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Declaration of Title & Sale Deed
25-Apr-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan held that a plaintiff seeking a declaration of title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) , is not required to seek cancellation of a sale deed executed by a third party under Section 31, as such cancellation does not constitute a necessary "further relief" and the absence of such a claim does not render the suit non-maintainable.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Hussain Ahmed Choudhury & Ors. v. Habibur Rahman (Dead) Through Lrs & ORS (2025).
What was the Background of Hussain Ahmed Choudhury & Ors. v. Habibur Rahman (Dead) Through Lrs & ORS. (2025) Case?
- This case involves a dispute over land ownership and the validity of two competing instruments
- a Gift Deed dated 26th April 1958, and a subsequent Sale Deed dated 05th May1997.
- Haji Abdul Aziz Choudhury (grandfather of the original plaintiff) executed a registered Gift Deed on 26th April 1958 in favor of Siraj Uddin Choudhury (original plaintiff) for land measuring 08 bighas and 06 chatak, which included the suit land measuring 04 bighas, 05 katha and 06 chatak.
- The Gift Deed was executed because Abdul Aziz's son had predeceased him, and his grandson (Siraj Uddin) would not otherwise have been eligible to inherit his grandfather's property under Muslim law.
- Abdul Aziz Choudhury passed away in 1971.
- On 05th May 1997, respondent no. 1 allegedly purchased part of the suit land from original defendant nos. 1 to 6 (brothers and sisters of the plaintiff's deceased father).
- According to the plaintiff, these defendants had no title or saleable rights over the suit property.
- The plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 88/1997 seeking declaration, confirmation of possession, and mandatory injunction over the suit's land.
- The cause of the action arose in 1997 when the defendants started threatening to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit's property.
- During the pendency of the suit, on 08.05.1999, the defendants succeeded in forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff.
- The plaint was subsequently amended on 28.08.1999 to seek recovery of possession.
- The Trial Court decided in favor of the plaintiff, holding that:
- The Gift Deed was validly executed
- The property was clearly identifiable despite mis-description of Dag numbers
- The plaintiff had acquired right, title, interest and possession over the suit land
- Defendants had no saleable interest to sell the suit land
- Two separate appeals were filed against this judgment in the First Appellate Court, which affirmed the Trial Court's findings.
- The defendants then filed second appeals in the High Court.
- While the High Court affirmed the findings regarding the validity of the Gift Deed and delivery of possession, it ultimately allowed the appeals and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the procedural ground that the plaintiff had failed to challenge the subsequent sale deed and seek its cancellation.
- Against this decision of the High Court, the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Supreme Court observed that the issue at hand was whether a plaintiff seeking declaration of title based on a valid Gift Deed should fail merely because the plaintiff omitted to pray for cancellation of a subsequent sale deed or declaration that the same is not binding.
- The Court noted that under Section 31 of SRA 1963, the expression "any person" does not include a third party but is restricted to either a party to the written instrument or any person who is bound by a party to the instrument.
- The Court observed that it is logically impossible for a person who is not a party to a document or decree to ask for its cancellation.
- The Court held that filing a suit for cancellation of a sale deed and seeking a declaration that a particular document is inoperative against the plaintiff are two distinct, separate legal actions.
- The Court stated that where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, they must seek cancellation under Section 31, but if a non-executant seeks annulment, they need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid or not binding on them.
- Regarding Section 34 , the Court observed that "further relief" must flow necessarily from the declaration sought, and if such relief is remote and not connected with the cause of action, there is no need to claim it.
- The Court held that the proviso to Section 34 should not be construed in a manner that compels the plaintiff to sue for any and all reliefs which could potentially be granted.
- The Court observed that a suit for declaration of title considers several factors about how the plaintiff is entitled to such declaration, naturally encompassing consideration of defendants' pleas regarding the validity and binding nature of any document claimed to defeat the plaintiff's title.
- The Court emphasized that courts have inherent powers to shape declarations to afford the relief that justice requires, and Section 34 is not exhaustive of cases where declaratory decrees may be made.
- The Court concluded that declaring title is equivalent to relief seeking cancellation of the sale deed or at minimum, a declaration that the sale deed is not binding on the plaintiff due to being void and non est.
