List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas of the Kerala High Court in the case of Binu Thankappan and Ors. v. State of Kerala (2025) held that police stations fall within the definition of 'house' under Section 442 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) [now Section 329 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)]as they are used for custody of property, official records, arms and ammunition. 

What was the Background of Binu Thankappan and Ors. v. State of Kerala (2025) Case? 

• The appeal was filed by accused Nos. 1 to 3 who were convicted under sections 143, 147, 148, 452, 323, 149, 332, 149, 294(b), 354 IPC along with Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 
• The appellants were sentenced to five years imprisonment. 
• The prosecution case involved a group of people led by the 1st accused creating public nuisance in connection with an election to a cooperative bank. 
• Subsequently, 14 people formed an unlawful assembly and trespassed into a police station while armed with deadly weapons. 
• The accused allegedly committed rioting, hurt, attempted culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shouted obscene words, damaged police station property and outraged the modesty of a woman police officer. 
• Originally 14 accused persons faced trial, but one died and proceedings against him abated. 
• Other accused except the appellants were found not guilty by the trial court. 
• Appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 308 IPC. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court examined whether house trespass under Section 452 IPC can be committed by trespassing into a police station. 
• Section 5 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 provides for establishment of police stations while Section 6 deals with facilities at police stations. 
• Section 6(2) of the Kerala Police Act stipulates that there must be sufficient storage space for safekeeping of articles in custody, official records, official arms and ammunition, and facilities for safe custody of the accused. 
• The Court concluded that a combined reading of these statutory provisions makes it explicit that police stations in Kerala can be regarded as buildings used for custody of property, thereby satisfying the definition of house under Section 442 IPC (now Section 329 BNS). 
• The Court partly allowed the appeal by acquitting the 2nd and 3rd accused as there was no consistent evidence proving their involvement. 
• The finding of guilt against the 1st accused was confirmed for offences under Sections 452 and 323 IPC as well as Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.He was acquitted of other offences. 

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Referred to? 

Section 442 of IPC - House-Trespass: 

• Section 442 IPC defines 'house-trespass' for purposes of criminal trespass and house-breaking offences. 
• House-trespass is committed when criminal trespass occurs by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling. 
• The definition also covers buildings used as places for worship or as places for the custody of property. 
• The definition extends beyond residential buildings to any structure used for safekeeping of property. 
• Police stations qualify as 'house' under this definition as they are used for custody of official property, records, arms and ammunition. 
• This provision aimed to provide enhanced protection to dwellings and places used for custody of property from unauthorized intrusion. 

Section 329 of BNS - Criminal Trespass and House-Trespass: 

• Section 329 BNS has replaced Section 442 IPC and consolidates provisions related to criminal trespass and house-trespass. 
• Criminal trespass occurs when someone enters property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession. 
• It also covers unlawfully remaining on property after lawful entry with intent to intimidate, insult, annoy or commit an offence. 
• House-trespass under BNS is defined identically to IPC - criminal trespass by entering or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as human dwelling, place of worship, or place for custody of property. 
• The BNS explicitly states that introduction of any part of the criminal trespasser's body is sufficient to constitute house-trespass. 
• Punishment for criminal trespass under BNS is imprisonment up to three months or fine up to five thousand rupees or both. 
• Punishment for house-trespass under BNS is imprisonment up to one year or fine up to five thousand rupees or both. 
• The BNS provisions maintain continuity with IPC while providing clearer structure and updated punishments. 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Subhash Vidyarthi of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Omkar Gupta v. State of U.P. Through Principal Secretary Department of Urban Development, Lucknow and 3 Others (2025) held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to election petitions filed under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. 

What was the Background of Omkar Gupta v. State of U.P. (2025) Case? 

• The respondent filed an election petition under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 challenging a municipal election result. 
• Along with the election petition, the respondent filed an application for condonation of delay of 17 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 
• The application for condonation of delay was allowed by the Additional District Judge (F.T.C.-I), Ambedkar Nagar. 
• The petitioner, Omkar Gupta, challenged this order allowing condonation of delay before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 
• The core legal question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which permits condonation of delay in filing suits, applies to election petitions filed under the Municipalities Act, 1916. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court held that although an election petition filed under Section 20 of the Municipalities Act is not a suit, it is an original proceeding which has to be decided in the manner provided for decision of suits. 
• Justice Vidyarthi observed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to suits, and for this reason, it would not apply to filing of election petitions under the Municipalities Act, 1916. 
• Regarding the specific application of the Limitation Act, the Court observed that the proviso to Section 23 of the Municipalities Act provides that sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply for determining limitation of an election petition. 
• The Court reasoned that when the legislature has specifically provided for application of a particular provision of the Limitation Act (Section 12(2)) and has not made other provisions applicable to it, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to election petitions filed under the Municipalities Act. 
• The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi, which was followed by the Allahabad High Court in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rambhual Nishad, to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to election petitions filed under the Representation of the People Act. 
• Since the provisions of the Representation of the People Act are similar to the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the Court held that Section 5 would not apply to election petitions filed under the latter Act. 
• Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the election petition before the Additional District Judge (F.T.C.-I), Ambedkar Nagar was dismissed. 

What is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963? 

About: 

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enunciates the principle of condonation of delay. It states: 

“Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period” 

• Section 5 of this Act states that, to seek condonation of delay a party must show the “sufficient cause” of the delay. 

Condonation of Delay: 

• Condonation of delay is a discretionary remedy exercised by courts wherein, upon an application made by a party who wishes to have an appeal or application admitted after the prescribed period, the court may condone (overlook) the delay if the party provides a “sufficient cause” that hindered them from filing the appeal or application on time. 

Sufficient Cause: 

• Sufficient cause means there should be adequate reasons or reasonable ground for the court to believe the applicant was prevented from proceeding with the application in a Court of Law. 
• Section 5 allows the extension of the prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay.  
• In State of West Bengal v. Administrator (1972):  
  • The Supreme Court held that the extension of time is a matter of concession and cannot be claimed by the party as a matter of right.  
  • It is difficult and undesirable to precisely define the meaning of sufficient cause. It must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. However, a sufficient cause should fulfill the following essentials:  
    • It must be a cause which was beyond the control of the party invoking it.  
    • He must not be guilty of negligence.  
    • His diligence and care must be shown.  
    • His intention must be bonafide.