List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra clarified in the matter of Annamalai v. Vasanthi and Others (2025) that the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement.  

What was the Background of Annamalai v. Vasanthi and Others (2025) Case? 

• An agreement to sell was entered into between the Appellant (buyer) and the defendant (vendor). 
• The defendant attempted to terminate the contract despite having no termination rights, even after accepting an additional amount of consideration from the plaintiff six months after the contract period had lapsed. 
• The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, stating that no declaration to invalidate the termination was sought by the plaintiff before filing the suit for specific performance. 
• The First Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision and decreed the suit for specific performance, holding that there was no requirement to seek a declaration about invalidation of the termination. 
• The First Appellate Court reasoned that upon accepting the additional consideration amount, the vendor had wrongly repudiated the contract by waiving its right to terminate through the conduct of accepting additional consideration. 
• The High Court reversed the First Appellate Court's decision in a second appeal, prompting the plaintiff-buyer to approach the Supreme Court. 
• The impugned judgment by the High Court had been delivered on February 2, 2018, prior to the 2018 amendment.  

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that prior to the 2018 amendment (brought through Act 18 of 2018), the grant of specific performance was a matter of judicial discretion, not a mandatory relief. 
• The bench referred to its earlier decision in Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd (2022), which held that the 2018 amendment was prospective in nature and could not govern contracts or suits instituted before its commencement. 
• Although the decision in Katta Sujatha Reddy was later reviewed and recalled in Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy (2024), the Supreme Court clarified that even in the review judgment, there was no express finding that the amended provisions would apply to suits filed prior. 
• The Court stated: "No doubt, this decision was reviewed and recalled in Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy but in the review order/judgment this Court did not specifically hold that the amended provisions would govern suits instituted prior to the 2018 Amendment. The review decision merely proceeded on the assumption that the grant of specific performance continued to be discretionary for suits instituted before the amendment." 
• The Court noted that since the impugned judgment had been delivered on February 2, 2018, prior to the amendment coming into force, it was bound to decide the issue based on the law as it stood at that time. 
• The Court held: "In our view, acceptance of additional money not only signified waiver of the right to forfeit advance money/consideration but also acknowledged subsistence of the agreement." 
• The Court pointed out that the subsequent notice of termination was therefore a wrongful repudiation, not a valid exercise of contractual right. 
• The buyer was thus entitled to sue directly for specific performance without first seeking a declaration. 
• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and restored the First Appellate Court's decision, allowing the appeal. 

What is the Specific Relief Act, 1963? 

About: 

• The Specific Relief Act, 1963 is a legislation that provides remedies for persons whose civil or contractual rights have been violated. 
• The Act deals with specific performance of contracts, rectification of instruments, rescission of contracts, and cancellation of instruments. 

SRA Amendment Act, 2018: 

Major Amendments:  

Sections 10 & 11 - Core Transformation: 

• Changed specific performance from discretionary ("may") to mandatory ("shall"). 
• Courts must now grant specific performance unless specific exceptions apply (Sections 11(2), 14, and 16). 

Section 6 - Dispossession Suits: 

• Widened scope to include "person through whom" the aggrieved party was in possession. 
• More parties can now file suits for dispossession of immovable property. 

Section 20 - Substituted Performance (New Provision): 

• Aggrieved party can obtain performance from a third party after giving 30 days notice. 
• Can recover costs from the defaulting party. 
• Applies unless contract states otherwise. 

Section 21 - Compensation: 

• Changed "either...or" to "in addition to" - compensation now supplements (not replaces) specific performance. 

Non-Enforceable Contracts (Section 14) 

Specific performance cannot be granted for: 

• Substituted performance contracts. 
• Contracts involving continuous duty. 
• Contracts dependent on personal qualifications. 
• Contracts of determinable nature. 

Special Provisions for Infrastructure Projects 

New Sections 20A, 20B, 20C: 

• 20A: Prohibits injunctions that impede infrastructure project progress. 
• 20B: Designates Special Courts for infrastructure contract disputes. 
• 20C: Mandates disposal within 12 months (extendable by 6 months). 
• Section 41(ha): No injunctions that delay infrastructure projects. 
• Schedule: Lists categories of infrastructure projects covered. 

Other Notable Changes: 

Section 14A - Expert Assistance: 

• Courts can engage experts for opinions on specific issues. 
• Parties can examine experts in open court. 

Sections 15 & 19 - LLP Provisions: 

• Amalgamated LLPs can enforce/be bound by contracts of component LLPs. 

Section 16(c) - Proof Requirements: 

• Party only needs to prove readiness/willingness to perform. 
• No requirement to aver in pleadings. 

Section 25: Updated to reflect Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.  

