List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

The bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi in the case of RattanIndia Power Limited v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Another (2026) held that observations made during remand cannot be treated as binding determinations unless the issue was expressly and finally adjudicated, and fresh decisions must apply current binding law.

What was the Background of RattanIndia Power Limited v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Another (2026) Case? 

• RattanIndia Power Limited (RPL) entered into two long-term Power Purchase Agreements in 2010 for the supply of 450 MW and 750 MW of power. 
• Subsequently, Change in Law events occurred, particularly the levy of a cess by the State of Chhattisgarh, which resulted in increased operational costs for the generator. 
• RPL sought compensation to neutralize this financial impact and also claimed Carrying Cost, meaning interest on the delayed payment of such compensation. 
• RPL contended that mere reimbursement without interest would not restore it to its original economic position. 
• RPL further argued that the interest should be calculated at the Late Payment Surcharge rate prescribed under the PPA and on a compounding basis. 
• In 2018, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission allowed Change in Law compensation but denied Carrying Cost, prompting RPL to approach APTEL. 
• In 2022, APTEL remanded the matter for determination of compensation to restore RPL's economic position. 
• On remand, MERC in 2023 granted Carrying Cost at simple interest using the Interest on Working Capital rate, leading to further appeals before APTEL. 
• In the impugned 2023 order, APTEL held that Carrying Cost must be paid at the contractual Late Payment Surcharge rate but rejected RPL's claim for compounding interest. 
• APTEL cited the absence of a specific direction in the 2022 remand order with respect to awarding compound interest as the basis for rejection. 
• The issue before the Supreme Court was whether APTEL's denial of compound interest on the ground that its earlier remand order did not provide for such interest would preclude the Tribunal from subsequently granting it, even though the question had been left open and had not been finally adjudicated.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that APTEL erred in treating the absence of a specific direction on compounding in the remand order as a bar to granting it. 
• The Court emphasized that observations made while remanding a matter cannot be treated as binding determinations unless the issue was expressly and finally adjudicated. 
• The Court noted that when a remand order does not itself settle an issue, the issue remanded is alive and has to be decided as per law applicable on the date of the decision. 
• The bench provided an illustrative example: if the Supreme Court declares binding law after a remand order, that declaration must be followed despite any general observations in the remand order, since the remand order did not settle the issue. 
• Since the question of compounding interest had never been finally decided in the earlier round, it remained open for consideration. 
• The Court held that when a Court or Appellate Tribunal remands a matter for fresh decision and refers to certain decisions, the subordinate court or adjudicating body is not bound by those decisions if the law has changed or developed in the interim. 
• The Court clarified that such directions must be given due consideration unless the binding law on the subject requires otherwise. 
• Accordingly, the Court remanded the limited issue of compounding of Carrying Cost back to APTEL for fresh adjudication on merits. 
• The appeal was allowed in terms of the aforesaid observations.

What is Remand?

About:  

• Remand is the custody (police or judicial) of an accused person during the investigation period before filing of chargesheet 
• Purpose is NOT punitive but investigative - to gather evidence and prevent tampering/absconding 
• Two types: Police Custody (for interrogation) and Judicial Custody (detention in jail) 

Remand Under CrPC, 1973 (Section 167) 

Basic Procedure: 

• Arrested person must be produced before Magistrate within 24 hours. 
• Magistrate can extend custody only as per Section 167 procedure. 
• Police must apply for police custody remand; otherwise accused sent to judicial custody. 
• Magistrate must record reasons for extending remand period. 

Time Limits: 

• Maximum police custody: 15 days total (can be broken into separate periods but only within first 15 days of presentation before Magistrate). 
• Total pre-chargesheet remand: 60 days (for offences with punishment less than 10 years) or 90 days (for offences with minimum 10 years sentence). 
• After 15 days, only judicial custody permitted. 
• Accused has right to apply for bail at any stage. 

Settled Legal Position: 

• State v. Dharampal (1980): Police custody only within first 15 days. 
• CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992): Police detention "generally disfavoured by law" to protect accused from overzealous officers. 
• Exception: UAPA allows 30 days police custody. 

Recent Reconsideration: 

• CBI v. Vikas Mishra (2023) and V. Senthil Balaji (2023) reconsidered whether police custody possible after initial 15 days if not availed earlier. 

Remand Under BNSS, 2023 (Section 187) 

Effective Date: July 1, 2024 (replaces CrPC) 

Key Changes: 

• Sub-section (2): Maximum 15 days police custody, breakable into separate periods BUT can be granted "at any time during the initial 40 days or 60 days" (out of total 60/90 days). 
• This removes the restriction of police custody only within first 15 days 
• Sub-section (3): Magistrate may authorize detention "beyond fifteen days" if adequate grounds exist. 
• Critical ambiguity: Does not specify if this extended detention is police or judicial custody - open to interpretation. 

Source: Gujarat High Court

Why in News?

