List of Current Affairs

Source: High Court of Himachal Pradesh 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla in Khelo Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025) partly allowed a criminal revision petition, upholding convictions under Sections 452, 354, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) while setting aside conviction under Section 324 IPC, ruling that human teeth cannot be considered deadly weapons. 

What was the Background of Khelo Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025) Case? 

• The case originated from an incident on March 5, 2007, when the accused Khelo Ram allegedly trespassed into the victim's house at night while she was sleeping with her 4-year-old child. 
• The victim reported that her husband had gone to attend a marriage, leaving her alone at home with her child around 11:30 p.m. 
• According to the prosecution case, the accused entered the unlocked room, caught hold of the victim's arm, started kissing her, and bit her cheek when she shouted for help. 
• The victim's brother-in-law came to her rescue upon hearing her cries, causing the accused to flee the scene. 
• The matter was immediately reported to police, and an FIR was registered under Sections 452, 354, 324, and 323 IPC. 
• Medical examination revealed bite marks on the victim's cheek and pain and tenderness in the neck. 
• The Trial Court convicted the accused on all charges, imposing concurrent sentences of simple imprisonment ranging from three to six months. 
• The Sessions Court dismissed the accused's appeal, concurring with the Trial Court's findings. 
• The accused then filed a criminal revision petition before the High Court challenging both judgments. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On Revisional Jurisdiction: 

• The Court emphasized that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC is extremely narrow and cannot be exercised like appellate jurisdiction. 
• The Court cited Supreme Court precedents establishing that revisional courts can only rectify patent defects, errors of jurisdiction, or law, and cannot re-appreciate evidence in the absence of perversity. 
• Justice Kainthla noted that concurrent findings of two courts require exceptional circumstances to warrant interference in revision. 

On Evidence Appreciation: 

• The Court found that the victim's testimony was credible and corroborated by medical evidence and her brother-in-law's statement. 
• Regarding alleged improvements in the victim's testimony, the Court held that since the investigating officer was not questioned about omissions under Section 162 CrPC, contradictions could not be established. 
• The Court clarified the proper procedure for proving contradictions, requiring the investigating officer's testimony when a witness denies making previous statements. 

On Hostile Witness Testimony: 

• The Court ruled that testimony of hostile witnesses is not automatically rejected but can be accepted to the extent it supports either prosecution or defense if corroborated. 
• The victim's brother-in-law, though declared hostile, had admitted facts supporting the prosecution case and was not properly contradicted with his previous statement. 

On Section 324 of IPC and Human Teeth: 

• The Court extensively analyzed various High Court judgments and Supreme Court precedent in Shakeel Ahmed v. State of Delhi (2004), concluding that human teeth cannot be considered deadly weapons under Section 324 IPC. 

What is Section 324 of IPC? 

About: 

• Section 324 of IPC deals with voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.  
• It states that whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 

Provision under BNS: 

• Section 118 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 deals with the offence of voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.  
• It replaces/combines what used to be Sections 324 & 326 of the IPC.

What is a Deadly Weapon under Criminal Law? 

Legal Definition: 

• Under Sections 324 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code, a deadly weapon refers to specific categories of instruments used to cause hurt or grievous hurt. The provisions define these as: 
  • "Any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death" 

Categories of Deadly Weapons: 

1. Instruments for Shooting:

• Firearms, guns, rifles 
• Any device that propels projectiles 

2. Instruments for Stabbing:

• Knives, daggers, swords 
• Sharp pointed objects designed to pierce 

3. Instruments for Cutting:

• Blades, machetes, axes 
• Any sharp-edged tool capable of slicing 

4. Instruments Likely to Cause Death:

• Heavy blunt objects like iron rods, hammers 
• Any tool that, when used offensively, poses lethal risk 

5. Other Specified Means:

• Fire or heated substances 
• Poison or corrosive substances 
• Explosive substances 
• Deleterious substances (harmful to inhale, swallow, or absorb) 
• Animals (when used as weapons) 

What Does NOT Constitute a Deadly Weapon: 

• The Khelo Ram case clarified several important exclusions: 

Human Body Parts: 

• Teeth, fists, feet are not considered deadly weapons. 
• The Supreme Court in Shakeel Ahmed v. State of Delhi (2004) definitively ruled that human teeth cannot be classified as deadly weapons. 

Key Legal Reasoning: 

• The term "instrument" in the IPC refers to external tools, not body parts. 
• The language "by means of any instrument" implies something separate from the human body. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and K Vinod Chandran quashed a cheque bounce complaint filed on the 35th day, clarifying that the 30-day limitation under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is mandatory. It is held that delay can be condoned only through a formal application with valid reasons, and not by presumption or automatic condonation.  