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

The Division Bench of Justices M.S. Karnik and N.R. Borkar in the case of Sarwan Kumar Jhabarmal Choudhary v. Sachin Shyamsundar Begrajka (2025) held that the explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are illustrative and not exhaustive in determining "just cause" for revoking or annulling grants of Probate or Letters of Administration. 

What was the Background of Sarwan Kumar Jhabarmal Choudhary v. Sachin Shyamsundar Begrajka (2025) Case? 

Factual Background: 

• Rajesh Chowdhary, domiciled in Ecuador, died on 25th July 2020 by suicide (suffocation by hanging). 
• On 9th December 2020, the respondent filed Testamentary Petition No. 109 of 2021 seeking probate of a Will allegedly executed on 3rd March 2022 by the deceased. 
• The petitioner (son of the deceased) filed a caveat on 20th May 2021 with supporting affidavit. 
• Due to the advocate's failure to remove office objections, the caveat was dismissed. 
• On 10th November 2023, the Additional Prothonotary and Senior Master granted probate. 

Petitioner's Challenge: 

• The petitioner filed a miscellaneous petition for revocation of the probate grant under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
• The petitioner contended that the deceased died under suspicious circumstances. 
• The affidavits of two attesting witnesses revealed that while the testator signed the Will in Ecuador, the witnesses signed it in India, allegedly violating Section 63 of the Succession Act, which requires attesting witnesses to sign in the presence of the testator. 
• The petitioner argued that legitimate objections couldn't be presented due to the caveat's dismissal for technical reasons. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

Key Principles Applied: 

The Division Bench relied on principles of statutory interpretation: 

• Function of Explanation Clauses: An explanation clarifies the main provision without expanding or restricting its scope and must be read harmoniously with the main section. 
• Significance of "Deemed": The word creates a legal fiction. In circumstances covered by explanations (a) to (e), just cause is automatically presumed to exist, but this doesn't exclude just cause in other circumstances. 
• Purposive Construction: When language permits multiple interpretations, courts must adopt the interpretation that advances legislative purpose and avoids absurdity. 
• Legislative Intent: The deliberate change from "just cause is" to "shall be deemed to exist where" reflects legislative intent to broaden judicial discretion while creating a deeming fiction for specified circumstances. 

Judicial Precedents Examined: 

• Earlier cases like Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai (1902) interpreted the earlier Acts' provisions as exhaustive under different statutory language. 
• George Anthony Harris (1933) and Sharad Shankarrao Mane (1997) held explanations to be exhaustive but failed to consider the changed phraseology in the 1925 Act. 
• Courts in Madras, Calcutta, and other jurisdictions had recognized that "just cause" extends beyond enumerated grounds. 

Key Holdings: 

1. Explanations are Illustrative: The explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 are illustrative, not exhaustive, in determining "just cause" for revoking probate. 
2. Broader Judicial Discretion: Circumstances not covered under explanations (a) to (e) can constitute "just cause" for revocation, to be determined by courts based on facts and circumstances of each case. 
3. Earlier Precedents Overruled: The judgments in George Anthony Harris (1933) and Sharad Shankarrao Mane (1997) do not lay down the correct position of law regarding Section 263. 

Application to Present Case: 

The Court noted the petitioner's legitimate concerns: 

• The deceased's suspicious death by suicide in Ecuador. 
• Potential violation of Section 63's requirement that witnesses sign in the testator's presence (witnesses signed in India while testator signed in Ecuador). 
• Serious objections couldn't be considered due to caveat's dismissal for technical reasons. 
• The Court held these circumstances may constitute "just cause" requiring judicial examination, even if not falling strictly within explanations (a) to (e). 

 What is Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925? 

Provision: 

• Section 263 provides that the grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for "just cause." 

Explanation to Section 263: 

The Explanation states that "just cause shall be deemed to exist where": 

• (a) The proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or 
• (b) The grant was obtained fraudulently by making false suggestions or concealing material facts; or 
• (c) The grant was obtained through untrue allegations essential in law to justify the grant, even if made in ignorance or inadvertently; or 
• (d) The grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; or 
• (e) The grantee wilfully omitted to exhibit inventory or account, or exhibited an untrue inventory/account. 

Illustrations: 

The section includes eight illustrations demonstrating situations such as lack of jurisdiction, forged wills, discovery of later wills, and unsound mind of the grantee. 

Legislative History: 

• Indian Succession Act, 1865 (Section 234) and Probate and Administration Act, 1881 (Section 50): Used the phrase "Just cause is" followed by enumerated grounds. 
• Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Section 263): Changed the language to "Just cause shall be deemed to exist where," marking a significant phraseological departure.