPC itself, citing the mother's illness as the cause of non-appearance. 
• No separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was filed along with the original application. 
• When the respondents raised objections regarding the absence of a condonation application, the petitioners filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 27th June 2022. 
• The respondents had filed a caveat before the Appellate Court, anticipating that the petitioners might file an appeal. 
• The Assistant Collector, after considering the applications and the reasons mentioned therein, allowed the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC vide order dated 28th July 2022. 
• The Assistant Collector condoned the delay and set aside the ex-parte order and decree dated 29th July 2022. 
• Aggrieved by the Assistant Collector's order, the respondents filed a revision petition under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 before the Board of Revenue. 
• The Board of Revenue, vide order dated 28th May 2024, allowed the revision petition on technical grounds. 
• The Board held that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not submitted along with the original application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, but was filed subsequently. 
• Based on this technical deficiency, the Board quashed and set aside the Assistant Collector's order dated 28th July 2022. 
• The respondents contended that the petitioners had availed two parallel remedies by filing both an appeal and an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. 
• Challenging the Board's order, the petitioners filed the present writ petition before the High Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that the reasons for delay were adequately explained in the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC itself. 
• The Court noted that the deficiency pointed out by the respondents was promptly cured by the petitioners by immediately filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 
• In the Court's opinion, the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was not defective merely because the condonation application was filed subsequently rather than simultaneously. 
• The Court observed that the delay was merely of six days, which had been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners. 
• The Court held that it is a settled proposition of law that a superior court should not disturb findings of the trial court unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or was arbitrary or perverse. 
• The Court emphasised that the primary function of the court is to adjudicate disputes between parties and advance substantial justice. 
• The Court observed that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties, but are meant to ensure that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek their remedy promptly. 
• The Court stated that the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. 
• The Court noted that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedies for the redressal of legal injuries suffered. 
• The Court observed that all material aspects of the matter were properly considered by the Assistant Collector whilst setting aside the ex-parte decree and order. 
• The Court held that there was no great delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, as it was filed within a period of one month and six days after the passing of the ex-parte decree. 
• The Court found that the reasons explained by the petitioners before the Assistant Collector were satisfactory. 
• The Court concluded that the Assistant Collector was right in allowing the application filed by the petitioners and setting aside the ex-parte order and decree. 
• The Court held that the order of the Assistant Collector had been unnecessarily quashed by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 
• The Court observed that the Board had decided the matter on mere technical grounds without appreciating the substantive aspects of justice. 
• The Court directed the Assistant Collector to decide the suit expeditiously, preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order. 

What is Order IX Rule 13 CPC ? 

• Order IX Rule 13 CPC - Setting Aside Decree Ex Parte Against Defendant. 
• A defendant against whom an ex parte decree has been passed may apply to the court which passed the decree to set it aside. 
• The defendant must satisfy the court on either of two grounds: that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing at the hearing. 
• If satisfied, the court shall set aside the decree upon such terms as to costs, payment into court, or otherwise as it thinks fit. 
• Upon setting aside the decree, the court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. 
• Where the decree cannot be set aside against the applying defendant only, it may be set aside against all or any other defendants also. 
• No court shall set aside an ex parte decree merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons, if the defendant had notice of the hearing date and sufficient time to appear. 
• Where an appeal against an ex parte decree has been disposed of on any ground other than withdrawal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside that decree. 
• The rule confers discretionary power upon the court to balance the interests of justice whilst preventing abuse of process. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Prathiba M Singh and Justice Shail Jain  held that a tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title during tenancy, even when alleging forgery, unless supported by credible evidence. The ruling came while dismissing a tenant’s appeal against eviction, emphasizing that tenants cannot misuse tenancy to delay lawful possession. 

• The Delhi High Court  held this in the matter of Naseem Ahmed v. Deepak Singh (2025). 

What was the Background of  Naseem Ahmed v. Deepak Singh (2025) ? 

