Manharan Rajwade v. State of Chhattisgarh

Date of Judgement/Order – 25.07.2024

Bench Strength – 3 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay Oka, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justise Augustine George-Masih

Case In Brief:

• In the present case, the prosecution argued that the appellant, husband of the deceased wife, was responsible for her murder.
• It was argued that the respondent suspected her wife of infidelity and that started arguments between the two.
• The appellant's wife was found dead in her house at about 5 PM on 29^th April 2006.
• The prosecution formed charges of murder under Section 302 of Indian Penal code 1860 (IPC) (now section 103 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) and by invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (IEA) (this is now Section 109 of Bharatiya Sakshaya Adhiniyam, 2023).
• It was alleged that the death was caused by strangulation.
• The respondent argued that there is no direct evidence to prove the allegations, and the case is decided on last seen theory.
• It was also argued that there were no witnesses to prove the allegation.
• It was also argued that at the time of the death the appellate was not present at home and was not even in the proximity.
• Both the Trial Court and the High Court convicted the appellant for the murder of his wife and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
• Aggrieved by the decision the appellate preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court observed that before invoking Section 106 of IEA the knowledge of the accused of crime is necessary and there was no evidence to prove that the accused was at the crime spot when his wife was allegedly murdered.
  • It was also made clear by some of the witnesses that when the wife of the appellant found dead the appellant was informed that his wife is not moving which infers that the appellant came after the death of his wife.
  • This made clear that the burden cannot be shifted upon the accused of proving the fact.
  • This also led to the decision that there were no inferences of last seen theory.
• The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the High Court and the Trial Court and allowed the appeal and held that the prosecution failed to sustain any charges of murder under IPC against the appellant.
• The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to examine the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(this section is now Section 351 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023)

Relevant Provision:

• Section 106 of IEA : Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Illustrations: (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

• Section 313 of CrPC: Power to examine the accused

(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court—

(a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary;

(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case:

Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b).

(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1).

(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them.

(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.

(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defense Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.

[Original Judgment]

Kaushik Narsinhbhai Patel & Ors. Versus M/s. S.J.R. Prime Corporation Private Limited & Ors.

Keywords: Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 22.07.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar

Case In Brief:

• The case involves a consumer dispute between flat buyers (complainants) and a builder (respondent).
• The complainants filed a consumer complaint against the builder for deficiency in service and delay in handing over possession of flats.
• The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) initially heard the case.
• The Supreme Court had previously issued an order declaring that the builder had forfeited its right to file a written statement.
• Despite this, the builder was given liberty to decide whether to participate in the proceedings.
• The builder, without having put forth a case, cross-examined a witness and produced documentary evidence during the NCDRC proceedings.
• The NCDRC partially allowed the complaint in its order.
• The complainants appealed the NCDRC's order to the Supreme Court.
• The complainants challenged the NCDRC's decision to allow the builder to file written submissions despite the forfeiture of its right to file a written statement.
• The case was heard by the Supreme Court, with Justice Ravikumar authoring the judgment.

Verdict:

• The Court held that when a party's right to file a written statement has been forfeited, they cannot indirectly introduce their case through evidence or written submissions.
  • They can participate in proceedings and cross-examine witnesses but cannot bring in new pleadings or evidence.
• The Court found that while the NCDRC improperly allowed the defendant to file written submissions, it did not rely on those submissions in its final order.
  • Therefore, this error by the NCDRC did not materially impact the outcome.
• The Court modified the NCDRC's method for calculating compensation for delayed possession of flats.
  • It directed that the due date for possession should be set based on the terms of the construction agreement, rather than the payment schedule used by the NCDRC.
• The Court upheld the NCDRC's decision to award compensation at 6% interest from the due date of possession until the date possession was offered, finding this consistent with precedent.

Relevant Provision:

• Rule 1 of Order VIII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) deals with written statements.
• It states that -
  • The Defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence.
  • Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.
  • Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.

[Original Judgement]

Mineral Area Development v. M/S Steel Authority of India & Ors

Keywords: Constitution of India, 1950, Supreme Court

Date of Judgement/Order – 25.07.2024

Bench Strength – 9 Judges

Composition of Bench – CJI Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Abhay S Oka, Justice J B Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Augustine George Masih.

