List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi of the Allahabad High Court, in Shailesh Kumar Yadav IPS v. Union of India & Others. (2026), held that punishment under Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 can only be imposed if there is deliberate obstruction or delay in supplying the information sought.  

• The Court quashed the penalty orders passed by the Central Information Commission, holding that they were arbitrary, premeditated, and vitiated by bias and pre-judgment, thereby offending the principles of natural justice.

What was the Background of Shailesh Kumar Yadav IPS v. Union of India & Others. (2026) Case? 

• An applicant filed a request under the RTI Act seeking information regarding duplicate passports, submission forms, procedures, and applicable time limits. 
• The petitioner, posted as Regional Passport Officer (RPO) as well as Public Information Officer (PIO) at Ghaziabad, received the file.  
• The application was initially returned since the demand draft submitted was in an incorrect name. 
• After correction and resubmission, the petitioner sought a "Key number" and "File number" from the applicant, without which the relevant website could not be operated. 
• Aggrieved by the non-receipt of information, the applicant lodged a complaint under Section 18 of the RTI Act.  
• The CIC passed two orders holding the petitioner guilty, initiated an inquiry, and imposed a maximum monetary penalty of ₹25,000 upon him. 
• The petitioner challenged these orders on the ground that they were premeditated and that the CIC had not awaited the inquiry report of the Chief Passport Officer before recommending punishment.  
• He pleaded that any delay was caused due to shortage of staff and backlog of work at the Regional Passport Office, Ghaziabad.

What were the Court's Observations?

On the Scope of Section 20: 

• The Court held that penalty under Section 20 is not triggered by every delay or deficiency.  
• The Commission must first form a specific opinion that one of the enumerated jurisdictional facts exists — such as mala fide conduct, deliberate obstruction, or unreasonable refusal — before penalty can be imposed. 

On the Commission's Duty: 

• The Court held that while the burden to prove diligent discharge of duty lies on the PIO, this does not relieve the Commission of its obligation to record clear, reasoned findings. Objective consideration must precede the imposition of penalty. 

On Absence of Deliberate Intent: 

• The Court found that no finding of deliberate intent was ever recorded against the petitioner. The inquiry report established that any lapses were attributable to severe staff shortage and extraordinary workload at the Regional Passport Office, Ghaziabad — and not to any mala fide or intentional conduct by the petitioner. 

On Bias and Pre-judgment: 

• The Court held that the language used in both impugned orders indicated a lack of impartiality and reflected bias and personal disapprobation rather than reasoned findings. This gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of pre-judgment, offending the principles of natural justice. 

On Relief: 

• The Court allowed the writ petition and quashed both impugned punishment orders, holding the imposition of maximum monetary penalty to be arbitrary.

What is Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005? 

About: 

• The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) is a landmark legislation enacted by the Parliament of India that grants citizens the right to access information held by public authorities.  
• It is a central legislation that empowers every citizen of India to seek information from any public authority.  
• The underlying principle is that an informed citizenry is essential to the functioning of a democracy and to contain corruption and hold governments accountable. 

Key Features: 

• Every citizen has the right to request information from a public authority, which is obligated to reply within 30 days. 
• It covers all constitutional authorities, including the executive, legislature, and judiciary, as well as bodies owned, controlled, or substantially financed by the government. 
• Each public authority is required to designate a Public Information Officer (PIO) to handle RTI requests. 
• A two-tier appellate mechanism exists — first appeal lies before a senior officer within the same public authority, and second appeal lies before the Central or State Information Commission. 

Section 20 — Penalties: 

Sub-section (1): Monetary Penalty 

Where the Central or State Information Commission, while deciding a complaint or appeal, is of the opinion that the PIO has, without reasonable cause: 

• Refused to receive an application for information; 
• Failed to furnish information within the time specified under Section 7(1); 
• Malafidely denied the request for information; 
• Knowingly given incorrect, incomplete, or misleading information; 
• Destroyed information that was the subject of the request; or 
• Obstructed in any manner the furnishing of information. 
• it shall impose a penalty of ₹250 per day till the application is received or information is furnished, subject to a maximum of ₹25,000. 

