List of Current Affairs

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Gauri Godse of the Bombay High Court, in Victoria Enterprises Limited v. DNM Trustee Service Private Ltd. (2026), rejected an application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).  

• The Court held that improper joinder of causes of action raises only a triable issue and cannot be a ground for rejection at the threshold. Costs of ₹50,000 were imposed on the defendant for attempting to delay proceedings.

What was the Background of Victoria Enterprises Limited v. DNM Trustee Service Private Ltd. (2026) Case? 

• The dispute arose from a registered agreement dated 2 February 2008 under which Victoria Enterprises Limited had agreed to hand over possession of certain units to the purchasers by 31 March 2008. 
• DNM Trustee Service Private Ltd. instituted a commercial suit alleging non-compliance with statutory and contractual obligations relating to amenities, parking spaces, and other facilities under the agreement. 
• Victoria Enterprises Limited filed an interim application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC, contending that the suit was barred by limitation, that the plaint did not disclose a valid cause of action, and that there was an improper joinder of causes of action under Order II Rule 4. 
• The suit had already progressed substantially and was at the stage of the plaintiff's application for summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC when this application was filed.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On Cause of Action: The Court examined the plaint along with the partition deed and trust deed and held that the pleadings sufficiently disclosed the plaintiff's right to sue under Order XXXI Rule 1 of the CPC. The objection regarding absence of cause of action was therefore not sustainable at the threshold. 
• On Joinder of Causes of Action: The Court held that the defendant's reliance on Order II Rule 4 was misplaced. An objection to improper joinder raises only a triable issue and cannot be a ground to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a). The plaintiff remains entitled to lead evidence in support of its cause of action at trial. 
• On Limitation: The Court observed that non-compliance with contractual obligations relating to amenities and facilities could constitute a continuing breach. The plaint contained detailed pleadings regarding repeated reminders and the defendant's sustained failure to fulfil its obligations, keeping the limitation question open for trial. 
• On Delay: The Court noted that filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 at such an advanced stage — when the matter was already before the Court for summary judgment — was plainly an attempt to delay proceedings, contrary to the objective of speedy disposal under the Commercial Courts Act. Costs of ₹50,000 were accordingly imposed.

What is Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Rejection of Plaint? 

About: 

Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC provides for rejection of a plaint in specific circumstances enumerated thereunder. It is an extraordinary power that must be exercised with great caution and circumspection and should not be used to shut out genuine claims merely on technical grounds without full adjudication on merits. 

The grounds for rejection are as follows: 

• Clause (a) mandates rejection where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. 
• Clause (b) provides for rejection where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the time fixed by the Court. 
• Clause (c) deals with cases where the relief is properly valued but the plaint is insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff fails to supply requisite stamp-paper within the time fixed. 
• Clause (d) mandates rejection where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 
• Clause (e) provides for rejection where the plaint is not filed in duplicate. 
• Clause (f) stipulates rejection where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order VII. 

The proviso stipulates that time for correction of valuation or supplying stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by an exceptional cause and that refusal would cause grave injustice. 

Key Principles Governing Order VII Rule 11: 

• While examining an application under Order VII Rule 11, courts are confined strictly to the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto or referred to therein.  
• The defence set up by the defendant cannot be considered, and the Court cannot travel beyond the four corners of the plaint. 
• Under clause (d), the Court must determine from the plaint itself whether the suit is barred by any law, including the law of limitation.  
• The power should be exercised only in clear and manifest cases where the plaint is ex facie barred.  
• Where determination of limitation requires examination of evidence or consideration of mixed questions of law and fact, the plaint cannot be rejected under clause (d).  
• Further, where several reliefs are claimed and even one relief is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety as barred by law. 

What is Cause of Action?  

• The term “cause of action” has been explained in several case laws as follows:  
  • Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Anr. (2006): 
    • The Supreme Court defined cause of action as "every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court."   
    • In other words, it's the bundle of facts necessary for the plaintiff to establish to succeed in their suit.  
  • Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai (1994): 
    • This case established that cause of action refers to the collection of facts that a plaintiff must prove to obtain a favorable judgment.  
  • Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998): 
    • The court held that in a broad sense (as used in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code), cause of action means every fact necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment.  
  • South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. (1996): 
    • This case clarified that cause of action consists of facts that give cause to enforce legal inquiry for redress. Importantly, it must include some act done by the defendant, as without such an act, no cause of action would arise.  
  • Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India (2001): 
    • The court distinguished between the restricted and wider meanings of cause of action:  
      • In the restricted sense: the circumstances forming the infraction of the right  
      • In the wider sense: necessary conditions for maintaining the suit, including both the infraction and the right itself  
    • The judgment also distinguished between facts necessary to be proved (which comprise the cause of action) and pieces of evidence needed to prove those facts (which are not part of the cause of action). 
  • Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh (1977): 
    • This case emphasized the two interpretations of cause of action:  
      • Restricted view: facts constituting the infringement or basis of a right. 
      • Comprehensive view: the entire bundle of material facts a plaintiff must prove to succeed. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta of the Supreme Court, in K v. K (2026), set aside the Bombay High Court's decision and held that a divorce decree passed by a US court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not enforceable in India. 

