List of Current Affairs

Source: Rajasthan High Court

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, comprising Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, in Ishita Bhardwaj v. State of Rajasthan (2026), quashed an FIR registered against a woman under Sections 312 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. (Sections 88 & 89 of BNS).  

• The Court held that merely sending abortion pills through courier does not fulfil the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 312 IPC unless such pills are forcefully given to the victim with an intention to cause miscarriage.  
• The Court further held that a subsequent FIR filed with verbatim identical allegations, after the complainant had already withdrawn the earlier complaint, amounted to an abuse of the process of law and was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.

What was the Background of Ishita Bhardwaj v. State of Rajasthan (2026) Case? 

• The present petition was filed by a brother and sister seeking quashing of an FIR. The brother was implicated for rape, while the sister was accused under Section 312 IPC for allegedly sending abortion pills to the complainant through courier. 
• The complainant and the brother had been in a live-in relationship. It was alleged that on the pretext of marriage, the brother had developed a consensual sexual relationship with the complainant on multiple occasions between 2018 and 2019. An FIR was accordingly lodged against him. During the trial, however, the complainant withdrew the proceedings. Subsequently, a second FIR was filed against the brother containing verbatim identical allegations. 
• As regards the sister, no allegation had been made against her in the complainant's own complaint. The allegation of sending abortion pills was introduced by the sister's husband — against whom she had filed a case for cruelty under Section 498A IPC — apparently as a counter-blast to her complaint.

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Ingredients of Section 312 IPC: The Court held that the basic ingredients of the offence under Sections 312 and 313 IPC require that a person voluntarily cause a woman with child to miscarry, and that such miscarriage should not have been caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the woman's life. Merely sending abortion pills through courier to any person does not satisfy these ingredients unless the pills are forcefully administered to the victim with the intent to cause miscarriage. 

On Absence of Evidence Against the Petitioner: The Court observed that not a single allegation in the FIR stated that the petitioner had caused miscarriage of the complainant. Even taking the allegations at face value, no primary evidence existed on record to establish forceful administration of the pills or any intent to cause miscarriage. Accordingly, the essential ingredients of Sections 312 and 313 IPC were found to be missing. 

On the Source of the Allegation: The Court noted that the allegation against the sister did not originate from the complainant but was introduced by the sister's husband, evidently as a counter-blast to the Section 498A IPC case filed against him. The Court treated this circumstance as a relevant indicator of the malafide character of the FIR. 

On the Subsequent FIR Against the Brother: The Court referred to multiple Supreme Court decisions holding that registration of a subsequent FIR or complaint regarding identical allegations, after the earlier complaint has been withdrawn, constitutes an abuse of the process of law that is impermissible and violative of Article 21. The Court observed that the allegations in both FIRs were verbatim identical, with no difference even in punctuation. Once the earlier criminal complaint regarding the same incident and the same offence was not pressed and was withdrawn by the victim, a successive FIR on the same facts was held to be legally unsustainable. 

On the FIR Being an Abuse of Process: The Court held that the FIR against the sister was a gross abuse of law, as it lacked any credible allegation and had been introduced through an interested party. The FIR was accordingly quashed. 

What are Sections 88 & 89 of BNS? 

• Section 88: Causing Miscarriage: 
  • This section states that whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
  • It is further given in the explanation that a woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section. 
• Section 89: Causing miscarriage without woman's consent: 
  • This Section states that whoever commits the offence under section 88 without the consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice AS Chandurkar, in Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy (Dead) Through LRs and Others (2026), summarised the governing principles on the survival of the right to sue upon the death of a party to a proceeding, and its continuation by or against the legal representatives of the deceased. 

• The Court held that the traditional common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona — a personal action dies with the person — is not absolute in India and stands modified by several statutes. It further held that the question of survivability of a claim must be assessed as on the date of death of the party, with personal injury claims abating while claims relating to pecuniary loss or the estate of the deceased surviving to legal representatives.

What was the Background of Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy (2026) Case? 

• The case arose in the context of a consumer complaint alleging medical negligence against a doctor who passed away during the pendency of proceedings. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the claim could be continued against the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased doctor. 
• The central legal issue involved the interplay between: 
  • The common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, which provides that personal actions die with the person. 
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which governs the transmission of rights and liabilities to legal representatives. 
  • Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides for the substitution of parties upon the death of a litigant. 
• The Court took the occasion to authoritatively summarise the principles governing survival of the right to sue, in order to resolve the tension between these provisions.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On Modification of the Common Law Maxim: The Court held that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has been significantly modified in India by statutory instruments including the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855, and the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The maxim, in its absolute common law form, does not operate in the Indian legal system. 
• On Institution of Fresh Proceedings: The Court clarified that legal representatives of a deceased person may institute fresh proceedings or be proceeded against afresh, in terms of the Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855 or Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, subject to applicable statutory limitations under succession law. 
• On Section 306 as the Governing Provision: The Court held that whether a proceeding survives the death of a party is a matter of substantive law, governed by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Procedural provisions alone cannot determine survivability. 
• On Harmonious Construction of Order XXII and Section 306: The Court held that Order XXII of the CPC, which enables substitution of parties upon death, must be harmoniously construed with Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. Order XXII cannot expand the scope of claims that are survivable under substantive law. 
• On the Relevant Date for Assessment: The Court held that the question of whether the right to sue survives must be assessed as on the date of death of the party — not at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. 
• On Personal Injury vs. Estate Claims: The Court drew a clear distinction between the two categories of claims. Personal injury claims — such as those for pain, suffering, or defamation — abate upon the death of the claimant. However, claims relating to pecuniary loss or the estate of the deceased survive and may be pursued by or against the legal representatives. 
• On the Facts of the Present Case: Applying these principles, the Court held that the legal heirs of the deceased doctor could be proceeded against under the Consumer Protection Act in respect of the medical negligence claim, as it involved a claim against the estate rather than a purely personal action.

What are the Key Legal Provisions Involved? 

Section 306 — Indian Succession Act, 1925 

Section 306 - Survival of Demands and Rights of Action: 

General Rule: 

• All demands and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding that exist in favour of or against a person at the time of his death survive to and against his executors or administrators. 

Exceptions — Claims that Do NOT Survive: 

• Causes of action for defamation. 
• Causes of action for assault (as defined under the Indian Penal Code, 1860). 
• Other personal injuries not causing the death of the party. 
• Cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory (of no effect). 

Illustrations: 

• Illustration (i): A passenger is severely injured in a railway collision due to an official's negligence but dies before filing any action. The cause of action does not survive to his legal representatives — as it was a personal injury claim that did not cause death. 
• Illustration (ii): A files a suit for divorce and dies during its pendency. The cause of action does not survive — as the relief of divorce is personal and could not be enjoyed after death. 

Key Takeaway: 

The section lays down that survivability of a legal claim is the rule, and its extinction is the exception. Only purely personal claims — relating to injury, defamation, assault, or relief that becomes infructuous upon death — are extinguished. All other rights and liabilities pass to the legal representatives of the deceased.

What is Order XXII of CPC, 1908? 

Order XXII of CPC — Death, Marriage, and Insolvency of Parties: 

• Order XXII contains 12 Rules. Rules 1–6, 9, and 10A deal with death of parties; Rule 7 with marriage; Rule 8 with insolvency; Rule 10 with assignment of interest; and Rules 11–12 with application to appeals and execution proceedings.