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Civil Imprisonment Does Not Extinguish Husband’s Duty to Pay Maintenance

    «
 25-Mar-2026

    Tags:
  • Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP & Another 

"Merely committing a defaulter to civil prison does not absolve him of the liability to pay monthly maintenance to the aggrieved wife." 

Justice Praveen Kumar Giri 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News?

A bench of Justice Praveen Kumar Giri of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP and Another (2026), held that civil imprisonment for non-payment of maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not extinguish the husband's continuing liability to pay arrears.  

  • The Court further clarified that the doctrine of double jeopardy under Section 300 CrPC (Section 337 of BNSS) is wholly inapplicable to proceedings under the DV Act.

What was the Background of Hasina Khatoon v. State of UP (2026) Case? 

  • The petition was filed by Hasina Khatoon, a wife challenging a January 2023 order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Fast Track Court (Crime against Women), Moradabad. 
  • In July 2019, a Magistrate had directed the petitioner's husband to pay interim maintenance of Rs. 4,000 to the wife and Rs. 4,000 to their disabled son every month. 
  • The husband consistently failed to make these payments, allowing arrears to accumulate to Rs. 2,64,000, prompting the wife to file an execution application. 
  • On the wife's plea, a recovery warrant was issued and the husband was arrested on October 30, 2022. Upon his refusal to deposit the awarded amount, the Judicial Magistrate committed him to civil prison for 30 days. 
  • Even after his release, the husband failed to pay the maintenance amount. The wife consequently filed a fresh application for recovery of the same arrears of Rs. 2,64,000. 
  • The Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Fast Track Court rejected this subsequent application, holding that the husband had already served 30 days of civil detention in respect of those arrears, and relying upon Section 300 CrPC to bar further proceedings on the same amount. 
  • The husband further defended this position by arguing that having served his term of imprisonment, no arrears remained outstanding, and also challenged the maintainability of the wife's petition under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the impugned order was appealable under Section 29 of the DV Act.

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • On the inapplicability of double jeopardy, the Court held at the outset that Section 300 CrPC, which embodies the principle of double jeopardy, is entirely inapplicable to proceedings under the DV Act, since such proceedings result in neither a conviction nor an acquittal.  
  • Refusing to execute a maintenance award by invoking Section 300 CrPC, the bench observed, reflects a non-application of judicial mind. 
  • On the nature of maintenance proceedings, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rina Kumari v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto (2025) to affirm that even where non-compliance with a maintenance order attracts penal consequences, the proceedings themselves do not constitute criminal proceedings in the traditional sense. 
  • On the continuing liability of the husband, the bench categorically held that committing a defaulting husband to civil prison is a coercive mechanism to enforce compliance — it is not a discharge or satisfaction of the underlying debt. 
  • The liability to pay maintenance, both current and arrears, survives the period of civil detention. 
  • On the remedy available, the Court directed that since the husband had already undergone a period of civil detention, further civil imprisonment for the same arrears would not be appropriate.  
  • Instead, the appropriate recourse was attachment of the husband's property, with proceeds applied toward payment of arrears along with simple bank interest at 6% per annum on the delayed amount.

What is Section 337 of BNSS? 

Section 337, BNSS — Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence 

  • Core Rule: A person once convicted or acquitted by a competent court cannot be tried again for the same offence, or on the same facts for any other offence that could have been charged at the original trial. 

Exceptions (When a Second Trial Is Permitted): 

  • Distinct offence — A person may be tried for a separate, distinct offence arising from the same transaction, but only with the State Government's consent. 
  • Unforeseen consequences — If an act leads to consequences that were unknown or hadn't yet occurred at the time of the first conviction (e.g., a victim later dying from injuries), the accused may be tried for the graver offence arising from those consequences. 
  • Incompetent court — If the original court lacked jurisdiction to try a particular offence, the accused may be tried for that offence before a competent court, despite the earlier conviction or acquittal. 
  • Discharged accused — A person discharged under Section 281 BNSS may be tried again for the same offence, but only with the consent of the discharging court or a superior court.

What Does NOT Count as Acquittal: 

The dismissal of a complaint or discharge of the accused does not amount to an acquittal for the purpose of this section — meaning double jeopardy protection does not attach in such cases.

Savings: 

The section expressly preserves the operation of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 208 of the BNSS, both of which deal with situations where a single act constitutes an offence under multiple laws.

Illustrations (Simplified): 

  • A is acquitted of theft as a servant — he cannot be retried for the same theft, or for simple theft on the same facts. 
  • A is convicted of causing grievous hurt — if the victim later dies, A can be tried afresh for culpable homicide, since the fatal consequence was not known at the time of the first trial.