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April 2025

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 20-May-2025

Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and Ors. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 01.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan 

Case In Brief: 

  • Satbir Singh (the appellant) filed an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) seeking to summon Rajesh Kumar, Sagar @ Bittoo, Niraj, and Ankit as additional accused. 
  • The case involves offences under Sections 323, 324, 307, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act. 
  • On 9th February 2020, both Mukesh (the principal accused) and Satbir Singh were admitted to hospitals with injuries after an assault. 
  • Initially, Mukesh gave a statement resulting in an FIR against Satbir, but police filed a closure report after investigation. 
  • When Satbir regained consciousness on 14th February 2020, he stated that while playing volleyball, he had an altercation with Mukesh who later returned with Neeraj, Sagar, and Ankit carrying weapons. 
  • According to Satbir, Neeraj held him while Mukesh stabbed him twice (including near the heart), and Sagar and Ankit beat him with sticks. Rajesh allegedly threatened him. 
  • Medical reports confirmed Satbir had two injuries from sharp weapons, with one chest injury classified as life-threatening. 
  • Police investigations conducted by multiple officers did not find evidence of involvement by Rajesh, Neeraj, Sagar, or Ankit. 
  • Charges were filed against Mukesh alone, and trial began with Satbir testifying as PW-1 on 27th April 2021. 
  • During trial, Satbir filed an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon the other four men. 
  • The Sessions Judge allowed this application, but when the four men challenged it, the High Court set aside the order. 
  • The High Court noted discrepancies between Satbir's testimony and medical evidence, as injuries allegedly caused by the other men were not corroborated by medical reports. 
  • The High Court also considered that the fight arose spontaneously during a volleyball game between opposing teams, with no prior enmity between the parties. 
  • The matter was hence before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict: 

  • The Court first of all laid down the law on additional prosecution as provided under Section 319 of CrPC. 
  • The Court observed that Neeraj is Mukesh's sibling, and according to the appellant (Satbir), Neeraj held him while Mukesh stabbed him. 
  • The Sessions Judge was satisfied that the tests laid down in the Hardeep Singh case were met, justifying the summoning of additional accused. 
  • The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to consider the matter from the proper perspective and reached an incorrect conclusion. 
  • Despite defense counsel's argument about police reports clearing Rajesh and Neeraj, the Court held that these reports weren't conclusive evidence of non-involvement. 
  • The Sessions Judge had formed a satisfaction "higher than prima facie" about Rajesh and Neeraj’s involvement based on appellant’s testimony. 
  • While the High Court had the power to adopt an "eyes on" approach in revision, the Supreme Court felt a "hands off" approach would have been more appropriate. 
  • The Supreme Court concluded that the Sessions Judge's decision was plausible, not absurd, and didn't warrant interference by the High Court. 
  • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Sessions Judge's order, allowing the appeal. 
  • The Court clarified that its observations shouldn't be construed as an opinion on Rajesh and Neeraj's actual involvement in the crime. 
  • The Sessions Judge was encouraged to complete the trial expeditiously according to law.

Relevant Provision: 

  • Section 319 of CrPC: Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of an offence. -  

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.  

(2) Where such a person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. 

(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.  

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then—  

(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; 

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc.Etc. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Vikram Nath and Justice PB Varale 

Case In Brief: 

  • Initial Allotment (2003): The respondents (Licensees) received allotments from NMPT (New Mangalore Port Trust) in 2003. 
  • License Fee Revisions: 
    • First revision: 20th  June 2005 (effective from February 2002) 
    • Second revision: 23rd  July 2010 (effective from 20th  February 2007 for five years) 
  • Demand Notices: 
    • March 2011: Assistant Estate Manager/Estate Officer issued demand notices to Licensees for arrears from 20th  February 2007 to 23rd  July 2010. 
    • 15th  January 2015: Final notice demanding Rs. 55,32,234/- for difference in license fee. 
  • Legal Proceedings: 
    • 2011-2012: Licensees filed writ petitions challenging the retrospective revision. 
    • 28th June 2013: Single Judge dismissed petitions, upholding retrospective revision. 
    • Licensees filed appeals before Division Bench (still pending without interim orders). 
  • Response to Demands: 
    • 4th February 2015: Licensees responded to demand notice, arguing the matter was pending in court. 
    • Similar responses were given to subsequent notices. 
  • Estate Officer's Action: 
    • 12th August 2015: Estate Officer issued notice under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act) Section 7(3). 
    • 15th  February 2016: Estate Officer issued another notice giving three weeks to show cause. 
    • The Estate Officer eventually passed an order under PP Act Section 7(1) demanding payment. 
  • Appeal to District Judge: 
    • Licensees appealed under Section 9 of PP Act. 
    • 15th March 2017: District Judge allowed appeals, holding proceedings were time-barred. 
  • High Court Petition: 
    • NMPT filed writ petitions against District Judge's order. 
    • These were dismissed, leading to the present appeals. 
  • The core dispute concerns whether NMPT could retrospectively revise and collect license fees for the period from 20th February 2007 to 23rd July 2010. 