Case In Brief:

• The instant appeals concern the constitutional distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States vis-à-vis the taxation of mineral rights.
• The core legislative entry in contention is Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which pertains to taxes on mineral rights.
• Parliament enacted the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) under Article 246 of the Constitution.
• In India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990), the Supreme Court held that royalty constitutes a tax and state legislatures lack competence to levy taxes on mineral rights.
• Subsequently, in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004), the Supreme Court clarified that royalty is not a tax, creating an apparent conflict with the earlier India Cement judgment.
• Post these judgments, certain state legislatures-imposed taxes on mineral-bearing land under Entry 49 of List II, utilizing mineral value or royalty as the tax measure.
• The constitutional validity of these state levies was impugned in various High Courts.
• In a Civil Appeal arising from the Patna High Court, which had struck down a Bihar state law imposing tax on land used for mining citing the India Cement judgment, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court noticed the divergence between the India Cement and Kesoram judgments.
• Consequently, the matter was referred to a nine-judge Constitution Bench for authoritative pronouncement on several questions pertaining to the nature of royalty, scope of legislative entries, and distribution of powers between the Union and States regarding mineral taxation.
• The nine-judge bench is now seized of these referred questions, which have been reframed to address the core constitutional issues at hand.

Verdict:

• The Court held that Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule confers upon the States the power to levy taxes on mineral rights, and this power is not limited by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.
• The Court clarified that royalty is not in the nature of a tax but rather a contractual consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor under a mining lease, thereby overruling the judgment in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990) to the extent it held royalty to be a tax.
• The Court reaffirmed the principle that taxing entries in the Constitution are to be interpreted strictly and separately from general entries, rejecting the notion that Entry 54 of List I or the Parliament's residuary powers could implicitly confer taxation powers over mineral rights.
• The Court upheld the States' authority to tax mineral-bearing lands under Entry 49 of List II, which covers taxes on lands and buildings, affirming that the term "lands" encompasses all types of land, including those bearing minerals, and that such taxation is not precluded by the MMDR Act, 1957.

Relevant Provision:

Article 246: Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States

(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "Union List").

(2)Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "Concurrent List").

(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'State List').

(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.

[Original Judgement]

Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India

Date of Judgement/Order – 30.07.2024

Bench Strength – 3 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice CJI DY Chandrachud, Justices JB Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra

Case In Brief:

• The Advocate Act 1961 (AA) was enacted to consolidate the advocate’s rules and also to constitute the Bar Council (BC) and the State Bar Councils (SBC) along with several provisions.
  • Section 6 of the AA states the functions of the SBCs.
  • Section 7 of the AA states the functions of BC of India.
  • Section 17 mandates the SBCs to prepare and maintain a roll of advocates.
  • Section 24 prescribes the qualifications and conditions for a person to be admitted as an advocate.
• The SBCs charge enrolment fees stipulated under Section 24(1)(f) of the AA to admit law graduates on their State roll.
• At the time of enrolment, the SBCs also charge various “fees” and “charges” in addition to the enrolment fees in the form of library fund contributions, administration fees, identity card fees, welfare funds, training fees, processing fees, certificate fees, etc.
• The amount of fees charged by the SBCs differ significantly. This results in a law graduate paying between Rupees fifteen thousand to Rupees forty-two thousand (depending on the SBC) as cumulative fees at the time of enrolment.
• The Petitioner in the present case filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the fees charged by the SBC is in violation of the Section 24 of the AA.
• The Supreme Court transferred all the cases to itself in this matter from the High Court of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court observed that taking heavy fees of enrollments puts pressure on the new commers to start their profession due to the non-availability of resources.
• The Supreme Court also emphasized on Section 24(1)(f) which clearly states the SBCs fee for enrollment.
• The Supreme Court clearly stated that no extra fee to be charged by the SBCs in the name of miscellaneous fee.
• There is no provision which authorizes the SBCs to charge any additional charge under enrollment fee.
• The Supreme Court also clarified that the Bar Councils are at liberty to fee other charges for the work they do for advocates, but they cannot be levied as enrollment fees.
• It was also held by the Supreme Court that charging high fees is in violation of the Right to profession, dignity and Equality as it Compels lawyers from marginalized sections to pay hefty enrollment fees strikes at the heart of principles of equality.
• The Supreme Court also held that the effect of the judgement will be progressive, and no paid fees is to be refunded.
• The Supreme Court held that the enrolment fee cannot exceed Rs.750 for advocates belonging to the general category and Rs.125 for advocates belonging to SC/ST categories.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 24 of The Advocate Act 1961 (AA) - Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll
• Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions, namely:―

(a) he is a citizen of India: Provided that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, a national of any other country may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if citizens of India, duly qualified, are permitted to practise law in that other country;

(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years;

(c) he has obtained a degree in law—

(i) before the 1 [12th day of March, 1967], from any University in the territory of India; or

(ii) before the 15th day of August, 1947, from any University in any area which was comprised before that date within India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935;

(iii) after the 12th day of March, 1967, save as provided in sub-clause (iiia), after undergoing a three-year course of study in law from any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or

(iiia) after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of which is not less than two academic years commencing from the academic year 1967-68 or any earlier academic year from any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or

(iv) in any other case, from any University outside the territory of India, if the degree is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or] [he is a barrister and is called to the Bar on or before the 31st day of December, 1976; or has passed the article clerk's examination or any other examination specified by the High Court at Bombay or Calcutta for enrolment as an attorney of that High Court;] or has obtained such other foreign qualification in law as is recognised by the Bar Council of India for the purpose of admission as an advocate under this Act.