- The Supreme Court determined that the High Court erred in dismissing the suit solely because the plaintiff did not specifically pray for cancellation of the sale deed.
What is Section 34 of SRA ?
- Section 34 deals with the Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.
- Key Elements:
- A person can file a suit seeking a declaration about their legal character or right to property
- This can be filed against anyone who denies or has an interest in denying that legal character or right
- The court has discretion whether to make such a declaration
- The plaintiff doesn't need to ask for any additional relief beyond the declaration
- Important Limitation:
- The court cannot make such a declaration if the plaintiff can seek further relief beyond a mere declaration of title but chooses not to do so
- Explanation Clause:
- A trustee is considered a "person interested to deny" a title that's adverse to someone not currently in existence but who would be the beneficiary of the trust if they existed
- This section essentially allows people to clarify their legal status or property rights through court declarations when those rights are being disputed, but with the limitation that they must seek all available remedies rather than just a declaration if additional remedies are available to them.
Civil Law
Suit for Cancellation of Deed and Recovery of Possession
25-Apr-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra held that in a composite suit for cancellation of deed and recovery of possession the period of limitation must be adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation which is 3 years and not the ancillary relief of possession that is 12 years.
- The Supreme Court held this in the case of Rajeev Gupta & Ors v. Prashant Garg & Ors. (2025).
What was the Background of Rajeev Gupta & Ors v. Prashant Garg & Ors. (2025) Case?
- On 17th October 1951, Dr. Babu Ram Garg executed a will bequeathing House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar to his two sons - Ishwar Chand and Dr. Karam Chand, while the third son Ramesh Chand received a pharmacy business and Rs. 5,000.
- In the year 1956, a family settlement resulted in mutations in the names of Leelawati (likely Ishwar Chand's wife) and Ramesh Chand for the suit property, with other properties being allotted to Dr. Karam Chand.
- After Ishwar Chand's death in 1984, his wife Leelawati filed a suit against Ramesh Chand seeking declaration of ownership of the western portion of the property, which was decreed by compromise on 30th May 1987.
- Dr. Karam Chand filed another suit in 1992 against Ramesh Chand and Ishwar Chand's heirs seeking to restrain them from alienating the property, during which an ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 15th June 1992.
- During the pendency of this second suit, Ramesh Chand executed two sale deeds on 16th June 1992 and 29th June 1992, in favor of the appellants for Rs. 80,000, which were duly registered on 17th June 1992 and 30th June 1992 respectively.
- A compromise was reached between Dr. Karam Chand and Ishwar Chand's heirs on 28th September 1992, and later between Dr. Karam Chand and Ramesh Chand.
- In 1997, a mutation occurred in revenue records in favor of the appellants.
- Ramesh Chand passed away in 2002.
- On 25th February 2003, Dr. Karam Chand and his son filed a suit against the appellants seeking cancellation of the sale deeds, recovery of possession, and injunction.
- A compromise was eventually reached between the plaintiffs and Ramesh Chand's legal heirs on 28th January 2008, where the latter accepted that Ramesh Chand was merely in permissive possession and had no right to execute sale deeds.
- The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed this decision, which was upheld by the High Court on 21st September 2021, leading to the current appeal.
- Verdicts of Lower Courts:
- Trial Court (25th January 2015): Dismissed the suit - found that plaintiffs failed to prove the will's execution, the suit was barred by limitation (filed in 2003 for deeds executed in 1992), and plaintiffs couldn't prove ownership.
- First Appellate Court (4th March 2017): Allowed the appeal and decreed the suit - held that the will was valid, Ramesh Chand never owned the property making his sale deeds void, doctrine of lis pendens applied, and the 12-year limitation period was applicable.
- High Court (21st September 2021): Confirmed the first appellate court's decision - ruled that sale deeds were void due to lis pendens, 12-year limitation period applied, and the will's execution was already proven in previous proceedings.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- Period of Limitation in case of composite suit filed for cancellation of sale deed and possession
- In composite suits for cancellation of sale deed and recovery of possession, the primary relief determines the limitation period (3 years for cancellation, not 12 years for possession).