Verdict: 

  • The Court held that once the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings under the PP Act, all its provisions, including Section 18, will be applicable. 
  • The Court found that the respondents' communication dated 4th February 2015 constituted an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the LA, which extended the limitation period to 3rd February 2018. 
  • The Court determined that the respondents were not denying the revised tariff but only challenging its retrospective application, and they were bound by the notification until it was set aside by a court. 
  • The Court found that the High Court should have deferred hearing the writ petition until the disposal of the pending intra-court appeals, as their outcome would directly affect the writ petition. 
  • The Court concluded that the respondents were attempting to delay payment while being bound by the Single Judge's decision and had no substantial objection to the demand except for the pending appeals. 
  • The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the writ petitions to be heard after the disposal of the pending intra-court appeals. 
  • The Court ruled that if the respondents' appeals are allowed by the Division Bench, the demands would be withdrawn, but if they fail, they would be liable to pay the demand with applicable interest. 

Relevant Provision: 

  • Section 18 of the Limitation Act:  Effect of acknowledgment in writing - 

(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.  

(2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received.  

Explanation. —For the purposes of this section, —  

(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right. 

(b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf.  

(c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or rights. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal 

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan 

Case In Brief: 

  • The plaintiff is the lawful owner of a property where the defendant claims to be a tenant. 
  • The original tenant was Ranjan Ghosh (defendant's father), who paid a monthly rent of Rs. 1700. 
  • Ranjan Ghosh passed away on 13th July 2016. 
  • On 20th July 2018, the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendant informing him that as the son of the original tenant, he could only inherit the tenancy for 5 years after his father's death. 
  • The defendant received this notice but did not provide a satisfactory reply. 
  • The plaintiff filed a title suit to recover possession of the property. 
  • In his written statement, the defendant admitted that:  
    • His father Ranjan Ghosh was the sole tenant. 
    • The plaintiff is the owner of the property. 
    • Rent was paid until May 2021. 
  • Based on these admissions, the plaintiff filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC for a judgment based on admission. 
  • The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 
  • The defendant appealed to the High Court (FAT No. 7 of 2024), but the High Court dismissed the appeal. 
  • The High Court confirmed that under Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the defendant could only continue as tenant for 5 years after his father's death. 
  • Since this 5-year period had already expired, the defendant was considered a trespasser, and the plaintiff was entitled to eviction. 
  • The High Court granted the defendant three months to vacate the premises. 
  • The defendant has now filed the present petition challenging the High Court's decision. 

Verdict: 

  • The Court made a very important observation with regard to Order XII Rule 6 that the provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary, and permissive. The Court observed that they are not mandatory, obligatory, or peremptory.  
  • The above is clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule. 
  • It was observed by the Court that to make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the discretion of the Court. 
  • It was also observed that the word “or otherwise” used in the provision is wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the pleadings.  
  • Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that the words “or otherwise” without the words “in writing” used in Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon oral or verbal admission also. 
  • The Court held that in the present facts having regard to clear and unequivocal admission made by the defendant in his written statement, the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in decreeing the suit applying Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. 
  • Thus, the Court in the facts of the present case dismissed the petition. 

Relevant Provision: 

  • Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC: Judgment on admissions — 

(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise; whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question-between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.  