• The dispute concerns Shop No. 4 at Village Mirpur Turk, Karawal Nagar, Delhi, where Naseem Ahmed (tenant) was inducted by Smt. Gayatri Devi (landlord's mother) for commercial purposes at Rs. 600 per month, later enhanced to Rs. 780. The tenant claims rent was paid until June 2011, after which the landlord refused acceptance. He tendered Rs. 20,280 arrears via cheque, which was returned un-encashed. The landlord alleges continuous default since 2011 and unauthorised occupation. 
• After Smt. Gayatri Devi's demise, her son Deepak Singh claimed ownership through a Will dated 5th April 2022. He issued a termination notice on 20th January 2024, claiming market rent of Rs. 20,000 per month. 
• The matter travelled through three proceedings: First, an eviction petition (125/2011) was filed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, which was eventually withdrawn in March 2019 as the Act was inapplicable to the suit premises. Second, the landlord filed Civil Suit 127/2024 before the Commercial Civil Judge, but it was returned as the valuation of Rs. 6,20,000 exceeded its pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 3,00,000. Third, the landlord instituted Civil Suit 143/2024 before the District Judge (Commercial Court), valuing the suit at Rs. 7,60,130. 
• The Commercial Court allowed the landlord's application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on 22nd July 2025, granting a decree for possession based on admissions. The tenant appealed, challenging the Commercial Court's pecuniary jurisdiction and disputing the landlord's ownership, alleging the Will was forged. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that courts are entitled to take judicial notice of rent escalation in metropolitan cities. The tenant himself admitted an adjacent shop was let out at Rs. 7,000 in 2018. Applying moderate escalation, the valuation would far exceed Rs. 3,00,000. The Court observed that the Rs. 20,000 monthly rent adopted by the landlord was reasonable, consistent with prevailing rentals, and not arbitrary. 
• The Court emphasised the doctrine of dominus litis, whereby the plaintiff has the prerogative to value the suit and choose the forum, subject only to the limitation that valuation must not be arbitrary or mala fide. Courts ordinarily respect the plaintiff's valuation unless shown to be capricious. 
• The Court invoked the Doctrine of Estoppel and Approbation and Reprobation, noting the tenant's contradictory stands. Before the Civil Judge, he argued the suit exceeded pecuniary jurisdiction; now he contends valuation is below Rs. 3,00,000. The Court held that the law does not permit a litigant to "blow hot and cold" or "play fast and loose" with the Court. Having urged one position for advantage before one forum, the tenant cannot now assail that very foundation. The landlord cannot be left remediless. 
• The Court held that a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC requires three conditions:  
  • (1) landlord-tenant relationship exists;  
  • (2) tenancy not covered under Delhi Rent Control Act; and  
  • (3) tenancy duly terminated. 
• First condition: The tenant admitted induction by the landlord's mother. This stood fulfilled. 
• Second condition: The tenancy was for commercial purposes in Karawal Nagar, an area not notified under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Court held that the Act's applicability is confined to areas expressly notified. Since Karawal Nagar remains unnotified, the Rent Controller has no authority, and only the Civil/Commercial Court has jurisdiction. 
• Third condition: The Court held that a tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title while continuing in possession. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 122 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) embodies the principle of Tenant Estoppel—a tenant is precluded from denying the landlord's title during tenancy. Even where forgery allegations are raised, absence of credible evidence or challenge by other legal heirs negates any triable issue. The Court observed this principle rests on statutory authority and equitable considerations to prevent tenants from misusing tenancy to prolong occupation and frustrate lawful eviction. 
• The Court held the Will forgery allegation was wholly unsubstantiated, as no legal heir challenged it before any competent Court. Without cogent contemporaneous evidence, the Commercial Court was justified in treating the Will as having persuasive evidentiary value. 
• Regarding termination, the Court observed that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that commercial leases are terminable by fifteen days' notice. Critically, the Court held that institution of a suit itself constitutes sufficient notice to quit, satisfying Section 106 TPA requirements. Once notice is served or deemed served, the tenancy stands terminated, and the tenant's status reduces to that of an unauthorised occupant. 
• The Court observed that denials in pleadings must be specific and supported by material particulars. Evasive denials or denials for want of knowledge are legally insufficient. The tenant's denials were vague and evasive, which strengthened justification for summary disposal. His assertion of rent payment until 2011 lacked contemporaneous receipts or banking records, raising no triable issue. 
• The Court held that all statutory prerequisites were satisfied, and defences raised were legally barred and untenable. The summary disposal was warranted as the tenant's challenge lacked merit when tenancy stood admitted. The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the tenant to hand over vacant peaceful possession within three months. 