• The Court reaffirmed that parties married under Hindu rites in India remain governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) regardless of their subsequent domicile abroad, and that a foreign decree granting divorce on an unrecognised ground cannot oust Indian court jurisdiction.

What was the Background of K v. K (2026) Case? 

• The parties were married in Mumbai in December 2005 according to Hindu rites, though residing in the United States. 
• They briefly stayed together in Pune (Aungh) during a 2007 visit to India, and continued cohabitation in the US until September 2008. 
• The wife-initiated divorce proceedings before a Circuit Court in Michigan, USA. The husband contested jurisdiction but did not participate further. 
• In February 2009, the US court granted divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, along with financial directions. 
• Simultaneously, the husband filed a divorce petition before the pune family Court under the HMA. 
• The Pune Family Court upheld its jurisdiction; however, the Bombay High Court reversed this, holding that the parties were domiciled in the US. 
• The husband appealed to the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On Applicability of HMA: The Court held that since the marriage was solemnised under Hindu rites in India, the HMA continues to govern the parties regardless of their domicile abroad. 
• On Non-Recognition of the Ground: Since irretrievable breakdown is not a recognised ground under the HMA, the US decree founded on it cannot be enforced in India. 
• On Jurisdiction: The husband having never submitted to the Michigan court's jurisdiction, he cannot be bound by its decree. 
• On Relief under Article 142: Despite holding the foreign decree unenforceable, the Court exercised its powers under Article 142 to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, given that the parties had been living apart since 2008 with no matrimonial bond subsisting in practice.

What is Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage? 

About: 

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage refers to a situation where spouses have been living separately for a considerable period with no possibility of reconciliation. Forcing such a marriage to continue is itself considered an act of cruelty. 

Origin and Development: 

• The concept originated in New Zealand in 1921 (Lodder v. Lodder). 
• First acknowledged in India in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984), where the Supreme Court suggested divorce may be granted when a marriage is broken beyond repair. 
• However, courts have consistently held that divorce cannot be granted solely on this ground — affirmed in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1993) and Amarendra N. Chatterjee v. Smt. Kalpana Chatterjee (2022). 

Current Legal Position: 

• The HMA, 1955 does not recognise irretrievable breakdown as a statutory ground for divorce. 
• The Law Commission recommended its inclusion in its 71st Report (1978) and again in 2009, but the legislature has not acted on it. 
• The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2010 sought to formally introduce this ground, but remains unadopted. 
• Courts may consider it as a factor while examining statutory grounds, but cannot grant divorce on this basis alone.

What is the Irretrievable Breakdown Theory? 

• The theory defines irretrievable breakdown as a failure in the matrimonial relationship where no reasonable probability remains for the spouses to live together as husband and wife. It posits that when a marital relationship deteriorates beyond reconciliation, the marriage ought to be legally terminated — since maintaining shared rights and responsibilities becomes unjustified when the marriage cannot endure in any practical sense. 
• Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer explained the concept as recognising the factual breakdown of a marriage when incompatibility between the spouses becomes insurmountable — acknowledging the ground reality of the relationship over its mere legal continuance. 

Factors Considered by the Supreme Court: 

• Duration of cohabitation between the parties. 
• Time elapsed since last cohabitation. 
• Nature of allegations made by the parties against each other. 
• Orders passed in legal proceedings between the parties. 
• Attempts made by family members for dispute settlement. 
• Separation period exceeding 6 years.

What is the Legal Provision on Irretrievable Breakdown? 

• Article 142 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to pass decrees or orders necessary for doing 'complete justice' in any cause or matter — the primary constitutional basis for granting divorce on this ground. 
• The exercise of power under Article 142 must be guided by fundamental general and specific public policy considerations and must align with fundamental rights and other basic features of the Constitution. 
• The concept can be applied only where there is no express prohibition in any substantive law against it. 
• Under the HMA, divorce by mutual consent requires a joint petition, a one-year separation period, and a mandatory six-month waiting period between two motions — making Article 142 the only available route in cases of unilateral irretrievable breakdown. 
• While the principle has gained informal validity through judicial decisions, it has not yet been incorporated into the HMA through legislative action.