(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

G.C. Manjunath & Ors. v. Seetaram 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma 

Case In Brief:

  • The case revolves around a complaint filed by Seetaram against police officers G.C. Manjunath and others, alleging abuse of authority, assault, wrongful confinement, and intimidation during investigations conducted against him. 
  • Seetaram, who had been declared a rowdy sheeter in 1990, alleged that on April 10, 1999, three police officers trespassed into his home, forcibly removed him, and subjected him to assault and torture at the Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station. 
  • The complainant alleged that on April 11, 1999, the officers forced him to hold a slate with his name written on it, photographed him, and later produced him before a Magistrate after registering false cases in Crime Nos. 137 and 138 of 1999. 
  • Seetaram further alleged that on October 27, 1999, certain officers again assaulted him, wrongfully seized his personal belongings including a gold chain, wrist watch, and cash, and confined him at the police station. 
  • The complainant claimed he sustained grievous injuries during these incidents, including a broken tooth, which was supported by medical evidence including wound certificates and X-ray reports. 
  • Seetaram filed a private complaint in 2007 against the officers for offences under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506(b) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  
  • The Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and issued summons to the accused officers, who challenged this order on the ground that prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act was required before prosecution. 
  • The criminal revision petition filed by the accused was dismissed by the Sessions Court, and subsequently, their criminal petition before the High Court was also dismissed. 
  • During the pendency of proceedings, three of the five accused officers passed away, and the remaining two officers (accused Nos. 2 and 5) had retired from service, being 71 and 64 years old respectively. 

Verdict: 

  • The Supreme Court observed that Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act bars the institution of suits or prosecutions against police officers for acts done under the colour of or in excess of official duty, unless prior sanction of the Government is obtained. 
  • The Court held that Section 197 CrPC similarly provides that courts cannot take cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty without prior sanction from the appropriate Government. 
  • The Court noted that the protection under these provisions extends to acts done ostensibly in excess of authority, provided there exists a reasonable nexus between the impugned act and the discharge of official functions. 
  • The Court emphasized that even if a police officer exceeds the bounds of duty, the protective shield continues to apply if there is a reasonable connection between the act complained of and the officer's official functions. 
  • The Supreme Court concluded that the allegations against the accused officers, though grave, fell within the ambit of "acts done under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority" and therefore, the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance without the requisite prior sanction. 
  • Considering the age of the retired officers and the fact that the alleged incidents dated back to 1999-2000, the Court held that no meaningful purpose would be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them. 

Relevant Provision: 

  • Section 197 of CrPC: Prosecution of Judges and public servants — 

(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013— 

(a) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government. 

(b) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government. 

(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 

(3) The State Government may by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the expression “State Government” were substituted. 

(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution of India, 1950 was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 

(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991 (43 of 1991), receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon. 

(4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.

[Read Original Judgment] 

SC Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh 

Date of Judgement/Order – 16.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra 

Case In Brief: 

  • S.C. Garg (appellant) was the Managing Director of Ruchira Papers Ltd., a company manufacturing craft papers. 
  • The company had business dealings with ID Packaging, a partnership concern of R.N. Tyagi (respondent no. 2). 
  • Between December 1997 and January 1998, Tyagi issued 11 cheques to Ruchira Papers Ltd., which were initially dishonoured due to insufficient funds. 
  • Both parties agreed to present the cheques again later upon Tyagi's instructions. 
  • For liabilities other than those covered by the 11 cheques, Tyagi issued 3 demand drafts to Garg's company. 
  • When the 11 cheques were presented again on 8th June 1998, only 4 were cleared, while the remaining 7 cheques were dishonoured. 
  • Garg's company filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against ID Packaging and Tyagi regarding the 7 dishonoured cheques. 
  • On 25th October 2002, the Magistrate convicted Tyagi, rejecting his defense that the debt had already been paid through demand drafts. 
  • Tyagi was sentenced to imprisonment till rising of Court and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 3,20,385/- (the total amount of the 7 dishonoured cheques). 
  • The Additional Sessions Judge dismissed Tyagi's appeal against the conviction on 17th March 2005. 
  • While Tyagi's criminal revision petition was pending, the High Court disposed of multiple proceedings between the parties on 10th October 2012, based on a compromise. 
  • The compromise involved Tyagi paying Rs. 3,20,385/- to Garg's company in full satisfaction of all claims. 
  • During the ongoing proceedings, Tyagi filed an application seeking registration of an FIR against Garg, alleging that despite payment through demand drafts, Garg fraudulently presented the cheques again and received payment for 4 of them. 
  • An FIR (No. 549 of 1998) was registered against Garg, but not against his company, and a charge sheet was filed. 
  • The Magistrate summoned the accused persons, including Garg, on 19th June 2002. 
  • Garg filed a petition to quash the chargesheet and summoning order, which was dismissed by the High Court. 