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd & Ors. v. M/S MSN Woodtech (2025).

What was the Background of H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd & Ors. v. M/S MSN Woodtech (2025) Case? 

• The present case arose from a cheque bounce complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd and its directors H.S. Oberoi and Manveer Singh Oberoi by M/S MSN Woodtech. 
• The respondent M/S MSN Woodtech filed a complaint alleging dishonour of a negotiable instrument (cheque) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881. However, this complaint was filed five days beyond the statutory limitation period of 30 days prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Act. 
• The Trial Court issued summons to the appellants despite the admitted delay in filing the complaint. The Trial Court erroneously recorded in its order that the complaint was filed within the limitation period, which was factually incorrect. 
• The appellants challenged this order before the Delhi High Court through a criminal revision petition.  
• The High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision to issue summons, holding that the Trial Court had the power to condone the delay under Section 142(b) of the Act and that filing a formal application for condonation of delay was not a statutory mandate. 
• Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the appellants approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition, which was converted into a Criminal Appeal. 
• The respondent's counsel argued that an application for condonation of delay had been prepared but was inadvertently not filed with the complaint, and that such application was still pending before the Trial Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court made several significant observations regarding the mandatory nature of limitation periods under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the procedure for condonation of delay: 
• The Court observed that once a statute prescribes a mandatory time limit for filing a complaint, there cannot be any deviation from the same except when a proper application accompanying the complaint is filed seeking condonation and disclosing reasons for the delay. 
• The Court emphasized that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to take note of such filing beyond limitation and to consider the reasons disclosed independently before coming to a judicious conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of that case, condonation is justified. 
• The Supreme Court noted that from a purely legal point of view, where facts are admitted that the complaint was filed beyond the time prescribed under the statute, there cannot be an automatic or presumed condonation of delay. 
• The Court observed that the Trial Court had proceeded on an erroneous presumption by noting that the complaint was filed within the limitation period when it was admittedly filed five days beyond the prescribed time limit. 
• The Court held that even assuming the power under Section 142 of the Act exists for the Court to condone delay, the first requirement is that the Court must take note of the fact that there is a delay and thereafter examine whether the reasons furnished by the complainant are sufficient to condone such delay. 
• The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's opinion that filing of an application for condonation of delay is not a statutory mandate under Section 142(b) of the Act was erroneous in law. 
• The Court noted that the proper procedure had absolutely not been followed in the present case, as neither was there a formal application for condonation of delay filed with the complaint, nor did the Trial Court judicially examine the reasons for delay before taking cognizance. 
• The Supreme Court concluded that the order taking cognizance and issuing summons needed interference and could not be sustained in law. 

What is Section 138 and 142 of NI Act? 

Section 138 - Elements of the Offence: 

About: 

• Section 138 creates a statutory offence for dishonour of cheques due to insufficient funds or exceeding the arranged amount.  
• The essential elements that must be satisfied for constituting an offence under this section are: 
  • Primary Requirement: A cheque drawn by a person on his account with a banker for payment of money to another person must be returned unpaid by the bank due to insufficient funds or exceeding the arranged overdraft limit. 

Three Mandatory Conditions under the Proviso: 

• The cheque must be presented to the bank within six months from the date it was drawn or within its validity period, whichever is earlier. 
• The payee or holder in due course must issue a written demand notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving information from the bank about the cheque being returned unpaid. 
• The drawer must fail to make payment of the cheque amount within fifteen days of receiving the demand notice. 
• Penalty Provision: Upon satisfaction of these conditions, the drawer commits an offence punishable with imprisonment up to two years, or fine up to twice the cheque amount, or both. 
• Scope Limitation: The debt or liability must be legally enforceable as clarified in the Explanation to the section. 

Section 142 - Procedural Requirements for Cognizance 

Section 142 prescribes the mandatory procedural framework for taking cognizance of offences under Section 138: 

• Complaint-Based Jurisdiction: Courts can only take cognizance upon a written complaint filed by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque. 
• Limitation Period: The complaint must be filed within one month of the cause of action arising under clause (c) of Section 138's proviso, which means within one month from the expiry of the fifteen-day notice period. 
• Condonation Provision: The proviso to Section 142(b) empowers courts to take cognizance of complaints filed beyond the prescribed one-month period, provided the complainant satisfies the court of sufficient cause for the delay. 
• Court Hierarchy: Only Metropolitan Magistrates or Judicial Magistrates of first class have jurisdiction to try such offences. 
• Territorial Jurisdiction: Section 142(2) specifies that the offence shall be tried only by courts within whose jurisdiction either the payee's bank branch (for collection through account) or the drawee bank branch (for direct presentation) is situated.