(e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council under this Chapter;

(f) he has paid, in respect of the enrolment, stamp duty, if any, chargeable under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), and an enrolment fee payable to the State Bar Council of [six hundred rupees and to the Bar Council of India, one hundred and fifty rupees by way of a bank draft drawn in favour of that Council:

Provided that where such person is a member of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and produces a certificate to that effect from such authority as may be prescribed, the enrolment fee payable by him to the State Bar Council shall be one hundred rupees and to the Bar Council of India, twenty-five rupees.

Explanation.―For the purposes of this sub-section, a person shall be deemed to have obtained a degree in law from a University in India on the date on which the results of the examination for that degree are published by the University on its notice board or otherwise declaring him to have passed that examination.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a vakil or a pleader who is a law graduate] may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he—

(a) makes an application for such enrolment in accordance with the provisions of this Act, not later than two years from the appointed day; and

(b) fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (e) and (f) of sub-section (1).

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) a person who—

(a) has, for at least three years, been a vakil or a pleader or a mukhtar, or was entitled at any time to be enrolled under any law as an advocate of a High Court (including a High Court of a former Part B State) or of a Court of Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory;

(aa) before the 1^st day of December, 1961, was entitled otherwise than as an advocate to practice the profession of law (whether by way of pleading or acting or both) by virtue of the provisions of any law, or who would have been so entitled had he not been in public service on the said date; or

(c) before the 1^st day of April, 1937, has been an advocate of any High Court in any area which was comprised within Burma as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5 C 42); or

(d) is entitled to be enrolled as an advocate under any rule made by the Bar Council of India in this behalf, may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he—

(i) makes an application for such enrolment in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and

(ii) fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (e) and (f) of sub-section (1).

[Original Judgment]

Amit Rana @ Koka & Anr v. The State of Haryana

Date of Judgement/Order – 22.07.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Rajesh Bindal

Case In Brief:

• In this case Dr Sahil (medical officer) deposed that the victim was admitted in the hospital with a gunshot wound.
• The victim became paralyzed due to the injury in the spinal cord.
• Thus, because of the attempt to murder there was injury to the victim.
• It was not in dispute that the accused had committed the offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• The Lower Court in this case had awarded imprisonment for 14 years.
• The main issue here was the quantum of punishment to be awarded.

Verdict:

• The Court here analyzed Section 307 IPC and held that there are three types of sentences imposable on a convict.

• The Court observed that in order to attract the offence under Section 307 of IPC it is not important that the victim should suffer any kind of bodily injury.
• Thus, any kind of bodily injury is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of IPC.
• The Court while interpreting Section 307 held that the imposition of rigorous imprisonment of 14 years for is impermissible here.
• This is because the words used in the second part of Section 307 are the punishment awarded is that of life imprisonment or any other punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
• Thus, the Court converted the imposition of rigorous imprisonment of 14 years to rigorous imprisonment of 10 years.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 307 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Attempt to Murder –
  • Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.

[Original Judgment]

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

Date of Judgement/Order – 22.07.2024

Bench Strength – 2 Judges

Composition of Bench – Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Dipankar Datta

Case In Brief:

• In this case the daughter of Sultana Jahan Begum filed a suit for partition of the property of her father.
• The High Court passed a preliminary decree based on a compromise entered into by the parties. Consequently she withdrew her claims and hence the suit was dismissed against the State of Andhra Pradesh.
• During the pendency of the suit her brother claimed land in the property of the father.
• On 26^th December 2003 the High Court passed a final decree in the civil suit in favour of the first respondent.
• Pursuant to this the first respondent approached the Tahsildar for the mutation of his name in respect of the decretal property in the revenue records.
• On 5^th March 2009 the Court asked the Tahsildar to mutate the anmes of the decree holders.However, the Tahsildar did not comply with the order and hence the application for contempt was filed agaisnt the alleged inaction of the Tahsildar.
• The main issue to be considered here is whether there was a continuing wilful breach of the order of the Single Judge dated 5th March 2009 amounting to civil contempt.

Verdict:

• Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (CCA) provides for the limitation for action for contempt. It provides that the limitation period is one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to be committed.
• The Court interpreted as to what would constitute ‘continuing wrong’.
• The Court relied on the judgment of M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020) held that mere fact that the effect of the injury caused has continued is not sufficient to constitute a continuing wrong.
• What constitutes a wrong a wrong of continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist.
• Hence, the Court held that there was no continuing breach in this case.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Limitation for actions for contempt -
  • No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

[Original Judgement]