- Article 58 of the Limitation Act uses "first" to signify that limitation begins when the right to sue first accrues, not when the plaintiff chooses to act.
- Suits seeking cancellation of instruments are governed by Article 59, with a 3-year limitation period from when the plaintiff first gained knowledge of the instrument.
- In this case, cancellation was deemed the primary relief with recovery of possession being ancillary.
- The registered sale deeds required cancellation before possession could be sought; they weren't "sham and inoperative" documents that could be ignored.
- The plaintiffs had both constructive and actual knowledge of the property transfer during or soon after the second suit in 1992.
- The plaintiffs' right to sue first accrued when the appellants took possession after the registered sale deeds were executed in June 1992.
- Since the suit was only instituted in 2003 (11 years later), it was "hopelessly barred by limitation" under the 3-year rule.
- The Supreme Court thus held that the trial court was correct in dismissing the suit on grounds of limitation.
- The next issue that the Court had to determine was whether the will that stood admitted in the previous suit was no longer required to be proved.
- A will must be proven according to Section 68 of the Evidence Act, even when not disputed by the opposing party, as established in Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena.
- The first appellate court incorrectly applied res judicata regarding acceptance of the will, failing to recognize that the appellants were not parties to the previous suits.
- The appellants cannot be bound by any admission or acceptance of the will made by their predecessor-in-interest in previous proceedings.
- The appellants themselves never made any admission accepting the will's validity.
- The plaintiffs' title to the disputed property could not be legally traced to Dr. Babu Ram Garg's will due to these evidentiary failings.
- The last issue that the Court considered was whether the first appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking the relief of declaration/ cancellation.
- According to Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008), when a plaintiff's title is disputed but they're in possession, they must sue for declaration of title and injunction; if not in possession, they must sue for declaration, possession, and injunction.
- Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019) reaffirmed that in suits for possession based on title, plaintiffs must prove ownership and seek a declaration of title.
- When Ramesh Chand compromised with Dr. Karam Chand, he had already transferred the property to appellants through registered sale deeds.
- The plaintiffs knew about the sale deeds but failed to bring this to the trial court's notice during the second suit.
- The compromise decrees from previous suits cannot bind the appellants, who were not parties to those proceedings.
- Since appellants objected to the will's validity, plaintiffs were legally required to prove the will according to law, which they failed to do.
- The plaintiffs gave up their cancellation claim in the trial court, and their later attempt to add a declaration prayer was rejected by the High Court.
- The first appellate court acted illegally by granting possession without there being any decree for declaration of rights or cancellation of deeds.
- The plaint was considered "incurably defective" at the appellate stage, making it impossible to grant relief to the plaintiffs.
What is the Relief of Cancellation and Limitation for the Same?
- Cancellation of Instruments is provided from Section 31 to 33 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA).
- Cancellation of instruments means the nullification of a written document which is proof of a transaction between the parties that are part of the transaction.
- If there is an instrument, which is void or voidable due to some reason and a party to such an instrument has enough reasons to believe that the said instrument if not cancelled may cause serious injury to him, then such a person can file a suit with regards to the cancellation of such instrument.
- Section 31 - When cancellation may be ordered -
- Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
- If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.
- Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (LA) provides for period of limitation for filing a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree.
- The period of limitation provided is three years.
- The time period from which the limitation will begin to run is when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him
Family Law
Talaq-e-Ahsan
25-Apr-2025
Source: Bombay High Court
Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justices Sanjay A. Deshmukh And Justices Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi has held that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 prohibits only Talaq-e-biddat (instant triple talaq) and does not bar divorce through Talaq-e-Ahsan, a valid traditional form under Islamic law.
- The Bombay High Court held this in the matter of Tanveer Ahmed Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (2025).
What was the Background of Tanveer Ahmed Patel v. State of Maharashtra (2025) Case ?
- The applicant husband and the respondent wife were married according to Muslim rites and customs on October 31, 2021, at Bhusawal, Jalgaon.
- The couple initially resided with the husband's parents at Jalgaon for approximately two weeks before relocating to Belapur, Navi Mumbai, where the husband was employed.