Two important conditions: 

• First, the PIO must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed. 
• Second, the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently lies on the PIO himself. 

Sub-section (2): Disciplinary Action 

• Where the Commission finds that the PIO has, without reasonable cause and persistently, committed any of the above defaults, it shall recommend disciplinary action against the PIO under the service rules applicable to him. 
• The key distinction from Sub-section (1) is the element of persistence — a single or isolated default may attract monetary penalty, but repeated and persistent defaults attract a recommendation for disciplinary action. 

Source: Bombay High Court

Why in News?

Justice Mehroz K. Pathan of the Bombay High Court, in Khandesh & Ors. v. Late Sau. Taisaheb Sunanda & Ors.(2026), held that Section 24 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not operate as a bar against a plaintiff filing a fresh suit for refund of earnest money after the dismissal of a suit for specific performance. 

• The Court clarified that while Section 24 restricts claims for compensation for breach of contract in the aftermath of a dismissed specific performance suit, it leaves intact the plaintiff's right to pursue other reliefs — including refund of earnest money — that arise from the same underlying transaction.

What was the Background of Khandesh & Ors. v. Late Sau. Taisaheb Sunanda & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The dispute arose between a cooperative society and a public charitable trust concerning a failed agreement for sale of immovable property. 
• The plaintiff deposited Rs. 2,00,000/- as earnest money pursuant to the agreement for the purchase of land. 
• The transaction failed to materialise due to disputes regarding title and objections raised by a third party named Babulal. 
• Following the breakdown of the transaction, the defendants forfeited the earnest money deposited by the plaintiffs. 
• The plaintiffs had issued a legal notice calling upon the defendants to furnish title documents; the defendants denied the request and failed to produce a clear title. 
• The defendants argued that since a prior suit for specific performance had not resulted in relief, any subsequent claim for refund was barred under law. 
• The second appeal was filed before the Bombay High Court challenging concurrent findings of the courts below, which had directed refund of the earnest money.

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Bar Under Order II Rule 2: 

• The Court examined the earlier proceedings and held that the bar under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not attracted, as the previous suit was for an injunction based on a different cause of action, whereas the present suit arose from the forfeiture of earnest money following the failure of the transaction — constituting a distinct cause of action. 

On Readiness and Willingness of Plaintiffs: 

• The Court noted that the plaintiffs were at all times ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It was solely due to the objection raised by Babulal that the sale deed could not be executed, and the failure to produce a clear title lay with the defendants. 

On Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act: 

• The Court analysed Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides that a plaintiff instituting a suit for specific performance may also claim alternative reliefs, including refund of any earnest money or deposit paid under the contract. 

On Section 24 of the Specific Relief Act: 

• Interpreting Section 24, the Court held that the provision operates only to bar a plaintiff's claim for compensation for breach of contract after dismissal of a suit for specific performance. It does not bar claims for other forms of relief — such as refund of earnest money — to which the plaintiff may otherwise be entitled by reason of the same breach. 

On Relief: 

• The Court dismissed the second appeal, upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below, and confirmed the decree directing refund of the earnest money along with interest at 9% per annum.

What is Section 24 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? 

Section 24: Bar on Suit for Compensation After Dismissal of Specific Performance Suit 

Section 24 operates on a simple two-part structure: 

• What it bars — Once a suit for specific performance of a contract (or any part of it) is dismissed, the plaintiff loses the right to file a fresh suit claiming compensation for breach of that same contract or part. 
• What it preserves — The dismissal does not bar the plaintiff from suing for any other relief to which they may be entitled by reason of the same breach — such as refund of earnest money, restitution, or other equitable remedies. 
• In essence: Section 24 prevents double-biting on the compensation front — a plaintiff cannot first litigate specific performance to finality and then turn around and claim damages for the same breach. However, it does not shut the door entirely; restitutionary or other non-compensatory reliefs remain available through a fresh suit.