Verdict: 

  • The Court held that the finding recorded by the finding recorded by the jurisdictional criminal court in Section 138 NI Act proceeding between the parties would be binding to both the parties in any subsequent proceedings involving the same issue. 
  • The Court discussed the law on applicability of res judicata in criminal matters. 
  • The Court held that the two decisions where res judicata was not applied to criminal proceedings involved petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). 
    • In the case of Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009), the first petition was for quashing of the FIR and the second petition was preferred after the Magistrate took cognizance of the matter. 
    • In the case of Muskan Enterprises & Anr v. State of Punjab (2024),the first petition was dismissed as withdrawn whereas the second petition was held not maintainable due to earlier withdrawal without any liberty. 
  • The Court thus held that Tyagi cannot maintain a prosecution on the basis of allegations which were precisely his defence in the earlier proceedings wherein he was an accused. Thus, the present criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed on this ground alone. 
  • The Court quashed the proceedings under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 

Relevant Provision: 

  • Section 11 of CPC: Res judicata— 

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

Sri Shrikanth NS & Ors. v. K. Munivenkatappa & Anr. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 23.04.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra 

Case In Brief: 

  • The dispute concerns a parcel of land bearing Survey No. 11/2 measuring 3 acres 39 guntas situated at Honnakalasapura village, Anekal Taluk, originally granted by the Government of Mysore to one Kurubettappa (father of respondent no. 1/plaintiff) on 19.11.1926. 
  • Smt. Marakka, grandmother of the appellants, allegedly purchased the said property through a registered sale deed dated 11.10.1939, with mutation carried out in her name in 1939-40. 
  • Respondent no. 1 and his mother initiated multiple proceedings challenging the transaction, including suits for declaration and injunction, applications under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, and criminal complaints alleging document fabrication. 
  • The respondent's earlier suits (O.S. No. 181 of 1975, O.S. No. 320 of 1989, O.S. No. 91 of 2010) were dismissed on various grounds including limitation, with appeals and second appeals also being rejected by higher forums. 
  • In the present matter, respondent no. 1 filed O.S. No. 434 of 2011 seeking a declaration that the order dated 06.09.2010 passed by respondent no. 2/Tehsildar in RRT No. 87 of 2010 was illegal. 
  • The appellants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the respondent could not seek relief without first seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 11.10.1939. 
  • The Trial Court allowed the application and rejected the plaint vide order dated 28.10.2013. 
  • Respondent no. 1 then preferred Regular Appeal No. 271 of 2020 against the rejection order and filed I.A. No. 2 under Order XI Rule 14 of CPC seeking direction to the Tehsildar to produce Mutation Register extract No. 5/1939-40. 
  • The First Appellate Court allowed the application, which was subsequently affirmed by the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict: 

  • The Supreme Court observed that Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC enables the Court to seek production of documents only during the pendency of a suit, whereas in the present case, the suit had already been dismissed consequent upon the rejection of the plaint. 
  • The Court held that the First Appellate Court was not enjoined to decide the merits of the controversy but only to examine the validity of the Trial Court's order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. 
  • The Apex Court noted that for examining the validity of plaint rejection, the Appellate Court should confine itself to the contents of the plaint and not venture beyond, as no other documents can be seen without first examining the issue concerning rejection of the plaint. 
  • The Court observed that the First Appellate Court was unnecessarily influenced by observations made by the Supreme Court while dismissing a Criminal Special Leave Petition, which merely indicated that civil proceedings should be determined on their own merits. 
  • The Supreme Court concluded that the order allowing production of the Mutation Register was "totally misconceived and suffers from an error of exercise of jurisdiction" and was beyond the scope of Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC. 
  • While setting aside the direction for document production, the Court affirmed the order allowing the respondent to raise additional grounds in the Regular Appeal, finding no illegality therein. 

Relevant Provision: 

  • Order XI Rule 14 CPC: Production of documents. —
    It shall be lawful for the Court, at any time during the pendency of any suit, to order the production by any party thereto, upon oath, of such of the documents in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question in such suit, as the Court shall think right; and the Court may deal with such documents, when produced, in such manner as shall appear just.  

[Read Original Judgment]