The Division Bench of Justices Sangeeta K. Vishen and Nisha M. Thakore in the case of X v. NA (2025) quashed a Family Court order that had rejected a couple's plea for divorce by mutual consent, holding that the six-month cooling off period under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) is not mandatory and can be waived in appropriate circumstances.

What was the Background of X v. NA (2025) Case? 

• The couple were married on December 9, 2023, and began living separately from January 17, 2024. 
• The husband moved to the United Kingdom for higher studies and proposed to settle there permanently. 
• The wife, settled in Ahmedabad, wished to pursue her career in India. 
• Both parties agreed that reunion was impossible given their geographical separation and career aspirations in different countries. 
• The couple filed an application for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on April 1, 2025, after more than a year of separation. 
• The second motion for divorce was moved in July 2025, while the statutory six-month cooling off period was to expire in October 2025. 
• The Family Court rejected their plea on August 8, 2025, holding that it was premature and that the six-month cooling off period under Section 13B was not "an empty formality but a meaningful opportunity for reconciliation." 
• The couple filed an appeal before the Gujarat High Court challenging the Family Court's order and seeking direction to decide their divorce application afresh. 
• The counsels for both parties submitted examination-in-chief affidavits confirming that their mutual consent for divorce was given voluntarily, without any force or coercion.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court observed that the period of six months under Section 13B (Divorce by mutual consent) of the Hindu Marriage Act is directory and not mandatory. 
• The bench noted that the parties had been staying separately for more than one year as on the date of presenting the petition, and both had mutually agreed for divorce. 
• The Court held that there was no scope of reunion between the parties, considering they were residing in different countries and pursuing separate career paths. 
• The bench emphasized that not accepting the request of the parties would only prolong their agony, as both were young and desirous of pursuing their careers according to their own wishes. 
• The Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, which established that the six-month cooling-off period under Section 13B(2) may be waived where a case is made out. 
• The Court noted that while the couple had not filed a formal application seeking waiver of the cooling off period, they agreed to file such application within two weeks. 
• The bench held that in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to allow both parties an opportunity to file an application before the Family Court seeking waiver of the cooling off period. 
• The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the Family Court's order rejecting the divorce petition. 
• The Court directed the Family Court to decide the couple's application afresh within six months, in accordance with law. 

What is Section 13 B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? 

About:  

• For the purposes of divorce by mutual consent two petitions must be jointly filed by the parties. 
• As per Section 13B (1): 
  • A joint petition for dissolution of marriage shall be presented before the District Court. 
  • Whether the marriage was solemnized before or after commencement of Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. 
  • The parties should have been living separately for a period of one year or more. 
  • The petition should provide that they have not been able to live together, and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 
• Section 13 B (2) provides for second motion: 
  • When should it be filed? 
    • Not earlier than six months after the presentation of the first motion and not later than eighteen months after the said. 
    • If the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime. 
  • How is the decree of divorce passed? 
    • After hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit 
    • That the marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true 
    • Pass a decree declaring marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree 
• The purpose of prescribing the above procedure is to give parties some period of togetherness before separation. 
• Marriage is a very important part of any individual’s life and therefore before the marriage is dissolved by mutual consent the parties must be given some reasonable time to reflect on their move to dissolve the marriage. 

Withdrawal of Consent Under Section 13 B: 

• Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011): 
  • The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties to be dissolved if the following conditions are met: 
    • A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under subsection (1) and not later than 18 months 
    • After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and 
    • The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree; 
• Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya (2009): 
  • It is only on continued mutual consent of the parties that a decree of divorce under Section 13 B can be passed. 
  • The court has to be satisfied about the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent.
    

Cooling off Period: 

• Under Section 13 B if the petition is not withdrawn post 6 months (and not later than 18 months) from the date of presentation of petition the Court may pass a decree of divorce. 
• Thus, the parties are given a cooling off period of 6 months. 
• The question that is posed is whether the cooling off period is mandatory or directory? 
  • Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017): 
    • A 2- judge bench comprising of Hon’ble Adarsh Kuamr Goel, Justice and Hon’ble Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice held that in determining if the period is directory or mandatory the language alone is not decisive. Rather the Court has to give regard to the context. 
    • The Court held that the cooling off period can be waived off only after considering the following factors: 
      • the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; 
      • all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; 
      • the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; 
      • the waiting period will only prolong their agony. 
  • Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023): 
    • A Constitution Bench held that Supreme Court can exercise power under Article 142 (1) of the Constitution and grant divorce by mutual consent dispensing with the waiting period prescribed under Section 13 B. 
    • The Court held that the cooling off period is not to stretch the already disintegrated marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties. 
    • The Court held that apart from the factors mentioned in the case above the Court should also ascertain whether the parties have freely on their own accord arrived at a genuine settlement that took care of alimony, maintenance and other matters. 
    • Thus, the Court held that Section 13B does not put any fetters on the powers of the Court to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent.