Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 1 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Sandeep Mehta 

Case In Brief: 

• This matter involves a domestic dispute between Alisha Berry (daughter-in-law) and Neelam Berry (mother-in-law).  
• Neelam Berry (respondent) had filed a case against Alisha Berry under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV) in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate.   
• Alisha Berry (petitioner) has a specially abled minor son who suffers from hearing impairment.  
• The petitioner is currently unemployed and financially dependent on her father for survival.  
• There are concurrent divorce proceedings between Alisha Berry and her husband, which were previously transferred from Family Court, West, Tis Hazari, New Delhi to Family Court, Ludhiana District Court, Punjab through Transfer Petition.   
• The Trial Court had issued bailable warrants against Alisha Berry (petitioner) on 6th February 2024.  
• The current petition was filed by Alisha Berry seeking transfer of the domestic violence case from Delhi to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, Punjab.  
• Despite being served notice, the respondent (Neelam Berry) did not appear or have representation before the Supreme Court in this transfer petition. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed that:  
  • The Supreme Court strongly criticized the Trial Court's decision to issue bailable warrants, stating there was "no justification whatsoever" for issuing such warrants in a Domestic Violence Act case.  
  • The Supreme Court observed that proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not carry penal consequences except in cases where there is a violation or breach of a protection order.  
  • The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the learned Magistrate was "absolutely unjustified" in directing the issuance of bailable warrants against the petitioner.  
• The Supreme Court considered several factors in making its decision:   
  • The submissions were made by the petitioner's counsel.  
  • The available material on record.  
  • The fact that related divorce proceedings had already been transferred to Ludhiana. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 18 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005  

• Protection orders 

The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from—  

(a) committing any act of domestic violence;  

(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;  

(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;  

(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;  

(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;  

(f) causing violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;  

(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order 

Section 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 

• Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent 

(1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.  

(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who passed the order, the breach of which has been alleged to have been caused by the accused.  

(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may also frame charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may be, if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions. 

[Original Judgement] 

 N. Pandakumar v. The State of Karnataka  

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale 

Case In Brief: 

• H.N. Pandakumar (accused) was involved in a criminal case stemming from FIR filed at K.R. Pete Rural Police Station, Mandya.  
• The original complaint was filed by Puttaraju, alleging that five accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted him and his family members, causing grievous injuries.  
• Based on the investigation, charges were framed against all accused under multiple sections including 143, 341, 504, 323, 324, and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code,1860.  
• The Trial Court, through its judgment dated 24th January 2012 in Sessions Court, convicted Accused Nos. 3 and 4 under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC.   
• They were sentenced to:   
  • Two years of rigorous imprisonment  
  • Fine of Rs. 2,000/- each  
  • The remaining accused were acquitted  
• Pandakumar appealed to the Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated 01th September,2023:   
  • Reduced his sentence to one year  
  • Enhanced the fine to Rs. 2,00,000/-  
  • Acquitted Accused No. 4  
• After his Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19th January 2024.  
• Pandakumar filed a Miscellaneous Application seeking to compound the offence based on:   
  • A compromise reached between the parties  
  • Agreement to pay Rs. 5,80,000/- as compensation  
  • Resolution of all disputes including property matters  
  • The fact that both parties are distantly related and live in close proximity  
• The complainant filed an Interlocutory Application supporting the compromise and seeking closure of the matter. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court acknowledged that while Section 326 IPC (punishment for grievous hurt by dangerous weapons) is non-compoundable under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the Court possesses inherent powers to give effect to compromise in exceptional circumstances.  
• The Court noted several significant factors that constituted exceptional circumstances in this case:   
  • The existence of an amicable settlement between parties  
  • The complainant's unequivocal consent documented through the Interlocutory Application  
  • The parties' residential proximity (separated only by a road)  
  • The distant familial relationship between the parties  
• The potential impact of continued hostility on the social fabric of the neighborhood  
• The comprehensive nature of the compromise covering both criminal and property disputes  
• The resolution of long-standing right of way issues  
• The Court recognized that the applicant/petitioner's commitment to paying the agreed compensation (Rs. 5,80,000/-) demonstrated a genuine effort to resolve the discord.  
• The Court states that the complainant's support for the compromise through a formal Interlocutory Application provides the voluntary nature of the settlement.  
• Based on these exceptional circumstances, the Court determined it appropriate to:   
  • Allow the Miscellaneous Application  
  • Recall the previous order dated 19th January 2024 dismissing the SLP  
  • Grant leave  
  • Confirm the conviction while reducing the sentence to the period already undergone  
• The Court disposed of the Interlocutory Application for impleadment in terms of this order, along with any other pending applications. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 320 of CrPC: Compounding offences. 
  • (1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table 
  • (2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table 
  • (3) When an offence is compoundable under this section, the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or where the accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in like manner.]  
  • (4) (a) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf may, with the permission of the Court, compound such offence. (b) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may, with the consent of the Court, compound such offence.  
  • (5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.  
  • (6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section.  
  • (7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such offence.  
  • (8) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded.  
  • (9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. 

[Original Judgement] 

Punjab National Bank v. Atin Arora & Anr 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar 

Case In Brief: 

• Punjab National Bank (PNB) filed a petition under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 IBC before NCLT Kolkata against M/s. George Distributors Pvt. Ltd. on 9th January, 2019. 
• The respondent company had changed its registered office from Kolkata to Cuttack through a Ministry of Corporate Affairs order dated 16th January, 2018, but never informed PNB about this change. 
• Despite the address change, NCLT Kolkata served notices through Speed Post, and the respondents were aware of the proceedings, even requesting a copy of the petition. 
• NCLT Kolkata admitted the Section 7 of IBC petition for hearing, while NCLT Cuttack bench was only constituted later on 11th  March, 2019. 
• The Calcutta High Court, exercising powers under Article 227, set aside NCLT's order that had rejected the recall application. 

Verdict 

• The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court erred in entertaining the Article 227 petition and overlooked Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) regarding jurisdictional objections. 
• The Court states that objections to the place of suing must be taken at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance. 
• The mere mention of e-Form for address change in the petition was not sufficient to establish that PNB had knowledge of the address change. 
• The High Court failed to consider its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and didn't fully examine the consequences of setting aside the IBC admission order. 
• While setting aside the High Court's order and allowing IBC proceedings to continue, the Supreme Court preserved the respondents' rights to pursue other legal remedies. 

Related Provision 

Section 21 of CPC:  

• Section 21 of CPC,1908 deals with Objections to jurisdiction. 
• It states that   
• (1) No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 
• (2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 
• (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice 

[Original Judgment] 

Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice  J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 

Case in Brief : 

• An FIR (No.96/18) was registered at Padav Police Station, Gwalior for offences under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, and 149 of IPC against seven individuals. 
• The case involved a murder incident in 2018 where the victim, Abhishek Tomar, was shot near the LIC office at Tansen Nagar Road. 
• Initially, the police filed a closure report exonerating two petitioners (Omi @ Omkar Rathore and another) from the alleged offence. 
• During the trial, PW3 (Raghvendra Tomar), the original first informant, testified and specifically implicated the two petitioners, attributing specific overt acts to them. 
• Based on PW3's testimony, an application was filed under Section 319 CrPC to summon the two petitioners as accused. 
• The Trial Court summoned the petitioners to face trial along with other co-accused. 
• The petitioners challenged this order through a Criminal Revision Application before the High Court. 
• The High Court rejected their revision application, affirming the Trial Court's order. 
• The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition. 

Verdict  

• The filing of a police closure report does not bar the summoning of an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC. 
• The trial court's power under Section 319 CrPC is not controlled by whether a person is named or not named in the FIR. 
• The court can summon additional accused based on evidence presented during trial, not based on materials in the charge sheet or case diary. 
• When evidence from a complainant is found worthy of acceptance, the investigating officer's satisfaction becomes irrelevant. 
• The power under Section 319 CrPC is discretionary and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and only with strong and cogent evidence. 
• The test for summoning under Section 319 CrPC requires stronger evidence than mere probability but less than what would lead to conviction if unrebutted. 
• Even if a person is initially named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted, they can be added to face trial if evidence surfaces during proceedings. 
• A closure report that hasn't been accepted by the court becomes insignificant once an order under Section 319 CrPC is passed summoning the accused. 

Related Provision 

Section 358 of The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 

• Section 358 deals with   Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of an offence. 
• It states that : 
  • (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
    (2) Where such a person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. 
    (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. 
    (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then--- 
    (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard; 
    (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 

[Original Judgment] 

Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. Daulat Ram & Ors. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 02.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol 

Case in Brief : 

• The Supreme Court of India overturned the Punjab and Haryana High Court's judgment, validating a disputed Will executed by Sanjhi Ram. 
• The case centered on interpreting Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, specifically the phrase "by the direction of the testator." 
• Sanjhi Ram executed a Will on November 7, 2005, transferring property to his nephew Gopal Krishan, and passed away the following day. 
• The respondents challenged the Will's validity, claiming it was forged and fabricated. 
• The Civil Court initially held the Will invalid, finding suspicious circumstances in its execution. 
• The Lower Appellate Court reversed this decision, upholding the Will's validity. 
• The High Court overturned again, finding that attestation requirements weren't properly met. 
• The Supreme Court ultimately restored the Lower Appellate Court's judgment, validating the Will. 

Verdict 

• Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act provides multiple distinct ways a Will can be validly attested, separated by the word "OR." 
• The High Court erred by treating the disjunctive "or" as conjunctive "and" in interpreting attestation requirements. 
• When an attesting witness has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will (as in this case), it satisfies one requirement under Section 63(c). 
• The phrase "by the direction of the testator" only applies in situations where a third person signs the Will on behalf of the testator. 
• The testimony of witness DW-1 (Janak Raj) that he saw Sanjhi Ram affix his thumb impression was sufficient for valid attestation. 
• The statutory language should be given its ordinary grammatical meaning unless it leads to ambiguity, uncertainty, or absurdity. 
• Requirements for proving a Will include showing it was executed by the testator, it was their last Will, and all formalities under Section 63 were fulfilled. 
• The Court affirmed that suspicious circumstances must be "real, germane and valid" and not merely "the fantasy of the doubting mind." 

Related Provision  

Section 63 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 

• Section 63 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 deals with Execution of unprivileged wills. 
• It states that : 
  • Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or an airman so employed or engaged,] or a mariner at sea, shall execute his will according to the following rules:—  
    • (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. 
    • (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will.  
    • (c) The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence an d by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. 

[Original Judgment] 

Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors 

Date of Judgement/Order – 03.01.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justices Manoj Misra 

Case in Brief : 

• CIRP was admitted against the corporate debtor on October 26, 2018, at the instance of Oriental Bank of Commerce as financial creditor. 
• During the 19th CoC meeting, the resolution plans were reviewed, the appellant was asked to incorporate certain items, and the meeting was adjourned to February 11, 2020. 
• There was a dispute about notice - while the resolution professional claimed notice was issued, Shyam Divan submitted his client never received it. 
• The revised resolution plan was approved unanimously by the CoC through e-voting on February 11, 2020, with 100% voting share. 
• Swamitva, whose resolution plan was rejected, filed an interlocutory application seeking reconsideration from the Adjudicating Authority. 
• The suspended director also filed an interlocutory application before NCLAT seeking rejection of the appellant's resolution plan. 
• The High Court ultimately set aside the resolution plan primarily because principles of natural justice were violated as 24 hours' notice was not granted. 
• The matter reached the Supreme Court through appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution against the Karnataka High Court's judgment.

Verdict :

• The Court noted the significant delay of almost three years between the CoC meeting (February 11, 2020) and approaching the High Court (January 4, 2023). 
• The proceedings by Swamitva Consortium before various forums could not justify the delay in approaching the High Court. 
• The Court emphasized that IBC is a complete code in itself with sufficient checks, balances, and remedial avenues. 
• The High Court should have noted that the respondent had already initiated proceedings under IBC by filing interlocutory applications. 
• The Court stressed the importance of adherence to protocols and procedures to maintain legal discipline. 
• While High Courts have supervisory powers, their exercise demands rigorous scrutiny and judicious application. 
• This was not an appropriate case for the High Court to interdict CIRP proceedings under IBC. 
• The Court directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume proceedings from where they were interdicted and complete them expeditiously. 

Related Provision 

Section 60 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. 

• Section 60 deals with Adjudicating authority for corporate persons.— 
• It states that  
  • (1) The Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate person is located.  
  • (2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.  
  • (3) An insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of the corporate debtor pending in any court or tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such corporate debtor. 
  • (4) The National Company Law Tribunal shall be vested with all the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under Part III of this Code for the purpose of sub-section (2). 
  • (5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the National Company Law Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of—  
    • a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person;  
    • (b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, including claims by or against any of its subsidiaries situated in India; and  
    • (c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under this Code. 
  • (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded. 

[Original Judgment]