What Does Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Provide For? 

• Basic Framework 
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act governs the duration and termination of leases where there is no written contract or local usage specifying different terms. 
• Types of Leases and Notice Requirements 
  • For leases of immovable property used for agricultural and manufacturing purposes, the law presumes a year-to-year tenancy that can be terminated by either the lessor or lessee by giving six months' notice. 
  • For leases of immovable property used for any other purpose including commercial or residential purposes, the law presumes a month-to-month tenancy that can be terminated by either party by giving fifteen days' notice. 
  • The fifteen-day notice for non-agricultural leases must expire with the end of a month of tenancy, meaning it must align with the monthly rental cycle. 
• Notice Period Calculation 
  • The notice period begins to run from the date when the notice is actually received by the other party, not from the date when it was sent or posted. 
  • A notice will not be deemed invalid merely because it mentions a shorter period than statutorily required, provided the suit or proceeding is actually filed after the proper statutory period has elapsed. 
• Form and Service of Notice 
  • Every termination notice must be in writing and must be signed by the person giving it or by someone authorized on their behalf. 
  • The notice may be served by sending it through post to the party who is intended to be bound by it. 
  • Alternatively, the notice may be delivered personally to the concerned party at any location. 
  • If personal delivery is not possible, the notice may be given to one of the party's family members or servants at their residence. 
  • If none of the above methods are practicable, the notice may be affixed to a conspicuous part of the leased property itself. 
• Continuation After Lease Expiry 
  • When a lessee continues to occupy the property after the lease expires and the lessor accepts rent or otherwise consents to the continued possession, the lessee becomes a tenant by holding over and the lease is automatically renewed on the same terms as specified in Section 106. 
  • When a lessee continues to occupy the property after the lease expires without the lessor's consent, the lessee becomes a tenant by sufferance whose possession is wrongful in its continuance though it was lawful at inception. 
• Legal Status of Tenant at Sufferance 
  • A tenant at sufferance is distinguished from a trespasser by the legal fiction that their initial possession was lawful, whereas a trespasser's possession is unlawful from the very beginning. 
  • There exists no landlord-tenant relationship between a lessor and a tenant at sufferance, and therefore no notice under Section 106 is required before filing a suit for eviction against such a person. 
  • A tenancy at sufferance automatically terminates when the landlord demands possession, when the landlord enters the property without notice, or when the tenant voluntarily quits the premises. 
• Institution of Suit as Notice 
  • Courts have consistently held that filing a suit for possession itself constitutes valid notice to quit under Section 106, thereby satisfying the statutory notice requirement. 
  • Once a suit is instituted and summons are served, even if technical objections are raised about the termination notice, the filing of the suit operates as deemed service of notice under Section 106. 
  • After such notice is served or deemed served through institution of the suit, the tenancy stands legally terminated and the tenant's status is reduced to that of an unauthorized occupant with no legal right to continue in possession. 
• Applicability and Exceptions 
  • Section 106 applies only as a default provision in the absence of any written contract, local law, or established local usage that provides for different terms. 
  • If the parties have executed a written lease agreement specifying different notice periods or termination procedures, those contractual terms will prevail over the default provisions of Section 106. 
  • The statute adopts a purpose-based classification recognizing that agricultural and manufacturing leases involve seasonal cycles and longer-term investments requiring six months' notice, while commercial and other leases are more flexible requiring only fifteen days' notice.