- From November 2021 to April 2022, the couple resided in Navi Mumbai until the respondent wife, who was pregnant, returned to her father's residence in Bhusawal.
- On April 26, 2022, the husband took the wife to a hospital in Khargar for a medical checkup, where she underwent a sonography that revealed bleeding complications.
- The wife was subsequently taken to Bhusawal by her father on 28th April, 2022, where a gynecologist advised 15 days of bed rest.
- Without consulting the applicants, the wife terminated her pregnancy based on another doctor's advice.
- On June 17, 2022, the wife and her brother were involved in an accident resulting in the wife suffering a serious head injury leading to brain hemorrhage, for which she received treatment at various hospitals until 27th December, 2022.
- The husband was transferred to Bangalore in February 2023 and took his wife with him.
- During Diwali when the husband's parents joined them in Bangalore, the wife allegedly misbehaved with them.
- The situation deteriorated when the wife allegedly threatened to commit suicide if not permitted to return to her father's house.
- Due to these irreconcilable differences, the husband pronounced Talaq-e-Ahsan (single divorce declaration) on 23rd December, 2023, in the presence of witnesses.
- The husband subsequently sent a notice of Talaq by registered post on December 28, 2023.
- Following the 90-day waiting period without cohabitation, the couple signed a Talaqnama on 24th March 2024.
- On 15th April, 2024, the wife lodged an FIR against the husband and his parents under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
- The wife alleged that her husband had pronounced an irrevocable form of divorce prohibited under the 2019 Act.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Court observed that the FIR was registered solely for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, with no allegations under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
- The Court noted that Section 4 of the said Act is restricted to offences committed by the husband only, and therefore the father-in-law and mother-in-law cannot be included in such an offence.
- The Court determined that Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code concerning common intention cannot be invoked in cases of Talaq pronouncement, as there cannot be a common intention in the pronouncement of Talaq.
- The Court examined Section 2(c) of the said Act, which defines 'Talaq' as 'Talaq-e-biddat' or any other similar form of Talaq having the effect of instantaneous or irrevocable divorce pronounced by a Muslim husband.
- The Court observed that the Act prohibits only those forms of Talaq that have both instantaneous and irrevocable effects, referencing the definition in Section 2(c).
- The Court noted that as per the FIR itself, the respondent wife acknowledged that the notice dated December 28, 2023, stated that the husband had pronounced Talaq-e-Ahsan (single pronouncement of Talaq).
- The Court recognized that witness statements also confirmed that the husband had pronounced Talaq-e-Ahsan, not Talaq-e-biddat.
- The Court referred to the charge-sheet containing a copy of the notice dated December 23, 2023, wherein the husband stated he was pronouncing Talaq-e-Ahsan as per Shariyat law.
- The Court acknowledged that the final Talaqnama was executed on March 24, 2024, after the 90-day waiting period during which there was no resumption of cohabitation or physical relations between the parties.
- The Court held that what was prohibited under the Act was Talaq-e-biddat and not Talaq-e-Ahsan, and therefore allowing the applicants to face trial would constitute an abuse of the process of law.
What is Talaq-e-Ahsan ?
- Talaq-e-Ahsan is considered the most appropriate and approved form of divorce under Islamic law.
- In Talaq-e-Ahsan, the husband pronounces a single declaration of divorce (talaq) to his wife during her period of purity (tuhr).
- Following the single pronouncement, a waiting period (iddat) of approximately 90 days or three menstrual cycles begins.
- During this waiting period, the divorce remains revocable, allowing the couple an opportunity for reconciliation.
- If the husband-and-wife resume cohabitation or physical relations during the iddat period, the divorce is effectively revoked.
- If no reconciliation occurs within the 90-day waiting period, the divorce becomes final and irrevocable upon the completion of iddat.
- The Talaq-e-Ahsan method is designed to provide a cooling-off period that encourages reconciliation between the spouses.
- Unlike Talaq-e-biddat (triple talaq), Talaq-e-Ahsan is not instantaneous and provides time for reflection and possible reunification.
- The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 does not prohibit or criminalize Talaq-e-Ahsan.
- The Bombay High Court has recognized Talaq-e-Ahsan as a valid form of divorce under Islamic law that remains legal in India.